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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ABSENCE OF RACE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: THE CASE OF 
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
by 
Gabriela Hoberman 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor 
This dissertation explores the relationship between race and 
democratization. Through the examination of the case of the Dominican 
Republic, this study challenges mainstream explanations of democratic 
transitions. At its core, this dissertation aims at calling attention to the 
absence of race and ethnic allegiances as explanatory variables of the 
democratic processes and debates in the region. 
By focusing on structural variables, the analysis shies away from elite 
and actor-centered explanations that fall short in predicting the 
developments and outcomes of transitions. The central research questions of 
this study are: Why is there an absence of the treatment of race and ethnic 
allegiances during the democratic transitions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean? How has the absence of ethnic identities affected the nature and 
depth of democratic transitions?  
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Unlike previous explanations of democratic transitions, this 
dissertation argues that the absence of race in democratic transitions has 
been a deliberate attempt to perpetuate limited citizenship by political and 
economic elites. Findings reveal a difficulty to overcome nationalist 
discourses where limited citizenship has affected the quality of democracy.  
Original field research data for the study has been gathered through semi-
structured interviews and focus groups conducted from October 2008 to 
December 2009 in the Dominican Republic. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The major purpose of this dissertation is to study the absence of race 
and ethnic identity as major issues in the political debates that characterized 
democratic transitions and how this absence affected their nature and depth. 
To analyze these questions, the dissertation will explore the nature of the 
democratization processes in the Dominican Republic (1978-1996) as well as 
the resulting profound transformations in notions of citizenship, contested 
identities, and demands for participation. The central argument of this 
dissertation is that the absence of the treatment of race during the 
democratic transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited 
definition of citizenship by political and economic elites. The dissertation will 
challenge traditional accounts of democratic transitions in the region, which 
fall short when explaining the absence of the treatment of race from the 
political discourse in the democratic transitions. Indeed, this downplaying of 
race in the democratization process has garnered little scholarly attention, 
thereby preventing a more dynamic understanding of the nature of 
democratic transitions in both the Latin American and Caribbean region and 
the Dominican Republic. 
The primary focus of the dissertation will be to offer a novel account of 
the relationship between race and democratization. By examining the 
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regional context of democratization and more precisely the Dominican case, 
the research will call attention to the deliberate deconstruction of racial 
discourses during the processes of democratization in the country. 
Specifically, the study of race—or, more accurately, the absence of race—
during the early transitions to democracies in these countries represents a 
necessary point of departure for understanding the nature of the democratic 
processes. In other words, the purpose of the dissertation is to explain the 
conspicuous absence of race in the transitions to democracy and its 
consequences into the consolidation process of the Dominican Republic.  
 
Significance and Contribution of the Study 
The study is significant for four main reasons. The dissertation first 
will critique mainstream literature on democratic transitions and the absence 
of the treatment of race in the political agenda. By examining key 
explanatory variables proposed by the literature, the central aim of this study 
is to address the conscious attempt to dismiss debates on race and ethnic 
allegiances in the framework of democratization by political and economic 
elites in the Dominican Republic. 
Second, the study seeks to develop an original theoretical framework 
from which to understand processes of democratization across regions with a 
more dynamic outlook. The study will suggest that the examination of racial 
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politics and contested identities during the early democratization process 
constituted an inescapable element of the democratic transitions. 
Third, it will examine democratization processes in the region and 
more specifically how the Dominican transition downplayed the racial 
discourse in democratization processes. In the case of the Dominican 
Republic, the African heritage has been largely denied by constructing an 
artificial myth of Indian heritage. 
Fourth, the dissertation will examine overlooked factors within the 
context of democratic transitions in the region. Although issues of ethnicity, 
racial politics and citizenship have been scrutinized since the mid-1990s, 
these components largely were excluded in examinations of early democratic 
transitions in Latin America.  
 
Reexamining Democratic Transitions in the Region 
This section examines the literature on democratic transitions as well 
as that of racial and ethnic identities. It focuses on four questions: 1) What 
have been the key explanatory factors in democratic transitions in Latin 
America and the Caribbean? 2) What line of argument has mainstream 
scholarship embraced in dealing with democratization processes? 3) How 
were racial and ethnic allegiances treated in the literature on transitions? 4) 
To what extent have structural factors been overlooked in the literature of 
democratization? 
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The salience of ethnic and racial allegiances in Latin America has 
increased significantly since the process of democratization began in the late 
1970s and resulted in a transversal upsurge of ethnic and racial conflicts 
across both developed and developing countries. However, the question of 
race and democratization in Latin America has been obscured somewhat by 
notions of class and ideology. Such experiences indicate that ethnicity and 
racial identities are powerful sources of political and social mobilization. This 
review of the literature on ethnic identity, race, and democratization aims to 
explore the more contemporary work in this field, particularly that of Yashar 
(2005) and Van Cott (2000), each of whom thoroughly discuss the salience of 
ethnic allegiances in their research on ethnic identity, citizenship, 
constitutional change, ethnic parties, and neoliberalism in the region. 
Transitions to democracy have been a growing concern among scholars 
since the late 1970s. The establishment of democratic institutions after years 
of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes remains both a challenge and an 
opportunity for democratically elected governments. The democratization 
process in Latin America and the Caribbean has sparked a great deal of 
interest in mainstream literature, with a focus on the way in which political 
opening brought a reconfiguration of political, economic, and social actors in 
the region’s dynamic. Although the countries of the region account for several 
models of transition, from authoritarian or dictatorial regimes to democratic 
ones, it is possible to encounter common threads through which unravel the 
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drivers of democratization from the late 1970s onwards. Without doubt, 
democratic transitions featured three indicators: an end to military 
governments, elimination of authoritarian processes, and the urgency to 
define the depositaries of political power. From the Southern Cone to Central 
American and Caribbean countries, these indicators were at the forefront of 
political and social struggles in the late 1970s.  
Especially in the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
several independent variables have been considered critical explanatory 
factors for the process of democratization. Among others, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), Malloy and Seligson (1987) and Linz and Stepan (1996) 
noted that political elites have been major players in the transitions to 
democracy in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Especially in the so-
called pacted democracies, the roles played by these elites have been 
underscored over other explanatory variables, such as economic development, 
level of education, class structure, regional diffusion or contagion effect, and 
party system fragmentation. This dissertation aims to unveil the gap in the 
literature by examining central questions in the process of democratization. 
By emphasizing the roles and actions of political actors in regime change, 
scholars have missed the mark in examining more structural explanatory 
factors, such as the way in which the presence or absence of ethnic and racial 
identities have affected the nature of the democratization process. 
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Mainstream literature largely has explored the nature of the 
democratic transitions of the countries in the Southern Cone, especially 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Special attention was given to the nature of 
O’Donnell’s “bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes” in Argentina and Brazil. 
Falling within O’Donnell’s categorization of “transition by defeat of military 
regime,”1
“…in these circumstances the political parties were able to 
refuse military overtures to enter into a pact. Three times the 
military made pact overtures, and three times the parties 
refused. This power relationship explains why the Argentine 
transition began with fewer agreed-upon restrictions by the 
political parties than in Brazil, Uruguay, or Chile. The parties 
did not accept an indirect presidential election as Brazilian 
parties did in 1985. The parties did not accept the exclusion of 
a major presidential candidate as they did in Uruguay. And the 
parties did not have to agree to begin government with key 
parts of the authoritarian regime’s constitution still in effect as 
they did in Chile. Argentina had the only unpacted and the 
 Argentina embarked in the early 1980s in the reconstitution of civil 
and political liberties, close civil control over the military and the redefinition 
of political parties. Examining the democratic transition in Argentina, Linz 
and Stepan note the internal division in the military after the defeat in the 
war as well as “free nature” of Argentine’s transition in comparison to that of 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay: 
                                                 
1 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 18-19. O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that every transition 
has been also the result of internal division in authoritarian regimes, especially between 
“hard-liners” and “soft-liners.” In the case of Argentina, visible opposition forces in civil 
society leveraged the “decision to open.” See O’Donnell and Schmitter, 20. 
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most classically free transition of our four South American 
cases…”2
 Brazil experienced a lengthy and constrained transition featured by 
conspicuous influence of the military and the consequences of the debt crisis.
 
 
3
Chile has been pointed out as one of the most remarkable examples of 
achieving a successful democratic transition into consolidation, especially in 
what concerns economic progress and improvement in social measures. With 
the country’s long-standing tradition of military power, Siavelis demonstrates 
that civilian control did not take hold immediately during the transition, but 
gathered momentum from the late 1990s.
  
4
The democratic story for Central American countries, in spite of 
internal disparities, has involved the culmination of long-standing civil wars, 
which at times included foreign countries and the commitment to initiate a 
peace process that would allow for new democratic and constitutional 
governments. In regard to civil control over the military, Dominguez argues 
 
                                                 
2 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 193. 
 
3 Ibid, 167-168. 
 
4 Peter Siavelis, “Chile: The End of the Unfinished Transition,” in Jorge I. Dominguez and 
Michael Shifter (eds.) Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America (3rd ed), 177-
208, 326. 
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that high levels of criminality maintain the leverage of the military in 
political power.5
At the beginning of this section I acknowledged the rise of political 
parties during the democratic transitions as the main depositaries of political 
power after the collapse of military and authoritarian regimes in the region. 
This indicator reflects a varied outcome of results in the mentioned countries. 
After experiencing an initial leverage triggered by the persistent failure of 
military governments to achieve political, economic and, social progress, 
political parties entered a deep representation crisis. Many authors have 
signaled the impact of the disappearance of three main parties, the AD 
(Democratic Action), and the COPEI (Committee of Independent Electoral 
Political Organization) in Venezuela, and the APRA (American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance) in Peru.
 
6
                                                 
5 Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (eds.) (3rd ed.), Constructing Democratic 
Governance in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 326. 
 
6 Ibid, 336. 
  
The breakdown of political parties in the region was aggravated 
further by the crisis of representation and the demands for inclusion of 
relegated groups. Since the beginning of the democratic transitions in the 
region, countries have experienced the disappearance of historical parties; 
the reconfiguration of old parties into new alliances and the creation of 
political offerings challenging traditional parties. 
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In Huntington’s groundbreaking The Third Wave, democratic 
transitions are examined in range and depth, along with causal factors and 
independent variables of the three waves of democratization. Huntington 
defines a wave of democratization as “a group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of 
time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction 
during that period of time.”7 In analyzing the independent variables that 
have included the third wave, Huntington gives special attention to the 
problems associated with the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, economic 
growth and development, changing doctrines of the Catholic Church, and 
leverage of external actors and international diffusion. Regarding the 
problem of legitimacy, Huntington considers three main variables: the fact 
that authoritarian regimes lack the capacity to overcome diminishing levels 
of political legitimacy that are usual in every regime, poor economic 
performance, and military defeats. In examining economic performance, 
Huntington acknowledges that broad economic development creates favorable 
conditions for democratization, yet the way in which wealth is created affects 
these conditions and may not contribute to democratic transitions in all 
cases.8
                                                 
7 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1993), 15. 
 
8 Ibid, 59-72. 
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Showing some contrast to conventional wisdom regarding democratic 
transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, Hagopian and Mainwaring 
assert that economic development is a poor explanation for the 
democratization processes initiated in the late 1970s.9 In fact, they argue 
that the data collected from 1946 to 1977 demonstrate that democracies with 
slightly better economic positions have been more vulnerable to regime 
breakdown. Calling attention to the regional environment underscored by the 
authors as an overlooked factor in literature, they also acknowledge the 
commitment of political elites to democratization. Hagopian and Mainwaring 
also highlight the leverage of the third wave of democratization that, for the 
purpose of examining Latin America and the Caribbean, began in 1978. Over 
the course of that wave, not only was the duration of these transitions 
significantly longer (from 1978 to 1992) but the number of cases also 
increased dramatically (from three in 1977 to eighteen in 1991).10
In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter 
define a transition as “the interval between one political regime and 
another.”
  
11
                                                 
9 Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring, The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin 
America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14. 
 
10 Ibid, 19. 
 
11 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6. 
 
 In keeping with their original intent to distinguish between 
liberalization and democratization, the authors focus on the problem of 
11 
 
legitimacy within the regime. Their well-known concepts relative to hard-
liners and soft-liners and their roles within authoritarian regimes often have 
been considered critical in transitions to democracy in the region. In fact, the 
authors attribute a great deal of the breakdown of democratic regimes to the 
increasing cleavages between political hard-liners and soft-liners.12  
Nevertheless, the core of their argument emphasizes the role of elites in 
negotiating pacts13
                                                 
12 Ibid, 19. 
 
13 O’Donnell and Schmitter’s classic definition of pact revolves around the idea of “an explicit, 
but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which 
seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of 
mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.’’ In O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 37. 
 for the transition to take place. Although they 
acknowledge the mobilization of civil society during the transition, they 
underscore the fact that most transitions occur in a top-down fashion. 
Therefore, structural factors such as ethnic identities, class structure, and 
race are left behind from the analysis as secondary factors.  
In analyzing Bolivia’s democratic transition, Malloy and Gamarra also 
rely on the role played by the elites, the inability of the military to ensure a 
more gradual transition, and the spread of social and political actors after 
decades of neopatrimonialism. However, among other authors, they 
acknowledge the fact that Bolivia’s democratic transition was related to prior 
reformist strategies aimed at including diverse sectors of the population 
(1988: 206). 
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Linz and Stepan’s Problems of Democratic Transitions and 
Consolidation examines extensively the circumstances and critical actors 
during the transitions, as well as the conditions to be met in order for 
democratic consolidation to take place. In this seminal volume, they focus on 
transitions and consolidations in Southern Europe, South America, and post-
Communist Europe. By reexamining the explanatory variables that have 
been placed at the forefront to explain regime change, they conclude that 
although pacted transitions have provided much of the rule in transitions, 
differences can be found between authoritarian and totalitarian/sultanistic 
regimes. They emphasize that in the latter cases, the possibility of 
negotiation through pacts is minimized due to the constraints inherent in the 
political space.14
                                                 
14 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 52-54. 
 
 Considering O’Donnell’s explanation of the impact of 
military defeat in provoking a transition to democracy, Linz and Stepan are 
reluctant to assume that this is a necessary condition. According to the 
authors, if such military defeat is not accompanied by a strong international 
commitment to establish democratic institutions, then it is unlikely that 
democratization will occur. Linz and Stepan take into consideration five 
critical variables that have influenced transitions to democracy. Among 
others, they discuss the question of “stateness,” the nature of the previous 
regime (authoritarian, totalitarian, sultanistic, democratic, and post-
13 
 
totalitarian); the previous leadership in nondemocratic regimes and 
international influences.15
Diamond examines the drivers of democratization by looking at some 
of the mainstream variables of transitions including economic development, 
economic performance, and international pressure. Diamond agrees with 
Huntington that economic development has been a major driver of 
democratization.
 Linz and Stepan focus primarily on institutional 
variables, avoiding the examination of more structural dimensions, such as 
the way in which race and ethnic allegiances may have affected the nature of 
these transitions. 
16 Yet, Diamond considers that increases in national wealth 
are not an exclusive condition for generating a transition to democracy; 
rather, the transversal conditions generated by increases in national wealth 
play a determinant role in the path toward democratization. Among others, a 
few conditions stand out, such as higher levels of education, and a stable 
middle class that is autonomous from the state and active civil society.17
                                                 
15 Linz and Stepan, xiv-xv. 
 
16 Larry Diamond. “Universal Democracy?” Policy Review Online, (June-July 2003), No. 119, 
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3448571.html>  
 
17 Ibid 
 For 
Diamond, then, economic development must sweep over the economic 
dimension, namely the social and cultural dimension, to ensure successful 
pressure toward democratization. Diamond distinguishes between economic 
development and economic performance, pointing out that authoritarian 
14 
 
regimes have relied too often on successful economic performance to justify 
their rule. Whenever economic performance fails to meet the expectations of 
the citizens, its support tends to decline, and pressures for regime change 
eventually become apparent. 
Although with some minor variations, the literature review suggests 
that conventional explanations were employed to examine democratic 
transitions in Latin America, among which some variables need to be 
considered: the role and commitment of political elites for democracy; 
economic development and performance; military defeat; the relationship 
between higher levels of education and the middle and urban classes; 
legitimacy issues and regional environment. If these explanations are 
considered comprehensive, then it appears the issues of race and ethnicity 
have been overlooked completely if not discarded from the analysis. Whether 
explaining why or how race was not a factor during transitions, or whether it 
is suggested that race was a means through which to establish a new concept 
of “nation” to fight a common authoritarian regime, it is noteworthy how the 
literature has avoided this pivotal issue. 
Considering that it is at least questionable to speak of homogenous 
processes of democratization in the region, the literature reveals that a 
discussion of ethnic allegiances and race in the drawing of new citizenship 
approaches was dismissed by political and economic elites in the early 
transition period. As I have stated above, this discussion took place since the 
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1990s and was accompanied by the delineation of new constitutional reforms, 
decentralization and the introduction of representation quotas for ethnic 
minorities. 
Finally, as an Argentine national I have experienced firsthand the 
military process in my country and the return to democracy in 1983 after the 
disastrous experience of the Falklands War with Great Britain in 1982. With 
the aim of contributing to the literature on democratization beyond the South 
American experience, this dissertation is geared toward the examination of 
transitions in the Caribbean to test whether or not similar explanations hold 
true. More specifically, considering that the democratization theme has been 
of utmost importance in the region, it is striking that ethnic and racial 
allegiances were omitted from the negotiation processes that took place 
during the early transitions. The following section will examine the 
democratization process in the Dominican Republic. 
 
The Case of the Dominican Republic 
The Dominican case is an extraordinary example to extrapolate the 
regional approach to democratization in the late 1970s and test whether or 
not the same logic applies to the first example of democratic transition in the 
Latin American and Caribbean region.  
I have previously stated the central argument of this dissertation as 
the existence of a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited definition of 
16 
 
citizenship by political and economic elites by avoiding the treatment of race 
during the democratic transitions. In so doing, the Dominican case represents 
one of the most appealing cases in the region to investigate, considering the 
leverage of race and ethnic allegiances in Dominican society as well as in its 
construction of nation and citizenship. One need not look further to grasp the 
consequences of the island’s colonial history, the twenty-two years of Haitian 
occupation of the Dominican Republic and the fact that Dominican 
independence was going to be achieved not from a foreign colonial power, but 
from its neighbor Haiti. These three periods in time represent a sound 
indicator of the way in which race, class, ethnicity, nation, and citizenship 
became conflated in the reality of the island of Hispaniola.   
Among the three common indicators found in Latin American and 
Caribbean transitions I mentioned the need to halt military regimes, the 
elimination of authoritarian processes, and the urgency to define the 
repositories of political power. The Dominican Republic in the late 1970s was 
undergoing the third uninterrupted term of Joaquin Balaguer, following 
earlier fraudulent elections that prevented any other party, particularly the 
PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party), from attaining the presidency. The 
PRD in fact, refrained from participating in presidential elections in 1970 
and 1974 because it claimed the elections would be rigged.  
Although this dissertation deals with the Dominican democratic 
transition in depth in the following sections, it needs to be acknowledged 
17 
 
from the outset that the country did not experience a clear “pacted 
democracy” or a “democratic transition by collapse” as had been the case in 
Bolivia and Argentina. It is important to note that in the Dominican case, 
different political, economic, and social agents contributed to exert pressure 
on the political system to democratize. Internal demands met then with 
international intervention that prevented a new fraudulent election by the 
Balaguer regime. Nevertheless, the transition was not free of obstacles. The 
reluctance of the old regime -incarnated in the figure of Joaquin Balaguer- to 
transfer political power was being made clear when military forces entered 
the Central Electoral Headquarters and took possession of the ballot boxes 
corresponding to the National District.18
After almost two weeks of back and forth movements, the final vote 
count revealed that Balaguer was defeated by the PRD’s candidate Antonio 
Guzman by approximately 150,000 votes.
 What followed this event was a 
complicated chain of events that included international pressure to continue 
the vote count; strong discourses by presidential candidate Antonio Guzman 
to engage the United States in Dominican affairs; and wide coverage by the 
world press to account for the challenges to democratize the Dominican 
Republic.  
19
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 Yet, it is important to point out 
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how Balaguer was able to impose conditions on his exit by maintaining a 
strong hold of the Senate. 
In a sense, the Dominican transition constituted an effort to 
democratize that shown the holistic nature, as well as the complexity, of the 
democratic process. It involved certain tacit agreements among different 
groups to put an end to Balaguer’s authoritarian regime. At the same time, it 
represented the profound will of Dominican society to eliminate 
authoritarianism in the country, as well as all remains of military power in 
politics dating back to the Trujillo era. Finally, it engaged civil society in 
political participation by supporting the PRD as the party that would convey 
and articulate society’s interests, expectations and demands from the bottom 
up. 
 
A New Approach to Democratization 
The literature on democratization evolved during the 1990s to a more 
concise focus on constitutional reforms, decentralization processes to 
empower local groups, and the inclusion of representation quotas for ethnic 
minorities. This literature approached democratization from the lens of the 
multidimensional spaces provided by political openings for historically 
oppressed populations, especially indigenous people. Hence, new definitions 
of citizenship were explored and novel variables considered in a more 
nuanced analysis of democratization processes in the region. Yet, these 
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approaches were not followed through by mainstream literature and 
represented isolated efforts to grasp the nature of regime change in Latin 
America and Caribbean countries.  
As noted above, few authors have touched upon the issues of race and 
ethnic allegiances along the path to democratization. Hartlyn’s discussion of 
the Dominican Republic’s political experience yields a nuanced analysis of 
neo-patrimonialism, a multidimensional approach to transition and 
consolidation, and a rejection of culturalist explanations (such as Wiarda’s 
Spanish colonial legacy) and imperialist arguments. In The Struggle for 
Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic Hartlyn constructs his case in 
such a way that historical and cultural factors underlying the country’s 
experience intermingle with political and institutional factors that have 
shaped the transition period. Hartlyn does a remarkable job of comparing 
three transitions that occurred in the Dominican Republic: the 1961-62 
transition (the collapse of the Trujillo regime), the 1965-66 transition 
(military intervention), and the 1978 transition.20
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 He identifies that among 
the three transitions, the one that occurred in 1978 presented the most 
suitable conditions for a transition to democracy. Although he places much of 
the emphasis on a transition negotiated from above by political elites with 
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ample guarantees for the departing ruler, he also considers other variables 
that interact with this framework.  
Interestingly, Hartlyn rejects the argument that the Dominican 
Republic initiated the transition in response to higher levels of 
modernization, education, a more urban population, and a more robust 
middle class. He argues that the atmosphere in 1978 presented the best 
conditions for the transition in three main realms: the nature of the prior 
authoritarian regime, the international context, and the way in which the 
transition took place.21 Hartlyn emphasizes the leverage associated with the 
nature of Balaguer’s regime, in which an inchoate institutionalization was 
present in society that allowed for some level of involvement by political and 
social actors.22 The international context also appeared more propitious for 
democratic support in the region, where the United States favored a pro-
democratic and human rights-oriented agenda. According to Hartlyn, in 
contrast to more repressive and restrictive regimes, neo-patrimonialism also 
played a role in leading to the democratic transition since the prior regime 
exhibited some tolerance regarding political opponents.23
Van Cott explores constitutional transformations in Latin America. By 
not focusing exclusively on regime change (from authoritarian to democratic 
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regimes), she explores societal and institutional changes that have been 
direct consequences of democratic transitions. These transformations, which 
occurred due to a combination of legitimacy crises, broader participation, and 
social mobilization, allowed for better inclusion of indigenous populations and 
ethnic minorities.24 In analyzing the constitutional reforms that took place in 
the region during the late 1990s, Van Cott delineates the features of 
exclusionary regimes in Latin America rooted in the colonial experience. By 
acknowledging the leverage of a racial and class-based society in the period of 
colonial domination, she asserts that “national identities” were constructed 
by the dissolution of ethnic allegiances, which forced assimilation into a 
racial construction of ethnic superiority.25 In analyzing constitutional 
transformation in Latin America, specifically in Bolivia and Colombia, Van 
Cott examines in depth the notions of state, citizenship, ethnicity, and racial 
construction as prior legacies to the democratization period. She develops a 
path-dependent historical account in which multicultural constitutions 
should serve the purpose of laying the foundations of an intercultural 
dialogue.26
                                                 
24 Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 4-10. 
 
25 Ibid, 2-3. 
 
26 Ibid, 279. 
 
 
22 
 
Yashar (2005) also investigates the redefinition of citizenship in the 
process of democratization. She argues that “unprecedented indigenous 
movements emerged throughout the Americas.”27 Following the rebirth of 
ethnic allegiances, demands for neglected rights, mechanisms of inclusion, 
and wide and open participation in public agendas have become paradigms of 
every ethnic movement in Latin America. Yashar does not contest the idea 
that this development was more palpable in countries in which the ethnic 
makeup of the population was significantly important, such as Bolivia and 
Guatemala. Indeed, she argues that contemporary indigenous struggle is 
linked to the understanding of citizenship in a context of multiculturalism.28
The redefinition of citizenship boundaries emerged through the quest 
for a more participatory democracy in the region, the basis for the 
construction of which revolved around certain factors that deserve more 
attention—namely, the fairness of institution; the acceptance of different 
forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; and the citizenry 
working together in order to participate in political processes “to promote 
public good and hold political authorities accountable.”
 
29
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29 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 175. 
 Yet, the question of 
race and democratization remains somewhat obscured in the analysis. What 
was the leverage of race in the democratic process? How did it translate in a 
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determinant source of mobilization in the post-democratic period? Why and 
with what specific purposes were racial and ethnic allegiances displaced in 
the political discourse during the democratic transitions? 
 
Racial and Ethnic Allegiances 
Ethnicity has been defined in many ways, emphasizing the primordial 
nature (asserting that ethnic allegiances are fixed relationships in which 
rational elements of ethnic loyalties were disregarded in favor of 
emotional/psychological attachments of kinship and common ancestry), 
looking at the constructed and situational character of ethnic allegiances, or 
examining the instrumental feature of ethnic identities, in which ethnicity 
results from the “efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols 
in order to obtain access to social, political and material resources.”30
“…a type of cultural collectivity, one that 
emphasizes the role of myths of descent and 
historical memories, and that is recognized by 
one or more cultural differences like religion, 
customs, language or institutions. Such 
collectivities are doubly ‘historical’ in the sense 
that not only are historical memories essential to 
their continuance but each such ethnic group is 
the product of specific historical forces and is 
 Indeed, 
Smith’s definition of ethnicity presents a good conflation between 
primordialism and constructivism in which an ethnic group is:  
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therefore subject to historical change and 
dissolution…”31
Meanwhile, Van Cott (2006) argues that challenges for traditional 
political parties during the 1990s allowed for the rise of ethnic-based social 
movements in Latin America. Looking specifically to the Andean countries, 
Van Cott addresses the debate between race/ethnic identities and the quality 
of democracy in the region by acknowledging the crisis of representation 
shown in the limitation of political parties in providing meaningful 
mechanisms of inclusion and citizenship to non-elite groups.
 
 
32 In dealing with 
democratic transitions, Van Cott claims that the literature on regime 
transitions and consolidations inadequately explains the poor and uneven 
quality of democracy.33
Glazer and Moynihan emphasize the increasing significance of group 
distinctiveness and identity. Their hypothesis suggests that ethnic groups 
bring different norms to bear on similar contexts with different levels of 
success.
 
34
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 The authors emphasize the group differences in status. 
Furthermore, they contest the assertion that ethnicity becomes only a means 
of advancing interests, insisting that ethnic allegiances involve “more than 
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interests,” thereby becoming more salient than class.35 Yet, Glazer and 
Moynihan shy away from a strict primordialist viewpoint as they consider 
that the degree of ethnic allegiance may vary due to “accidental 
circumstances” that are the product of rapid changes and shifting identities.36
Isaacs, on the other hand, ascribes to a more primordial approach to 
ethnic identities in which the making of a group identity involves body image, 
basic ties, language, and common descent. Isaacs defines basic group identity 
as “the set of endowments and identifications which every individual shares 
with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which 
he is born at that given time in that given place.”
  
37
Howard argues that—although race, class and color have often have 
been conflated in the Caribbean—the Dominican society has two distinct 
stratification concepts. Class is a construction much easier to define—
namely, as “a status negotiated between economic attainment and social 
standing”
  
38
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 —whereas race is a more multifaceted phenomenon. Howard 
suggests that phenotypical differences serve as important social markers. 
Particularly in the case of the Caribbean, color represents the prevailing 
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characteristic of phenotypical differences, becoming conflated with the social 
world, in which phenotypical differences usually correlate with levels of 
economic status and social mobility.39 In the Dominican Republic, elites seem 
to reflect this conflation among race, color, and class, as elites tend to have 
lighter skin while darker-skinned Dominicans tend to have lower levels of 
social mobility. Howard underscores the fact that Dominicans largely have 
favored their Indian and European heritages instead of their African roots. In 
denying their African heritage, the majority of the Dominican population 
have rejected the term mulatto, preferring the term indio instead.40
Other authors dealing with the evolution of the concept of race 
including Wade (1997), argue that racial categories, -understood within 
“definable physical characteristics” with notions of superiority of some races 
over the others-, are socially constructed, and respond to historical processes 
entrenched in the European colonization of foreign territories.
  
41
In his groundbreaking volume on ethnic groups in conflict, Horowitz 
explores the meaning of ethnic allegiances, ethnicity, and group identity. He 
analyzes the basic markers of ethnicity and race, including color, language, 
and common descent and name attributes.
  
42
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 Accepting the fact that these 
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markers take place in a fluid context, he argues that ethnicity prevails over 
class, asserting that the ideological factor present in ethnic parties favors 
loyalty in a much more mobilizing way than class does.43
Following the same line of argument as Howard, Sagas argues that 
racism is an inseparable element of Dominican society, reflecting a conflation 
between race and social status.
  
44 Sagas acknowledges the unofficial racism 
toward the dark-skinned population in the Dominican Republic’s immediate 
neighbor, Haiti (a nation in which blacks comprise up 95 percent of the 
population). Dominican elites utilized this antihaitianism to their advantage 
while using racial prejudices to halt the threats of disadvantaged groups in 
the Dominican Republic.45
Meanwhile, Thompson (2007) suggests that Bolivia’s political vacuum 
stemming from a decline of political parties and organized trade union 
movements signaled the rise of ethnic forces with a distinctive radical ethnic 
discourse since the rise of Morales. In his analysis, Thompson emphasizes the 
 The ideology of racism and antihaitianism 
presents Haitians as an undesirable and barbaric population. Interestingly, 
Sagas shows how antihaitianism was imposed from above, having been built 
upon national–cultural prejudices. 
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Indian discourse for self-determination rather than the class-oriented 
discourse that has prevailed since the 1950s. In addition, Cusicanqui 
(1986)—a scholar of multiculturalism—argues that the neoliberalism of the 
1990s eroded the basis of indigenous crafts and goods and this favored the 
upsurge of ethnic demands in Bolivia. Cusicanqui considers the katarista 
movement of the Altiplano to be the expression of the failure of the MNR 
homogenizing project of the 1950s. In this context, the social forces that 
emerged from the ill-conceived national project—which rejected 
cultural/social/ethnic heterogeneity in favor of a copycat model of Western 
societies—challenged the Bolivian political elites. 
Perhaps the most famous scholar in distinguishing terms such as 
nation, state, and ethnonationalism is Walker Connor. In Ethnonationalism: 
The Quest for Understanding,46 Connor delineates the main features for 
understanding ethnicity as an emotionally and psychologically non-rational 
element that builds its power on the endogenous perceptions of a determined 
group of individuals. In his analysis, Connor emphasizes the way in which 
scholars missed the mark on the leverage of ethnicity, fueled by a 
misunderstanding of terms such as nation, state, and ethnicity.47
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purports that the modernization process emphasized differences while 
strengthening existing ethnic cleavages.  
Hartlyn analyzes the nature of democratic politics and 
neopatrimonialism in the Dominican Republic.48 He deals with the 
independent leverage of political factors in the success or failure of the 
Dominican Republic’s democratic transition by looking specifically at the 
factors that have constrained its consolidation. The new framework 
developed by Hartlyn rejects other culturalist (Wiarda, 1979) and economic 
explanations for the failure of democratic consolidation in the country. 
Hartlyn extensively develops the notion of neopatrimonialism as a feature of 
Dominican politics. He concludes noting the difficulties with which 
neopatrimonialism and democracy can coexist, often leading to either hybrid 
or unconsolidated regimes.49
Looking at the case of Bolivia, Cardenas (2007) argues that the rise of 
ethnic identities, ultimately has replaced one type of exclusionary system 
with another exclusionary system. In analyzing Bolivia’s reality, he claims 
that indigenous and communitarianism do not belong to the Bolivian vision 
of nation; rather, society and state are manipulated to install a sectarian 
ideological system. By examining the three main approaches to ethnic 
identities—indigenismo, indianismo, and katarismo—he analyzes Morales’ 
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current administration as one in which the indigenous are overvalued, 
serving to create a symbolic and cultural form of domination from an 
ethnocentric and Aymara vision. Other scholars on Bolivia, such as Jorge 
Lazarte (2007), delve in the different meanings assigned to multiculturalism 
and plurinationalism. Looking at contemporary Bolivia, Lazarte contends 
that the current consensus on ethnic diversity that has existed since the 
1960s is being challenged by an excess of post-national differentialism in 
which “what is different” is being privileged. This leads to an important point 
of confusion as ethnicities become conflated with nations, thereby favoring 
the rise of ethnic, regional, and territorial cleavages.  
31 
 
In studying ethnicity and race in Latin America, it becomes difficult to 
clearly define terms that seem to have overlapping features. In unveiling the 
differences between racial and ethnic identifications Wade notes that in a 
general level, racial identities are constructed over phenotypes for the 
purpose of categorization and at the same time they are transmitted “through 
the blood,” while ethnicity that involves a cultural construction of belonging, 
is also transmitted from generations being the ancestral origin of great 
importance.50
Although some confusion still exists, scholars agree that conventional 
treatments of ethnicity underscore a common descent, a common history, and 
cultural practices believed to represent the central features of a group’s 
identity. Avoiding engaging in a discussion of whether primordialism, 
instrumentalism, or constructivism constitute a better framework in which to 
approach ethnicity, this dissertation aims to provide a clear distinction 
among these three different viewpoints while examining ethnic allegiances. 
Although primordialism emphasizes features such as common descent, 
language, common history and—varying according to scholars—certain 
physical characteristics from birth, instrumentalism underscores the 
artificial construct of ethnic identities, in which ethnic allegiances are fluid 
 One of problem with ethnicity is that it has been defined in 
multiple ways, sometimes being confused with terms such as race, nation, 
and nationalism, among others. 
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and influenced by the historical, economic, and social processes in which they 
exist.51
The question of race involves trickier and more sensitive issues. Many 
scholars have suggested that, in contraposition to ethnic allegiances, race is 
frequently defined in opposition to other groups. Eriksen notes that authors 
such as Michael Banton claim that “ethnicity is generally more concerned 
with the identification of ‘us,’ while racism is more oriented to the 
categorization of ‘them’.”
 
52
Contemporary scholars agree that “there are no essential races.”
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 In 
other words, in the case of Latin America, racial categories are constructed 
over cultural and physical features of the individuals who belong to/identify 
with a certain group. In the Latin American and Caribbean context, state 
policies not only emphasized the superiority of a group’s blood, but use 
elements such as occupation, language, and dress to serve as markers of 
determined racial categorizations. Following the lead of Appelbaum, 
Macpherson, and Rosemblatt, this study will posit that national identities in 
the region often have been constructed in racial terms, a process in which 
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“diverse actors have ignored, expressed, appropriated, and transformed racial 
difference.”54
Moving away from the eighteenth-century definition of race by Johann 
F. Blumenbach (who divided humanity into five distinct varieties), the 
combination of democratization forces and modernization have brought into 
question the validity of biologically determinist theories to explaining human 
differences. A new understanding of race speaks to a more fluid, malleable, 
and flexible perception of racial identities. Although racial categories still 
rely a great deal on “attributes grounded in biological differences,”
 
55
Other views of race and ethnicity in Latin America acknowledge a 
contradictory relationship between homogeneity and diversity. By looking at 
the process of mestizaje, Wade points out two main characteristics: the 
importance of mestizaje as a democratic process aimed at racial harmony and 
mestizaje as a racist discourse in which whitening is the expression of 
 they are 
not by any means the sole expression of racial categorization in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The distinction between the “scientific racism” of 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and “cultural racism” 
also has been a major debate among scholars of race and ethnicity in the 
region.  
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progress. In addition, Wade notes that the idea of mestizaje in this context 
implies “sameness and hierarchical difference.”56 As mentioned previously, 
the question of race persists as a means to differentiate one group from 
another. Although the self-definition of racial categories begins with 
identification within the group, it reinforces their power by distinguishing 
one from external groups.57
Theoretical Perspective 
  
Looking specifically at racial categories in the Andes, Chambers (2003) 
argues that—although racial ideologies have allowed for some diversity—
they underscore the cleavage between indigenous and Spanish cultures, 
considering the former as backward and uncivilized. Interestingly, contrary 
to other places, miscegenation allowed for a variety of racial categories that 
blurred the initial race distinction between indigenous and Spanish cultures, 
from among which new categories such as mulattos, zambos, moriscos, and 
mestizos emerged (Chambers, 2003).  
 
Democratic transitions lie at the core of Latin American literature. The 
wealth of attention that issues of democratization and democratic transitions 
have garnered since the third wave has surpassed all other topics of attention 
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in mainstream political science. Despite many factors underscored as critical 
for democratic transitions, the racial component often has been neglected and 
dismissed from analyses on transitions.  
Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2000) focus on the relationship between 
ethnic identities, race, citizenship and democratization in Latin America. 
They argue that notions of citizenship, parties, and ethnic identities are 
intertwined. Yashar underscores that citizenship and ethnic narratives were 
tied to ancient practices of exclusion, vis-à-vis the state and within ethnic 
groups. Her focus is more on identity politics and citizenship regimes in the 
context of democratization and less on the effects of the racial rhetoric during 
the democratic process.58
Huntington challenges modernization theory by noting that not always 
social modernization leads to political modernization. He argues that this 
argument is true for developing countries where indicators such as 
urbanization, literacy, income and industrialization did increased 
significantly, but where political modernization -understood in terms of 
political stability, democracy and integration- did not occur.
  
59
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notes that two elements proved critical in political modernization in 
developing countries, the notions of mobilization and participation.60
This study builds upon the literature on democratic transitions as well 
as on race, ethnic identities, and multiculturalism. With the aim of 
introducing new interpretations of the usually neglected relationship between 
race and democratization, this study will broaden the understanding of 
democratic processes in the region.  
    
Other authors, such as Smith (1991), Glazer and Moynihan (1975), and 
Horowitz (2000) explored the notion of race and ethnicity along historical and 
symbolic-cultural dynamics. Svampa focused on the effect of neoliberal 
reforms brought by the democratic transitions on ethnic identities. Arguing 
that the “market” was at the forefront of social relations becoming the hinge 
upon which inclusive mechanisms were put in place, indigenous communities 
were the most affected by this mechanism preventing their citizenship 
discourses to succeed (Svampa 2005). Along this same line of reasoning, 
Hartlyn (1998), Malloy (1988), and Sagas (2000) noted the clouded 
relationship between neopatrimonialism, race and democracy in the region. 
The proposed research tackles the relative absence of race from the 
political discourse during democratic transitions. The racial rhetoric clouded 
by many other cleavages, including class and ideology, played a role in the 
democratization process and many of its outcomes. 
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The dissertation will consist of five chapters and the conclusions. The 
first chapter of this dissertation lays out the central argument of this study 
stating that the conspicuous absence of race during the democratic 
transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited definition of 
citizenship by political and economic elites. It also examines mainstream 
scholarly work on democratic transitions and race in the region and identifies 
the model upon which this relationship will be examined. The second chapter 
investigates the colonial legacy of the island of Hispaniola, calling attention 
to the Haitian revolution and the Dominican independence. The section also 
deals with economic challenges in the island as well as the initial process of 
state formation. The third part analyzes the legacy of Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo, the path to democracy, and the race factor in the democratic 
transition. The fourth section examines the unobserved link of race and 
migration and the consequences of the absence of the treatment of race 
during the transition. More specifically, this section deals with racial 
prejudice and nationality in the Dominican Republic. The fifth section 
investigates political implications of race including strategic culture in both 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti, construction of political representation, 
and public perceptions of Haitian nationals.  
As an alternative to other explanations of democratic transitions, this 
dissertation will examine the way in which the racial discourse was absent in 
the Dominican Republic during the early process of democratization, when a 
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profound impact on the nature of these processes was palpable and facilitated 
the resurgence of ethnicity and race from the 1990s onwards. This approach 
also will suggest that race has been framed differently in the region, as 
shown in the aforementioned cases—whether as an internal construction of 
“the other” (i.e., Bolivia) or as an “external” construction (i.e., the Dominican 
Republic). 
 
Research Questions and Assumptions 
The specific research questions that will be proposed in this study are: 
(1) How and why was race absent from the political discourse of the 
democratization process in the Dominican Republic? (2) How did the absence 
of the ethnic issue during the early stages of the transitions affect the nature 
and depth of the democratization process? The second question entails a 
much broader understanding of the relationship between race and 
democratization and aims to unveil unobserved implications of transitions in 
the region. 
Based on these questions, the following assumptions will be postulated: 
Assumption 1: Race was considered a dividing factor among groups 
united to fight a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early 
democratic transitions. 
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Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were clouded by ideologies and 
class cleavages that perceived the racial question as a factor that 
would disappear as countries became more democratic. 
Assumption 3: Democratization as spearheaded by the middle class 
political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a 
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e. 
through parties and not through race, class, or ethnicity. 
Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship 
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new 
democratic definition of citizenship. 
 
Methodology  
Design and instrumentation  
This dissertation combines both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques in examining the case study of the Dominican Republic. 
Qualitative data for this dissertation will be gathered through semi-
structured interviews with government officials, intellectuals, analysts and 
scholars as well as through focus groups, scholarly journals, books, and 
newspaper articles. Survey data also will be available for in-depth analysis. 
Original sources, including the Iberobarometro, Latinobarometro, and the 
Barometer of the Americas will be available for data analysis. Fieldwork will 
be conducted in different sites of the Dominican Republic.   
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In regard to research design, this dissertation will follow Pzeworski 
and Teune’s most-different research design, in which similar outcomes are 
observed in the dependent variable (democratization) but different values are 
encountered on a varied range of independent variables, therefore, 
considering only those independent variables with similar values as possible 
explanatory factors (Pzeworski and Teune, 1970; Smith, 1995). 
The case of the Dominican Republic has been chosen due to the 
conspicuous absence of the treatment of race during its incipient democratic 
transition. This absence is particularly notorious in a country where race has 
been a critical element in its historical development. In the case of the 
Dominican Republic, the construction of race is intrinsically related to the 
conformation of “dominicanness” vis-à-vis the influence/heritage of African 
descent. 
The case of the Dominican Republic shows a longstanding intertwined 
relationship of race and class, both determinants of social and economic 
structure. These conditions—highly visible before the democratic 
transitions—have occupied a secondary place since the beginning of the 
democratization process in the region. The Dominican Republic initiated its 
transition in 1978 with the victory of the PRD over the twelve-year 
incumbent Joaquin Balaguer. This transition to democracy has been 
underscored as a “missed opportunity” for democracy (Hartlyn 1988). 
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The comparison of the Dominican and Bolivian cases is expected to be 
part of a broader research on race and democratization and will not be 
pursued in this dissertation. This future study is aimed at comparing the 
process of democratization through the lens of race and ethnicity, or put 
differently, through the absence of this issue in two countries certainly 
featured by the conflation of race, ethnicity, nation and citizenship. Three 
main factors have been determinant in relying on the Dominican case and 
temporarily putting on hold the Bolivian case. First, the challenges in 
obtaining necessary funding to carry out field research in both countries 
made it practically impossible to consider both cases for this dissertation. 
Second, the richness and deepness of the Dominican case merited a single 
case study, while postponing the comparative case with Bolivia for a second 
phase of research. Finally, there was the drive to move beyond the South 
American experience on democratization -highly featured by preexisting 
hierarchical military regimes- to the transitions in the Caribbean to test 
whether similar explanatory variables could be applied to the mentioned sub-
regions. 
Prior to the democratic transitions, both countries experienced what 
has been called neo-patrimonialism (Gamarra and Malloy 1988), which led to 
the reconfiguration of the state, networks of patronage with important 
leverage on subsequent democratic transitions, and problems encountered in 
the post-transition period. 
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Data analysis 
Secondary data analysis for this dissertation will be conducted using 
SPSS Windows 17.0 statistical software. This analysis also will rely on a 
regular set of trackings and surveys on the Dominican Republic, as well as 
sophisticated focus groups and surveys that will allow testing of this original 
approach in a valid and reliable manner.   
The study aims to shed light on the impact of racial politics on 
democratic transitions as a long-standing overlooked element in the process 
of democratization. To achieve this goal, the study will offer an original 
approach to understanding third-wave democratic transitions from a 
different angle, developing a multidimensional analysis built upon the 
Dominican experience. This approach will unfold in the fifth section of the 
dissertation, in which the assumptions put forth in the theoretical 
background will be examined.   
 
Plan of the Study 
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that the main argument of 
this dissertation was that the absence of the treatment of race during the 
democratic transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited 
definition of citizenship by political and economic elites. 
The research questions proposed in the study are: 
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(1) How and why was race absent from the political discourse of the 
democratization process in the Dominican Republic? 
(2) How did the absence of the racial and ethnic issue during the early 
stages of the transitions affect the nature and depth of the democratization 
process in the country? 
 
In addition to that, a plan of the dissertation is explained below: 
The introductory chapter will provide an extensive review of the 
literature on race and democratization. This conceptual review is aimed at 
pointing out how race and ethnic allegiances have been either dismissed or 
overlooked from the literature on transitions. The chapter examines the 
literature on transitions as well as its main explanatory variables at the 
regional level before addressing the Dominican case. By giving special 
attention to the literature on race, ethnic identities, and democratic 
transitions, this dissertation aims to explain why and how racial identities 
did not represent a factor of the political agenda and discourse during the 
democratization process. Indeed, this study is geared toward examining how 
the question of race shaped many of the outcomes of the mentioned 
transitions. The chapter addresses multiculturalism approaches, culturalist 
explanations, and neo-patrimonial approaches to the case of the Dominican 
Republic. 
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The second chapter provides an analysis of the history of the island of 
Hispaniola. It assesses the consequences of the Haitian revolution as well as 
the Dominican independence. By looking at the politics of race after 
independence, this chapter will take a close look to the economic challenges 
faced by the Dominican Republic in the incipient state formation process. 
Chapter three is aimed at unveiling the legacies of the long-time 
dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. During this regime, the country 
embarked on the construction of the modern state in terms of political, 
economic, and social progress. This section also will look to the intellectual 
construction of antihaitian prejudice in the Dominican Republic and the 
legacy in contemporary politics. The chapter utilizes a multidimensional 
approach to analyze the politics of race in the aftermath of the downfall of the 
Trujillo regime, the convoluted quest for democracy, and the struggle of the 
PRD to achieve the Dominican presidency. Special attention will be given to 
the Dominican Republic’s democratic transition of 1978. Analyzing the 
literature on racial politics in the Dominican Republic, this dissertation will 
provide evidence that race—usually clouded by the notion of class—has 
prevailed in the reinforcement of the concept of nation, thereby influencing 
the outcomes of the democratic process. By assessing the main approaches in 
ethnic identities—namely primordialism, instrumentalism, and 
constructivism—this dissertation focuses on the election of 1996, in which 
racial politics reached the highest point in Dominican history.  
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The fourth chapter assesses the linkage between race and migration. It 
delves into the historic development of migration in the island of Hispaniola, 
and how race, migration and nationality are conflated in the Dominican 
reality. More specifically, the chapter aims at identifying the consequences of 
the absence of the treatment of race during the initial democratic transition. 
In so doing, uncontrolled migration has been one of the most important 
consequences of the political agenda of the late 1970s. Here, the chapter 
analyzes the constitutional debate on jus solis and jus sanguinis as markers 
of nationality. 
Chapter five examines the political implications of race, assessing how 
the Dominican Republic case study addresses the assumption and eventually 
respond to the proposed research questions. The underlined logic of the use of 
case studies is to provide a good description, which, is necessary especially in 
sciences where explanatory power is weak. Therefore, it is assumed that a 
good description is necessarily related to a good explanation.61
                                                 
61 Gary King, Robert A. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 44. 
 Special 
attention will be given to data from in-depth interviews, focus groups, 
surveys and public opinion research done in the country. This section outlines 
the assumptions and subsequently test them vis-à-vis the sources of data 
available. Public perception surveys such as Iberobarometro and 
Latinobarometro will be complemented by trackings for the period under 
examination. This data analysis also will be enriched by semi-structured 
46 
 
interviews conducted as field research in the Dominican Republic, with 
government officials, scholars, and analysts.  The analysis will look at 
methodological problems in examining democratic transitions in the region 
and conclude with the implications of the overlooked leverage of race during 
the transitions by mainstream literature as well as its influence on the 
difficulties of the post-transition period in the Dominican Republic.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the 
dissertation and proposes a multidimensional approach to understand the 
absence of race during the democratic transitions as well as how this absence 
affected the nature of the democratization process. The study will conclude 
with suggestions for future work on democratization.  
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Chapter 2 
The Island of Hispaniola 
“[O]ne cannot possibly view or begin to understand Dominican 
history and culture without fully realizing or recognizing the 
intricately interwoven textures and threads flowing between the 
two neighboring cultures, Dominican and Haitian. Their 
evolving societies on the jointly shared island of Hispaniola 
have been quite intimately interconnected since the earliest 
periods in the island’s history…” (Alan Cambeira, Quisqueya la 
Bella: The Dominican Republic in Historical and Cultural 
Perspective (New York: Sharpe, 1997), 148 
 
 
The Dominican Republic and Haiti share a troubled and complex 
history that has influenced each other’s formation of identity, nation, and 
state. The Dominican Republic has been the only country in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region that has achieved its independence not from 
a foreign colonial power, but rather from Haiti. This is a point that needs to 
be highlighted if the task is to examine Dominican-Haitian relations since 
colonial times up to the current state of affairs in the twenty-first century. 
This challenging endeavor needs to take into consideration political, 
historical, economic, and cultural factors that have driven the relations of 
both countries.  
Although much has been written about Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic as cockfights that aim at a zero-sum game,62
                                                 
62 Samuel Martinez, “Not a Cockfight, Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations,” Latin 
American Perspectives, 30, No. 3 (May 2003):16.  
 the truth of the matter 
is that the relations of both countries have encountered periods of 
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compromise, understanding, and cooperation that usually are downplayed or 
neglected in the literature.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine Dominican-Haitian relations 
through certain elements and components that have prevailed historically 
between both nations.  
First, the chapter will examine the Spanish and French settlements in 
the island of Hispaniola and the international treaties that marked the initial 
separation of both colonies. Second, the chapter will examine the 
consequences of the Haitian Revolution and further occupation of the 
Dominican Republic. A section of this chapter will assess the nature of the 
Dominican independence. Third, the chapter will address the economic 
differences between both sides of Hispaniola which led to a vibrant and agro 
exporter economy in the west side of the island (Haiti) and a limited and poor 
economy in the east (Dominican Republic). Finally, the chapter will analyze 
the features and challenges of state formation and nation building in the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
The Colonial Legacy 
The history of Haiti and the Dominican Republic is interconnected and 
has transited a path of complex relations and instances of cooperation. 
Ernesto Sagas notes that “Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two nations 
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trapped by historical circumstances in a small Caribbean island.”63 Silie 
highlights that 1492 marked a period of territorial appropriation by force, 
with the use of physical, moral and cultural resources that determined the 
destiny of native populations.64
The island known today as Hispaniola was discovered by Christopher 
Columbus in 1492. Its original inhabitants were the Arawak Indians who 
called the island “Quizqueya.” As in many other countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, most of the indigenous populations were decimated by 
French and Spanish colonists in their efforts to control the island. Fennema 
and Loewenthal argue that following the arrival of Colon to the island of 
Hispaniola, the indigenous population was around 400,000 people. Twenty-
seven years later, in 1519, indigenous people numbered fewer than 3,000.
 Indeed, he notes that what began as a 
conquest process was transformed quickly into colonization.  
65
                                                 
63 Ernesto Sagas, “An Apparent Contradiction? Popular Perceptions of Haiti and the Foreign 
Policy of the Dominican Republic,” 1994,  
 
Noticeably, Haiti at the beginning was a flourishing colony protected by the 
French, who developed a well-known slave trade to produce sugar. This 
situation extended throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
1777, the French colony of Saint-Domingue achieved official recognition by 
http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/dominican/conception.htm  
 
64 Rubén Silie, “1492: Descubrimiento. Encuentro. Invasión. Como calificar este hecho?,” 
Ciencia y Sociedad, XVII, No. 3, (Julio-Septiembre 1992): 246. 
 
65 Meindert Fennema and Troetje Loewenthal. La Construcción de Raza y Nación en la 
Republica Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria-UASD, 1987), 14. See also 
Moya Pons, 1984, 29. 
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the Treaty of Aranjuez, which established the boundary between France and 
Spain in their colonies. Yet, as Krohn-Hansen notes, this recognition would 
last only until 1795. 66 In that year, Spain decided to cede the eastern colony 
of Santo Domingo to France. Paez Piantini highlights the Peace of Westfalia 
agreement in 1648 as the starting point of the diplomatic negotiations that 
later would affect the future of the Dominican Republic.67 At the time, France 
was a key player at the international arena and was acquiring new territories 
and colonies. Later, the Treaty of Nimega brought to an end the war between 
Spain and France. However, the peace would not last long and both countries 
were engaged in a new war eleven years later. In 1689, France decided to 
invade the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, controlled by Spain.68 The 
Treaty of Aranjuez, signed in 1777, set the line of demarcation between the 
French and Spanish-controlled parts of Hispaniola. The demarcation 
consisted in a total of 221 pyramids from the beginning of the Dajabon River 
in the Atlantic Ocean and the mouth of the Pedernales River.69
In assessing the Dominican and Haitian economies during the 
seventeenth century, Matibag highlights the fact that while the western part 
 
                                                 
66 Christian Krohn-Hansen. Political Authoritarianism in the Dominican Republic  (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 22. 
 
67 William Páez Piantini, Relaciones Dominico-Haitianas: 300 Años de Historia (2nd. ed.) 
(Santo Domingo: Mediabyte, 2007), 29. 
 
68 Ibid, 32 
 
69 Ibid, 36 
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of Hispaniola controlled by the French was undergoing a labor-intensive 
industry of sugar cultivation, the eastern part of the island experienced a 
much less advanced mode of economic production based on “cattle-raising and 
herding.”70 Ernesto Sagas notes, however, that temporary periods of peace in 
Europe opened the way to the development “of trade between the two 
colonies,” especially of heads of cattle and European products, commerce that 
often avoided authorities’ control.71 The year 1795 signals a period in which 
the French were able to take power over the eastern part for a few years.  On 
the other hand, the eastern part of the island dominated by the Spaniards 
was being left behind and faced challenging economic times.72
The abandonment of the eastern part of the country, the absence of 
communication networks, and the lack of population marked an extremely 
restrictive economy directed toward the French colony of Saint-Domingue.
 This period 
was featured by economic activity of survival concentrated in cattle farming 
and oriented toward the community.  
73
                                                 
70 Eugenio Matibag, Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 28. 
 
71 Sagas, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 25. 
 
72 Cross-Beras notes as a critical element of Dominican history, the inability of the Spaniards 
in fostering population settlements from the beginning of the colony until the end of the 
nineteenth century. Several issues determined these migratory movements outside the 
colony, including the discovery of the Aztec and Inca empires in Mexico and Peru, the 
longstanding attacks of European countries on this side of the island and the Haitian 
invasions. See Julio A. Cross-Beras, Sociedad y Desarrollo en Republica Dominicana:1844-
1899  (Santo Domingo: Cenapec, 1984), 43-44. 
 
73 Cross- Beras, 44. 
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Here, it is important to keep in mind that the intra-island commerce between 
the French and the Spanish colonies was far from being official. In other 
words, Spain had not recognized the French colony, thus restricting 
commercial activities as well as attempting to defend its territory from illegal 
occupation. In talking about the opposing interests of both sides of the island, 
Matibag cites Moya Pons’ perception that “it was a battle between the 
plantation and the ranch, between French colonial capitalism and the 
traditional Spanish system of land exploitation.”74 Cross-Beras points out 
that the Spanish colony was economically devastated after the Haitian war of 
independence, after which the prosperous French economy was destroyed. 
This marked the destruction of the main economic market for the Spanish 
colony as well as an imminent political menace for its survival. 75 
Furthermore, in looking at the evolution of slavery in both colonies and the 
following revolution that ensued in the French-controlled part of the island, 
Matibag underscores the structural differences between slavery in the French 
and Spanish colonies. While the former slaves lacked of any kind of privileges 
that would allow them to buy their freedom, the eastern part of Hispaniola 
enjoyed more relaxed servitude conditions that would include the “possibility 
of buying their freedom.”76
                                                 
74 Matibag, 26. 
 
75 Cross-Beras, 46. 
 
76 Matibag, 32. 
 Regarding the origin of slaves, it is important to 
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address the differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While 
most slaves in the western part of the island were brought from Africa to 
work in the intense-labor plantations, most slaves in the eastern part were 
born in the island.77
The Haitian Revolution 
 
 
The year 1804 marked the date of the creation of the first “black 
Republic” as well as the first declaration of independence from a foreign 
colonial power in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The events 
began in 1791, with the slave revolts, and the repression carried out by the 
white and “mulatto” population.78  Fennema and Loewenthal identify three 
main factors in the success of the Haitian revolution: the struggle between 
the tenant of slaves white and mulatto, the support given by the colony of 
Santo Domingo to the rebel slaves (after the 1793 declaration of war by the 
French revolutionary government against Spain and Great Britain), and the 
leadership of Toussaint Louverture (who kept discipline among former slaves, 
deserters, and the war of “guerrillas”).79
                                                 
77 Ibid 
 
78 Fennema and Loewenthal, 19. 
 
79 Ibid, 20. 
 
 Following the slave revolt, the 
governor Sonthonax was forced to abolish slavery in the colony of Saint-
Domingue in 1793. This action was followed for a while in all French colonies 
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and Louverture became commander in chief of the French army in Saint-
Domingue. Yet, this situation did not last long, and after the fall of 
Robespierre in 1794, slavery was reinstalled in the colonies. Fennema and 
Loewenthal note, however, that Bonaparte was unable to reintroduce slavery 
in Saint-Domingue.80 The situation had a quick turn, when in 1795 with the 
Treaty of Basilea, the Spanish part of the island of Hispaniola was ceded to 
France. The French government denied Louverture’s request to occupy the 
eastern part of the country until 1800. Following the occupation by 
Louverture, who declared the island “one and indivisible,” slavery was 
abolished in eastern Hispaniola. The attempts of Louverture to introduce 
agrarian reforms and a plantation economy were halted by the Napoleonic 
army that entered the island in 1802 and captured Louverture.81
Fennema and Loewental cite two important articles of the 1805 
Constitution that refer to the inability of foreign persons of white origin to 
obtain any kind of property as well as the establishment of Haitians under 
the general denomination of “black people.”
 Then, a 
critical actor who laid the foundations of what is now Haiti, Jean Francois 
Dessalines, repelled the French army and proclaimed the independence of 
Haiti and creation of the first black republic in the continent in 1804.  
82
                                                 
80 Ibid 
 
81 Ibid, 21 
 
82 Ibid. See also Price-Mars (1953:1, 52). 
 Immediately after this 
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situation, came the invasions of Dessalines that would affect so negatively 
the perception of the Dominican people. In the same line of action of what 
Louverture attempted to achieve in Hispaniola -the unification and 
indivisibility of the island- Dessalines besieged Santo Domingo briefly but 
had to retreat for fear of new French invasions. While withdrawing his army, 
however, Dessalines issued an order to “burn cities, kill the men and take 
women and children as war prisoners to Haiti.”83 Price-Mars underscores 
that Dessalines felt the same kind of animosity for the people in the east as 
the one he felt for the French invaders.84
Haiti then became the first independent “black” republic in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This act of independence by the western part of 
the island surely would generate concern among its neighbors. The nature 
  
The Haitian revolution, as it was underscored elsewhere, notably was 
grounded in racial and cultural traits that divided the island from colonial 
times and that would endure in all the historical, social, and economic 
development of Hispaniola. Therefore, this process would generate, on one 
side of the island, the first black republic in the continent that would lay out 
racial grounds on its constitution of the nation-state, and on the other side of 
the island, a strong sense of antihaitianism and anti-abolitionist feelings 
grounded in the aspiration to regain the Hispanic and Christian legacy. 
                                                 
83 Ibid, 21, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
 
84 Ibid, Cit. of Price Mars (1953: 1, 97).  
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and features of the independence struggle and the violence it engendered 
spread fears that these kinds of behavior would affect the entire island of 
Hispaniola. After undergoing a long period of internal fractions and political 
struggle for political control, a light-skinned elite composed of mestizo 
population emerged as the key holders of political and economic power in the 
island.  
The year 1822 is critical both for the Dominican Republic and Haiti. 
Since then, much of the current antihaitianism and perceptions of mutual 
distrust in the Dominican Republic and Haiti have sprung from the Haitian 
occupation of the neighboring country by Jean Pierre Boyer in 1822. This 
occupation of the eastern part of the island was seen by the population in the 
Dominican Republic as the realization of the Haitian principle of “one island, 
united and indivisible.”  
Previous to the declaration of independence of the Dominican Republic 
in 1844, Dominicans had what has been called an “ephemeral independence,” 
which was a response and reaction by Dominicans to the lack of attention and 
abandonment by the Spaniards of the eastern part of the island. Yet, this 
attempt would not last as the Dominican Republic would be soon invaded and 
occupied by Haiti the following year.85
                                                 
85 Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura, OEI, 
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The Dominican Independence 
It has been widely argued that the struggle for independence was 
mainly oriented to dismantle Louverture’s plan to unite the island rather 
than against the Spanish colonial regime.86 It is worth noting that 
Louverture’s political project followed the well-recalled invasions of 
Dessalines and the occupation of Boyer in 1822.87 This chain of events 
deepened the anti-Haitian narrative and nationalism. Mejia-Ricart argues 
that the Dominican national independence was carried out by a new 
generation that represented an incipient bourgeoisie to be consolidated later 
mainly as a product of an alliance of the “hateros” and the “madereros.” 
According to Mejia-Ricart several factors weighted the balance in favor of a 
Dominican victory. Although patriotism and courage of the Dominican people 
proved determinant, the territory, access to resources, and lack of logistical 
support also were important factors in Haiti losing the Dominican territory.88
Matibag underscores that “one nation’s drive to gain independence and 
self-determination clashed with the other nation’s resolve to secure the 
territorial integrity of the island.”
 
89
                                                 
86 Fennema and Loewenthal, 23. 
 
87 Interesting to note, is that Jean Pierre Boyer abolished for the second time (Toussaint 
Louverture did it in the first place) slavery in Santo Domingo, action that led to stark 
opposition in many sectors of society. 
 
88 Ibid. 
 
89 Matibag, 112. 
 
 He emphasizes that the process of 
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Dominican independence was not an easy task, and that it took more than 
fifty years to consolidate it, from Toussaint Louverture’s revolution of 1801 to 
Faustin Soulouque’s last invasion of 1856.90 Although none of them 
succeeded, Matibag highlights the increasing popularity of General Santana, 
who would become one of the fundamental Dominican caudillos that would 
hold power for several years in the newly established country. From that 
point onward, as many scholars have noted,91
The Politics of Race and Prejudice after Independence 
 the perception generally has 
been oriented to the fear that the west (Haiti) attempts to take over the east 
(Dominican Republic). These conception still fuel sentiments of 
antihaitianism fully ingrained in the Dominican Republic and serve the 
interests of elites in nurturing these narratives.  
 
 After 22 years of Haitian occupation, on February 27, 1844, 
Dominican groups declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. Yet, 
this independent movement meant for Haiti a weakness in its national 
security as the eastern part of the country was considered instrumental for 
its survival. Therefore, Haiti did not give up on the eastern part of the island 
for several years. Actually, the twelve years that followed the declaration of 
                                                 
90 Ibid. Here, Matibag recalls the four Haitian invasions that featured the period from 1844 
to 1856:  the invasion of 1844, the invasion of 1845-9, the invasion of 1849-55 and the one of 
1855-56. See Matibag, 112. 
 
91 Fennema and Loewenthal, 23. 
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independence were marked by violence and unrest in which Haitian leaders 
tried to reoccupy the eastern part of Hispaniola. Sentiments of nationalism 
grew stronger as annexation attempts by Haitian leaders entrenched already 
existing anti-Haitian sentiments. These attempts of annexation led to many 
consequences, of which seeking the protection of foreign powers proved one of 
the most critical. 
The rationale for this attitude was anchored on the perception that the 
Dominican Republic had a smaller population than its neighbor –thus being 
more vulnerable to intrusion attempts by Haiti- and the belief that the 
country still was unable to develop as an independent nation. After the 
declaration of independence, the Dominican Republic began the process of 
becoming a state, only to be consolidated with the thirty one years of 
Trujillo’s dictatorship. The immediate period after independence was 
featured by the dominance of two “caudillos,” Pedro Santana and 
Buenaventura Baez. Both cattle ranchers, they divided their leadership in 
the eastern part of the island for almost 40 years.92
The idea of achieving protection from a European state was considered 
as a means to stop Haitian ambitions in the eastern part of the country. 
Under the leadership of Santana, the Dominican Republic was re-annexed to 
 Also during this period, 
the pressures from Haiti, still a predominant political and military force in 
the island throughout the century, became more and more intense.  
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Spain from 1861 to 1865.93 Spanish dominance notably was contested in 
1863, and after two years, the eastern part of Hispaniola re-achieved its 
independence. Following this period, three events featured the development 
of the Dominican Republic up to the beginning of the Trujillo rule in 1930: 
the rule of General Ulises Heureaux from 1882 to 1899, the incipient 
development of a modern sugar industry that set the foundations for the 
economic base of the country,94 and the occupation by the United States from 
1916 to 1924. Krohn-Hansen underscores that the first three decades of the 
twentieth century also featured internal political struggles between followers 
of two factions: the Jimenistas (followers of Juan Isidro Jimenez) and 
Horacistas (followers of Horacio Vazquez).95
Haitian-Dominican relations have been characterized by perceptions of 
mutual distrust and intermittent periods of cooperation. The Trujillo era was 
signaled by cordial relations with Haitian governments. Even the 1937 
massacre of the Haitian population in the Dominican Republic was settled by 
an agreement to pay an indemnity of $750,000 to the Republic of Haiti. Later 
on, diplomatic relations between both countries featured agreements 
designed to regulate the importation of Haitians to work in the Dominican 
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94 Krohn-Hansen, 24 
 
95 Ibid 
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sugar industry. These contracts continued to be in place until 1986.96 The 
agreements coincided with a period in which the sugar industry was highly 
lucrative, and the relations with Haiti became a high priority for Trujillo. He 
also influenced Haitian politics as a means to deter Dominican exiles to 
utilize the neighboring country as a base of operation for rebellious activity. 
It is worth bearing in mind that Trujillo also had the ability to alter the 
balance of power in the island: while Haiti lost its economic brilliance 
characteristic of the nineteenth century the Dominican Republic was 
experiencing a flourishing development with a promising future.97
According to Silie, relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
have been marked by conflict and confrontation from colonial times when the 
island of Hispaniola was at the forefront of metropolitan interests in the New 
World.
  
98 Silie, as well as many other authors, underscores the relevance of 
the Haitian occupation in 1822, determining much of the future 
developments between the two neighbors sharing the island of Hispaniola.99
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The line of demarcation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
was established in the year 1929, eroding the chances of military struggle 
among both countries. 
The Trujillo dictatorship (1930-1961) brought to the scene a new way 
of doing politics and managing national interests. On the one hand, and while 
the Duvalier dictatorship also was in place, Trujillo maintained cordial 
relations with Haiti in order to keep in place the contracts that allowed for a 
cheap workforce for the country’s sugar plantations. This policy was 
maintained as a matter of national interest to pursue economic development 
in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, Trujillo and his closest circle 
developed a profound anti-Haitian construct that would engrain firmly in 
Dominican society. This anti-Haitian ideology was composed of prejudice, 
fear, and distortion that aimed to warn about the way in which the Haitian 
population was convinced about taking over the eastern part of the island, 
i.e., the Dominican Republic.100
The antihaitianism constructed during the Trujillo dictatorship has 
had such a long-lasting effect that it has endured until current times in the 
Dominican Republic, despite several actions carried out by Dominican leaders 
and governments oriented to ease the relations with Haiti. Trujillo was the 
mastermind of the construction of the ideology; however he was not alone. 
And many of his collaborators, such as Manuel Peña Battle, proved critical in 
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developing the pillars for this ideology. In a study by the Jesuit Service of 
Refugees and Migrants (SJRM) about opinions of racism in the Dominican 
Republic, Raymundo Gonzalez notes the role of the intellectuals in serving 
the Trujillista ideology. While stressing the common despise and neglect of 
everything black and Haitian, he stresses the differences between Balaguer 
and Peña Battle, as the intellectual masterminds of the Trujillo dictatorship. 
While Balaguer argued for a more biological view of ethnicity, where racial 
discrimination was ethnically/racially grounded, Peña Battle favored a 
cultural view, where discrimination was built upon ethnic and cultural 
features.101
Pelegrin Castillo argues that Dominican independence has profoundly 
defined the relationship between both countries and halted Haitian 
ambitions in the Dominican Republic.
 
If we take a closer look at the Trujillo dictatorship, it is clear that the 
anti-Haitian discourse was immerse in inspiring a sense of nationalism, 
where Trujillo, as the “father” of the country, appealed for unity and devotion 
to the country as well as to a sense of belongingness that would feature the 
core of the Dominican “nation.” 
102
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 Important to note for this author 
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have been the American interventions in the island that encouraged the 
vision that the political center of Hispaniola, where the economic power and 
development emerged, was the Dominican Republic. According to Castillo, 
Haiti carries a vision of resentment and distrust as a product of the radical 
twist of the country since the Dominican independence in 1844. He also 
asserts that during the first American occupation, Haiti embraced a strong 
nationalism revolving around three fundamental values in the country: race-
color, religion, and creole.103
Andujar asserts that the treatment of race and ethnicity was absent 
during the independence period in 1844. Andujar posits the fact that 
although the American nations were founded with the blood and life of the 
black and freemen at the moment of defining national values, the population 
from black descent was not taken into consideration and most of the influence 
came from the Spanish tradition.
 According to Castillo, this nationalism became 
fully engrained in the intellectual black movements of the 1920s and 1930s. 
104
Looking at the treatment of race and ethnicity in the Dominican 
Republic, Wooding asserts that the situation has also been complicated 
because of the isolation of the country until the fall of the Trujillo 
dictatorship in 1961 and the perception of the so-called “Haitian threat” as 
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the first black republic since 1804.105 While Martinez agrees with the 
existence of anti-Haitian sentiments in the Dominican society as a vital 
element of Dominican nationalism, he questions the lack of attention that 
has been given to the reasons and period in which anti-Haitian feelings 
became important.106
Economic Challenges in the Island of Hispaniola 
 
 
In looking at the economic challenges on the island of Hispaniola, 
Manigat argues that the Haitian economy always has relied on crops such as 
sugar and coffee. Indeed, he notes that Haiti has experienced since 1804 a 
population growth that has affected the country’s ability to ensure enough 
production and income for its people. He also underscores the fact that the 
Haitian economy still remains in the power of a few families who control the 
import-export business, while the great majority is in poverty conditions.107
The introduction of slavery in the island of Hispaniola in colonial times 
must not be overlooked and still remains a fundamental factor that helps 
explain the political economy of the colonies of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) and 
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Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic). When Christopher Columbus 
discovered Hispaniola in 1492, the island was inhabited by native and 
indigenous peoples. One century later, most of this population was decimated 
by the foreign countries that settled in the island. The introduction of slavery 
was a necessary means to obtain cheap labor to develop the sugar industry, 
which has endured as the most important industry throughout the 
centuries.108 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the cheapest labor 
was black labor. As Fennema and Loewenthal underscore, at the time, it was 
considered that the black African population were four time stronger than 
the native Indians and had no conditions to adopt the Christian faith.109 Not 
only did black labor constitute the cheapest labor available, but in 
comparison to Indians and white people, black people were thought of as 
individuals suited for exploitation. As many authors have argued, the 
contributions of the black population in the sugar plantations both in Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic have been widely neglected. Williams argue that 
no economic progress could have been achieved without the black population 
labor in the sugar fields, positioning the territories from “pirates’ nests” to 
valuable colonies. 110
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 Fennema and Loewenthal argue that slavery did not 
have much relevance in the colony in Santo Domingo, as a great part of the 
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Spanish colonizers migrated to Mexico after the discovery of gold.  This 
migration was accompanied by the decline of the sugar industry in the 
sixteenth century. In addition, pandemics affected the slaves’ population 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 111 Puig underscores that the 
main pillars of the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic have been 
people from Haitian descent. 112 It is worth noting that in the eighteenth 
century, Haiti accounted for half a million black slaves constituting almost 85 
percent of the population of Saint-Domingue.113
Examining the political economy of both countries, most of the 
literature agrees that until the twentieth century, Haiti was a much richer 
and advanced economy in comparison to the Dominican Republic. Puig 
highlights the lack of population in the Dominican territory by the mid-
nineteenth century, with about 100,000 people distributed unevenly around 
the country. In comparison, by the same date, Puig estimates that Haiti had 
some 500,000 people. However, and from the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century to the beginning of the Trujillo rule, the Dominican Republic was 
favored by expanding demands of sugar production. This was accompanied by 
an increase in global trade and an expanded demand for tropical 
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commodities. One of the major challenges for the country was to put in place 
the conditions for cheap labor that would help develop the sugar industry. 
The search for labor led to the importation of foreign workers from the Lesser 
Antilles called “Cocolos.”114 As has been widely acknowledged by the 
literature, the conditions under which these workers entered the island of 
Hispaniola were completely different from the labor conditions that would 
affect the Haitian population. The “Cocolos” were workers who came to the 
Dominican Republic with contracts to work for specific periods of time, and 
most returned to their home countries once the harvest was finished. Yet, it 
is worth noting that the use of “Cocolos” for the sugar industry declined 
during the U.S. occupation, to be replaced later by Haitian workers with the 
aim to reduce costs and increase profitability of the sugar industry.115
Puig talks about the differences throughout the years in the 
relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. According to Puig, 
the anti-Haitian prejudice can be devised through symbolic cases, and it is 
engrained in the Dominican collective conscience. This anti-Haitian prejudice 
can be summarized in all the damage inflicted to the country throughout 
centuries including the invasions by Dessalines and the prolonged occupation 
of Jean Pierre Boyer. Puig notes that the same kinds of prejudice take place 
on the other side of Hispaniola, where the 1937 massacre is still remembered 
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and vindicated as one of the main reasons Haiti should not abandon feelings 
of distrust and fear toward the Dominican Republic. He also notes that, 
surprisingly, after the massacre, new agreements were established between 
Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Duvalier (Haiti) in order to keep alive the 
profitability of the sugar business. Therefore, the agreements of the sugar 
industry with the incorporation of “braceros” from Haiti to work in the 
“bateyes” in the Dominican Republic not only signified a positive relationship 
between two governments, but also implied considerable benefits for the 
companies involved in the business, as well as the army that regulated 
migratory movements in the Dominican Republic. In other terms, the 
agreements between both countries were a stabilizing factor that brought the 
island of Hispaniola to a period of good relations between both neighbors. 
Regarding the current Dominican economy, Vega notes a shift to a 
service economy, with a decrease of commodities, agriculture, and cattle 
industry. The most important shift has been to the tourism industry as one of 
the most important factors of dynamism of the Dominican economy.116
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same line of argument, Lozano underscores that the rise of the tourism sector 
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was accompanied by a crisis in the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic, 
especially during the last quarter of the twentieth century.117
State Formation in the Dominican Republic 
 
 
It is worth noting that the literature examining the political, economic, 
and social developments in the island of Hispaniola has not reached a 
consensus regarding the period and features of state formation in the 
Dominican Republic. What exists in the literature are contending 
assessments focusing on modes of accumulation, the emphasis on the market 
models vis-à-vis common interests based on collective consciousness and 
common descent.118 Betances argues that the “outline of a capitalist state 
first emerged in the Dominican Republic with the Ulises Heureaux 
dictatorship.”119According to this author, it is with Heureaux that the state 
begins to “express the interests of an emerging bourgeoisie dependent on 
sugar planters and merchants.”120
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 However, the formation of the nation was 
halted with the dependent mode of integration of the Dominican economy to 
the global market and the disintegration of the Heureaux’s dictatorship. 
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Further control of U.S. sugar banks and corporations during the U.S. 
occupation made consolidation more difficult, and the process would resume 
its momentum with the beginning of the Trujillo dictatorship.  
As Krohn-Hansen notes, the building and consolidation of the 
Dominican state during the twentieth century demanded “long-scale 
processes” that influenced both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and were 
highly rooted in the colonial history of the island of Hispaniola.121
Looking at state formation in the Dominican Republic from 1844, the 
year the country achieved its independence, Betances asserts that obstacles 
to state formation after independence responded to “the fragmentation of the 
 There were 
three fundamental features of the Dominican Republic in colonial times. 
First, although it was highly admired after the first decades of colonization, 
the colony of Santo Domingo soon was abandoned to its own luck due to the 
discovery of more rich and effective resources in Mexico and Peru. Second, 
because of the lack of resources, the colony was unable to generate 
appropriate income to maintain its economy and had very little production for 
export. Third, the colony -in clear contraposition to what was happening in 
the colony of Saint-Domingue- experienced very slow demographic 
development. This situation put the eastern part of the island in vulnerable 
conditions until the mid-nineteenth century and increased the superiority of 
the Haitian army.  
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Dominican economy and the social composition of the dominant blocs.”122 
Here, Betances attributes the delay in state formation to the internal 
struggles between an agrarian and commercial bourgeoisie of the Cibao 
region and the declining dominance of the “hateros”123 and mining exporters 
of the eastern and southern region.124
When examining state formation and nation building in the Dominican 
Republic, there is a need to assess the kind of constitution the republic 
established after its independence, as well as the political institutions that 
began to take shape in the post-colonial period. Like many of the countries in 
the Latin American region that attempted to mirror the U.S. constitution in 
terms of established powers, rights, and institutions, the Dominican Republic 
and the group of liberal nationalists that carried out the independent period 
followed this same path. They included among other measures: the 
establishment of three independent powers (executive, legislative, and 
judicial) along with the creation of four ministries (Justice and Public 
Instruction, Interior and Police, Finance and Commerce, and War and 
Navy.
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 Yet, the principles established in the constitution would fall short in 
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the Dominican political reality and soon revealed the manipulation of the 
“caudillos” that governed the country in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Betances argues that it was during the Heureaux rule that the country was 
able to achieve an incipient “national unity” as well as a feasible bureaucracy. 
Betances identifies two factors that affected the formation of the state: the 
country’s economic regionalism and the political fragmentation that featured 
the mentioned period.126
Conclusions 
  
 
 This chapter has attempted to address broadly the process of state 
formation and nation-building in the Dominican Republic. This task was 
approached from several angles, including the colonial period; the Haitian 
revolution and occupation of the Dominican Republic; the Dominican 
independence; the economic development of both colonies; and the context in 
which state formation and nation building began to take shape. As it has 
been suggested elsewhere, this task cannot be carried out without addressing 
the parallel political, social, and economic reality of its neighboring country, 
Haiti. Both countries have shared a complex history and still struggle -in the 
twenty-first century- to overcome multifaceted legacies. Historical processes 
are not linear and encounter in the Dominican-Haitian relationship a legacy 
of conflict and cooperation. Nevertheless, perception and nationalism on both 
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sides of Hispaniola continue to be of critical importance in the history and 
development of both countries. This chapter argues that much of the process 
of state formation and nation building in the Dominican Republic has been 
grounded on racial factors that have shaped the life of Hispaniola. It is 
worthy to note, and often overlooked, that the Dominican Republic was the 
only country in the region to achieve its independence not from a foreign and 
powerful colonial power but from its immediate neighbor, Haiti. This fact no 
doubt has shaped the consequences and legacies of the post-colonial period. 
Yet, new light needs to be shed on these intricate centuries of experience in 
the island of Hispaniola to build and secure the trust missing in the history of 
both countries for so long.  
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Chapter 3 
The Legacy of Trujillo 
“The vicinity of Haiti has been and continues to be the 
main problem of the Dominican Republic… But if the 
racial problem is of incalculable importance to all 
countries, to Santo Domingo, the matter takes on 
immense proportions, as upon it depends, the very 
existence of the nationality that has for over a century 
been struggling against a more prolific race...” (Joaquín 
Balaguer, La Isla al Revés, 1947), 99. 127
As was discussed broadly in the previous chapter, race has been an 
important factor in the construction of dominicanidad, specifically beginning 
 
 
This chapter examines the conditions that characterized the 
Dominican Republic in the late 1970s when it initiated its democratization 
process. The focus of this chapter is on the absence of race during both the 
initial transition and the post-transition periods. 
During the early democratization process in Dominican Republic, race 
was not a major or even minor concern among the principal actors of the 
transition. This absence is especially surprising considering that the 
Dominican Republic has constructed much of its identity in contraposition to 
its closest neighbor, Haiti. Furthermore, the Dominican Republic is the only 
country in Latin America and the Caribbean that achieved its formal 
independence not from a colonial power but from its neighbor, Haiti.  
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in the Trujillo dictatorship.128 This construction was built upon two bedrocks, 
the veneration of the Hispanic culture and Catholicism as a key value of the 
Dominican nation. Trujillo’s ideology featured a very strong anti-Haitian 
component (particularly since 1937), which labeled Haitians as inferiors to 
Dominicans because of Afro-French culture. The presence of Haitians in the 
country and Haiti as a neighbor were considered a threat to the Dominican 
nation.129
Rafael Leónidas Trujillo became president of the Dominican Republic 
in 1930 following a coup that overthrew Horacio Vásquez. Trujillo, who was a 
member of the -U.S. created National Guard- assumed power following a long 
period of U.S. intervention (1916-1924). Trujillo embarked on a series of 
reforms oriented to instill in the Dominican society the notions of order, 
peace, and work. This trinity became the milestone of the Trujillo 
dictatorship until his assassination in 1961. Yet, this trinity was to be 
 The path to democracy in Dominican Republic cannot be 
understood without a brief overview of the Trujillo dictatorship, and its 
influence on the construction of nation, citizenship and ‘‘dominicanness.’’ 
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imposed on society not by incorporation of labor but through the exclusion of 
political participation and rights at all levels of the decision-making arena.  
Trujillo’s dictatorship cannot be understood without examining the 
profound pattern of repression toward any kind of dissent from political 
groups, factions, or organizations. Trujillo established a culture of fear and 
these sentiments became entrenched in the Dominican mindset. Rosario 
Espinal, who studied the discursive narrative of Rafael Trujillo along with 
the longstanding legacies of his dictatorship, emphasizes the relevance of the 
Trujillo dictatorship as a determinant period of Dominican politics and as a 
means to come to terms with the democratic present, in which authoritarian 
and democratic tendencies conflate in a complex reality.130
Espinal suggests that the formation of collective identities in 
Dominican Republic responded to the inclusion to society through work, 
  
Espinal asserts that the first years of the Trujillo dictatorship 
translated into a recovery process for the nation, in which the state –as 
paternal and authoritarian – played a critical role. The dictatorship 
centralized all political and economic power by including potent appeals to 
patriotism, nation and order. Both Trujillo’s political discourse and his 
political decisions were aimed toward the recuperation of family values, 
education, the role of women, and the return to some kind of social order.  
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order, and obedience.131
In this sense, much of Trujillo’s distinction resembles Peron’s appeal to 
the “descamisados” and the “anti-patria” enemies. This complex mix of 
subordination to Trujillo’s personal power, social order, and stark political 
repression were key elements of the dictatorship, especially during the first 
years. As Espinal suggests, the formation of collective identities revolved 
around the inclusion of actors with duties of work, peace, and order and the 
exclusion in all arenas of political participation and/or contestation.
 Many of Trujillo’s practices resemble traditional 
characteristics of populist governments elsewhere in Latin America during 
the mid-twentieth century, in which two groups were pitted against each 
other, in terms of “the people” – who subscribed to the ideals of progress and 
order- and the “malavenidos” –who did not subscribed to Trujillo ideals.  
132
Repression under Trujillo requires a full-fledged explanation to 
understand the Dominican transition to democracy in the late 1970s. He 
effectively eliminated all political dissidence with paramilitary squads and 
military action.  Also, repression and the use of military force was a means to 
homogenize political interests that culminated with the formation of the 
Dominican Party created by Trujillo in 1931.
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 The party came to represent 
the birth of a new nationality with order, peace, and progress as the 
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underlying bedrock. In short, the party became the mechanism through 
which Trujillo decided the condition of being “a good Dominican” by entering 
the party.  
Trujillo’s grip over the Dominican Republic reached its peak in 1955 
when he declared himself “Father of the New Patria” to celebrate his 25 years 
in power. Espinal points out that the 1930s marked the political 
centralization of the Dominican state, while the 1940s signaled the economic 
centralization of the country. The latter was marked by the nationalization of 
the financial market, the creation of the national currency (the Dominican 
peso), and the creation of the national banking system.134 These policies were 
accompanied by an incipient strategy of import substitution 
industrialization,135
The Trujillo era also was marked by the relations with its closest 
neighbor, Haiti. Key moments of his administration involved the frontier 
demarcation with Haiti, the massacre of Haitians in 1937, and the final 
accord of 1938 that marked the end of negotiations and the territorial 
demarcation. The 1937 massacre of Haitians on the Dominican side of the 
 following regional trends of the period.  
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135 Import Substitution Industrialization is an economic policy that has been applied in Latin 
American countries from the 1930s through the 1980s. It was geared towards reducing 
foreign economic dependency from industrialized countries and increasing the performance 
of national industrialized products. One of the causes of this developmental model was the 
impact of the economic recession of the 1930s where industrialized countries limit the quota 
of primary products imports from Latin American countries. Raul Prebisch, the Argentine 
economist and Head during the 1950s of ECLAC, was one of the first to develop the ISI 
model for the Latin American region. 
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The massacre, inspired by historical and deep-seated racial prejudices, 
had the sole and only purpose of “lightening” the skin of Dominicans. 
Alternative explanations abound, including bordering cattle theft, plots 
engineered from Haiti, and stopping the migration of Haitian labor to the 
Dominican sugarcane industry.
 represents a critical juncture of Haitian-Dominican relations with 
longstanding legacies for immigration policies followed by the Dominican 
elites in the following period.  
137
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 The massacre left profound legacies for 
both sides of Hispaniola. In Haiti, it unfolded with the downfall of then 
President, Stenio Vincent, who failed to challenge the Dominican government 
over such a horrendous atrocity. In the Dominican Republic, the massacre 
reinforced the racial card played by Trujillo and his then interim foreign 
minister, Joaquin Balaguer, who would go on to play a central role in 
Dominican politics. The racial politics played in that period emphasized the 
differences “between the mulatto Spanish-speaking society in the Dominican 
Republic” and the black French/Creole-speaking society in Haiti. 
Stigmatization became a key strategy as Haitians were portrayed as 
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“disease-ridden, morally deficient, lazy, and subject to demonic 
possession.’’138
Retrospectively, the Trujillo dictatorship can be divided into two 
different periods. The first twenty years represented a period in which 
Trujillo gained absolute power, control, and leadership over a country that 
had experienced tremendous political and economic turmoil during most of 
the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth century. During this period, 
Trujillo emerged as the “father” of a “divided and corrupted” Dominican 
society that needed his appeal and charisma to transit the path toward 
modernity. In other words, Trujillo became the means through which the 
ideals of peace, order, and justice were achieved. It also was the period in 
which every attempt at the political inclusion of “subordinate classes” was 
halted.
 
139 This situation was not meant to last forever; beginning in the 
1940s; Dominican society experienced a more volatile political environment 
as socialist ideals emerged within the labor movement, thus generating social 
and political upheaval and a substantial increase in strikes.140
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American investments controlled 85 percent of the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors and 93 percent of the sugar cane fields; by the time of 
the assassination of Trujillo, the Dominican state held a much firmer grip on 
its resources. American companies controlled only 42 percent of the industrial 
sector and 26 percent of the sugar industry.141
Trujillo embarked on a process of mirroring what has been called as a 
“perfect dictatorship,”
 In other words, it could be 
argued that Trujillo engaged in a successful strategy to “Dominicanize” the 
economy and reduce foreign control over key sectors of it. 
142 favoring the creation of two new political parties 
(The National Democratic Party and the National Labor Party) for the 
election to be held in 1947. As these elections were manipulated to favor the 
Dominican Party led by Trujillo, his ultimate aim to gain international 
legitimacy as an active player in the realm of diplomatic relations emerged 
after the end of the World War II.143
                                                 
141 Pablo A. Mariñez, “El Proceso Democrático en Republica Dominicana: Algunos Rasgos 
Fundamentales,” Estudios Sociales, XXVI, No. 93, (Julio-Septiembre, 1993). 
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 During this period, opposition forces 
began to organize both domestically and internationally. At the same time, 
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an incipient implementation of import substitution industrialization policies 
favored the expansion of urban and middle strata in Dominican society. 
Espinal asserts that the rise of the middle class through the process of 
industrialization in the Dominican Republic represented a point of fracture 
from the Trujillo dictatorship that later would play a key role in Trujillo’s 
downfall.144
Authoritarianism Revisited 
  
 
Authoritarian politics did not end with the assassination of Trujillo in 
the early 1960s. The Dominican Republic entered into another twelve-year 
period, under Joaquin Balaguer, of an authoritarian, paternalistic, and 
highly restrictive way of governing. Espinal points out that prevailing social, 
economic, and political cleavage in the country explain the difficulties faced 
by Balaguer. These cleavages had to do mainly with a profound sense of 
disappointment and the failure of incipient projects forged by antitrujillista 
forces to begin anew in a society that had suffered thirty years of 
authoritarian rule.145
Following the downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship, new political actors 
emerged with the goal of capturing new political spaces. These groups were in 
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145 Flavio Darío Espinal, “Política, Constitución y Reforma: Avances y Obstrucciones de la 
Democratización Dominicana.” Ciencia y Sociedad, XII, No. 2, (Abril – Junio, 1987), 233-235. 
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traditional urban sectors, less influenced by the politics of subservience so 
characteristic of the Trujillo administration and a key element in the 
subsequent Balaguer rule. These traditional urban sectors were extremely 
vulnerable to clientelism and neopatrimonialism. In fact, clientelism was one 
of the most significant features of the Trujillo regime and continues to be the 
characteristic that prevails in the Dominican Republic. It is within the 
framework of neopatrimonialism that authors such as Hartlyn chose to 
explain this long-standing phenomenon in Dominican politics. 
This incipient transition that followed Trujillo’s assassination gave 
way to a phase of political and social instability, as well as a lack of 
institutional framework, in which political actors attempted to impose their 
national projects. Espinal argues that the conditions to maintain a 
democratic state were not met at the time, specifically the imbalance between 
the level of mobilization, the institutional capacity to channel political and 
societal conflicts, and the lack of state coercion in regulating social 
demands.146
Wiarda and Kryzanek emphasize that chaotic months followed the 
downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship. As usually happens when these kinds of 
leaders are gone, the Trujillo system remained in place for a while.
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international situation, however, did not remain the same. The United States 
made it very clear to Trujillo’s heir, his son Ramfis Trujillo, as well as to 
Joaquin Balaguer –the so called “puppet president”148
Three main political forces emerged to channel the opposition demands 
of the Dominican society. The National Civic Union (UCN) led by Viriato 
Fiallo garnered the support of the business community. The Dominican 
  that in order to keep 
good relations with the U.S., some progress towards democracy was 
necessary. This condition undercut the aim of Trujillo heirs to perpetuate the 
political, social, and economic regime that had been characteristic during 
thirty-one years of dictatorship. The position of the United States was clear 
and the political and social turmoil in the country made it impossible to 
continue the Trujillo days. As the political heir of Trujillo, Joaquin Balaguer 
initiated some reforms that were perceived as the beginning of a political 
opening. These reforms included lifting the ban on political activity, allowing 
exiles to return to the country, the incipient formation of opposition parties, 
and, greater participation of labor and business associations. The incipient 
formation of opposition parties cannot be treated superficially. These moves 
set the foundations for a viable political force that, in the late 1970s, 
garnered widespread social support that laid the basis for the transition to 
representative democracy in a country historically convoluted with 
authoritarianism.  
                                                 
148 Ibid 
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Revolutionary Party (PRD), founded by Juan Bosch in exile149 represented 
the ideals of a social-democratic party that had the conditions to emerge as a 
popular movement based on a clear mandate of social reform.150 And as 
Wiarda and Kryzanek point out, the third force was represented by the “pro-
Castro element” featuring a youth movement with a leaning toward the left 
called the Fourteenth of June Movement.151
After Ramfis Trujillo disappeared from the national scene, Balaguer 
was forced to form a Council of State, a seven-man junta representing the 
main sectors of Dominican society, including the clergy, the business sector, 
leaders representing the UCN, and two surviving Trujillo assassins.
 Although the measures initiated 
by Balaguer, as well as the formation of other political spaces, gave birth to a 
new period in the Dominican society, the provisional government faced 
tremendous pressure by the U.S. as well as from the society. This led to the 
breakdown of the political heirs of the regime, with the exile of Trujillo’s son, 
who reportedly fled with more than $90 million.  
152
                                                 
149 The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) was founded in the early 1940’s by political 
exiles and had to remain two decades in ostracism until 1961, after Trujillo’s assassination, 
where it was able to organize and compete for national elections. 
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 The 
main commitment of this Council of State was the promise to hold elections 
before the end of 1962. The Council of State suffered both a military coup and 
a restoration coup that expelled Balaguer from the coalition. The second 
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Council of State had sounder participation of businessmen and conservatives 
in an organ backed by military units and with close ties to the U.S. The 
council experienced what has been dominant in the Dominican society, the 
contradiction and coexistence of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. In 
addition, political and economic forces found it difficult to coexist and factions 
within Dominican society began to fall apart, stemming from a general sense 
of distrust after the collapse of the Trujillo regime. 
 
Revisiting “La Isla al Revés” 
The book by Joaquin Balaguer represented in the Dominican Republic 
the incarnation of anti-Haitian ideology that began during the Trujillo 
dictatorship. Joaquin Balaguer and Manuel Peña Battle played determinant 
roles in masterminding the ideology that underpinned three decades of 
dictatorship regime under Trujillo. The leverage of La Isla al Revés, in terms 
of academic reach as well as in contributing to the way Dominicans 
understand their nationality, must not be undermined or overlooked. One of 
the traditional myths entrenched in the Dominican society, was the result of 
Balaguer’s insistence of the threat of a “peaceful invasion” by Haitian 
nationals. Joaquin Balaguer was a very influential personality on his own 
terms.  
He remained a main actor of the Dominican political elite for almost a 
century, occupying official posts during the Trujillo regime that ranged from 
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chancellor to vice-president. He later occupied the presidency from 1960 to 
1962, 1966 to 1978 and from 1986 to 1996, finally having to step down after 
an agreement was reached to claims of fraudulent elections. Until his death 
in 2002 at almost 100 years, he was critically involved in two main chapters 
of Dominican politics: that of a cruel and brutal dictatorship and the 
transition to democracy in the late 1970s. Balaguer is seen by many 
Dominicans as a political leader who was able to manage Dominican political 
destiny in a wise and controlled manner after the collapse of the Trujillato.153 
He also usually is referred to as a politician -in contrast to many of the 
contemporary political leaders in the Dominican Republic- who did not get 
involved in corruption and, most importantly, who died “poor.”154 Reducing 
corruption remains one of the most important challenges of current 
Dominican politics. Balaguer’s “transparent aura” almost a decade after his 
death still holds tremendous leverage in the perception of Dominicans of their 
political leaders. Balaguer published La Isla al Revés in 1983,155
                                                 
153 The word “Trujillato” is utilized to refer to the thirty-year period that lasted the 
dictatorship incarnated by Rafael Leónidas Trujillo (1930-1961) in the Dominican Republic. 
 
154 Focus groups conducted in the cities of Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican 
Republic, in September 2009. 
 
155 We need to note also that Balaguer’s “La Isla al Revés” was republished until 2003 and is 
part of mainstream lecture in Dominican politics. 
 
 eleven years 
before the most racist and fraudulent presidential campaign experienced by 
the country, which prevented Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, a politician of 
Haitian descent, from achieving the presidency.  
89 
 
Yri emphasizes that Balaguer was without doubt influenced by his 
past as the confidence man of the Trujillato.156 In addition, he argues that the 
conformation of the “Dominican nation” under Trujillo revolving around the 
framework of a “pristine Hispanic heritage” is a “perpetual process” that still 
may be current in the country.157
Joaquin Balaguer also was a prolific author in Dominican politics and 
an erudite scholar of the history of the island of Hispaniola. Broadly, La Isla 
al Revés deals with the history of Hispaniola, the differences between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, and possible outcomes of a complicated 
shared history.
 
158
According to Carlos Dore, Balaguer was an erudite intellectual; 
however, his credibility was undermined by practices that discredited him as 
a valuable political writer. He cites La Isla al Revés as a repetition of a book 
 The notion of “inseparability” is the thread that connects 
this work and constitutes the quest of commonality between these very 
different countries. 
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he had already written in the 1940s,159 without even bothering to change the 
bibliographical notes.160
La Isla al Revés sparked considerable attention in Dominican society 
as well as in the intellectual community. This work was a highly 
controversial effort geared toward inspiring fear of any Haitian penetration 
as an assured devaluation of Dominican national values, identity, and racial 
constitution. The book explicitly attempts to show a “whitened” population as 
an ideal model to follow, inciting clear-cut racial prejudice. It also conveys 
biological racism, while equalizing color and social condition. In other words, 
the white population is the superior and privileged race while the black 
population is the inferior and barbaric race. He emphasized the pristine 
Hispanic heritage of the community of Bani, founded by white people from 
the Canaries, as “the fleur of the races.”
 
161 Dore Cabral criticizes “La Isla al 
Revés” by claiming that Balaguer manipulated Dominican history suggesting 
that Dominicans descend from pure Hispanic and indigenous antecessors.162
                                                 
159 Dialogo de la Lengua, Interview by Caridad Plaza with Carlos Dore Cabral and Marcio 
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One of the main critiques is geared toward emphasizing the outdated 
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character of the arguments that serve Balaguer’s work. Dore Cabral takes 
issue with scientific and historic perceptions of the creation and evolution of 
races that have been proven wrong since the late nineteenth century. 
Another major critique points out that the bibliography supporting 
Balaguer’s work has been completely overcome in terms of scientific and 
academic validity.163
“…Haiti does not constitute any longer a threat for 
Santo Domingo
 
Balaguer’s research revolves around three main arguments: the 
Hispanic and Christian descent of Dominican population, Haitian 
imperialism geared toward unifying the island under its dominance, and the 
threat that carries the acculturation of Haitian nationals in the Dominican 
Republic in terms of the evolution of “dominicanness.” In the chapter that 
analyzes the current tendencies of Haitian imperialism, Balaguer affirms 
that: 
164 for political reasons. But Haitian 
imperialism continues to be a hazard for our country, in 
greater degree, for biological reasons…”165
                                                 
163 Carlos Dore Cabral notes that out of the 60 books listed in the bibliography, 25 have been 
edited before the twentieth century, 20 citations previous to 1950, 2 before 1960, 3 previous 
to 1970, 4 have been published before 1980 and 6 do not have any date at all. See Carlos 
Dore Cabral, 63. 
 
164 It is worth noting that in “La Isla al Revés,” Joaquin Balaguer refers to Santo Domingo, 
the capital of Dominican Republic, however, it has been widely accepted that he refers to the 
Dominican Republic as the whole nation. 
 
165 Joaquín Balaguer, La Isla al Revés: Haití y el Destino Dominicano (Santo Domingo: 
Corripio, 2002), 35, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
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Balaguer puts forward the argument that Haitian nationals are unable 
to restrain themselves and have uncontrollable levels of reproduction, which 
makes them resemble vegetal species. This argument is highly entrenched in 
Dominican society. Focus groups conducted for this study reveal that most 
Dominicans claim that the pace of Haitian reproduction is much faster than 
Dominican reproduction, and this poses severe threats to the integrity of the 
Dominican population. This prejudice also has important consequences in 
education and health services, which often are noted as examples of how 
completely overwhelmed services are by the presence of Haitian nationals 
living in the country.166
“…the excess of population from Haiti, constitutes, an 
increasing threat for the Dominican Republic. This is so 
for a biological reason: black people, abandoned to their 
instincts and without the restrain that a relatively 
elevated level of life imposes on all countries in 
reproduction issues, is multiplied with rapidity almost 
similar to that of vegetal species. It is also for an 
economic reason: the territorial extension of Haiti is 
only 28,676 square kilometers, and the population has a 
trend to increase, in contraposition to what occurs in 
most of the other countries, with a faster rhythm than 
available supplies…”
 In the words of Balaguer: 
167
Another major issue that concerned Balaguer was the de-
nationalization of Santo Domingo expressed in the progressive deterioration 
of the Dominican population and in the moral and physical constitution of its 
inhabitants. To support his extremely controversial argument, Balaguer 
 
 
                                                 
166 Focus groups conducted in the Dominican Republic during December 2008 and September 
2009. 
 
167 Balaguer, La Isla al Revés, 36-37, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
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claimed that daily contact with Haitian nationals, especially in the rural 
regions where Dominican farmers have a close contact with their Haitian 
neighbors resulted in the loosening of moral attitudes and traditional values 
characteristic of the Dominican population. 
In the end, what was the contribution of Joaquin Balaguer’s La Isla al 
Revés? Balaguer attempted to reaffirm the racial prejudice that provided the 
layers that constituted Dominican nationality in the early twentieth century. 
The book originally published in 1983 -well into the democratization process 
that the country began in the late 1970s- demonstrates the difficulties of 
overcoming the reality that includes Haitian nationals in the Dominican 
population. Balaguer warned of the threats that Haitians pose to the country, 
inculcating retrograde narratives involving the superiority of the races, all of 
which have been discarded for decades. Balaguer touched on issues that still 
persist in the Dominican imagination, and relate to its population with the 
use of well-entrenched structural values that Dominicans acquired at birth.  
 
The PRD and the Politics of Intervention 
The PRD was a party created in exile. For this particular feature, it 
carried many characteristics that made it unique. In spite of the ban on 
political forces during the Trujillo dictatorship, the PRD not only was able to 
garner support outside the country but also was strong enough to build 
grassroots organizations in many parts of the country. In addition, the party 
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represented the needs of more urban and rural masses. This characteristic 
projected the party as a national force. Furthermore, the party had in Juan 
Bosch a truly charismatic leader who was able to articulate the social 
demands that were to be put in place after the fall of Trujillo.  
The party articulated an agenda of social reform and social justice. The 
triumph of the PRD in the elections of 1962 marked a determinant event in 
Dominican politics. The PRD was able to outperform the UCN led by Viriato 
Fallo by a 2 to 1 margin. Juan Bosch and the PRD did not have much time to 
deliver the outcomes he had promised during the campaign. And soon, it 
became notorious that many challenges would have to be overcome if the 
government was going to prove successful. Wiarda and Kryzanek argue that 
a political cocktail between different sectors entered into place, making the 
coup against Bosch inevitable. The business sector, the military and the 
Church were the main actors of the military coup that ousted Bosch in 
1963.168 This was accompanied by the notion that the Bosch government was 
a potential threat to stability in the country. Espinal adds to the societal 
fragmentation the unfavorable international conditions169
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of a Democratic Regime” in Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities, Carlene J. 
Edie (ed.) (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 146-161. 
 
 that accelerated 
the overthrown of the PRD government. Wiarda and Kryzanek emphasize 
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that anticommunism was the main issue that united all these sectors.170
After months of internal commotion and combat between the 
conservative military and the pro-Bosch so-called constitutional forces, the 
U.S. embassy began to play a decisive role as arbiter in the struggle, and 
clearly defined the rules of the game with strong leaning toward the 
conservative forces. Yet, the civil unrest reached its peak on April 28, 1965 
when President Johnson ordered U.S. military forces to bring to an end the 
advance of the constitutionalist forces by the insertion of a huge reserve of 
troops into the country. The intervention had two main purposes from the 
U.S. perspective: prevent the formation of another “Cuba” in the Caribbean 
and show military strength to the North Vietnamese within a major buildup 
of U.S. forces in the region.
 Yet, 
as many scholars have argued, the communist and Marxist elements in the 
Dominican Republic often were exaggerated and too weak to give credit to the 
versions that the country would become another Cuba. It may be argued that 
at the time, the conditions for democracy were not met, and neither the 
political forces nor the Dominican society were ready for the beginning of a 
democratic transition.  Therefore, the period that opened in 1963 to 1965 was 
featured by political and social commotion, repression and instability.  
171
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 The U.S. embassy wanted to prevent the return 
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of Bosch to the country, as well as the instauration of a leftist government 
that they sensed was invaded by communist ideology.  
After the military maneuvers led by the U.S. troops to help organize 
the conservative and loyalist forces, and peacekeeping forces spread all over 
the country,172
Wiarda and Kryzanek make the argument that the Dominican 
Republic’s revolution was “an unfinished revolution.”
 the civil war was brought to an end on August 31, 1965, with 
a cease-fire arranged by Colonel Caamaño (constitutionalist) and General 
Antonio Imbert (conservative). Again, the U.S. government played the role of 
international guardian and arbiter by forcing the players to sign an 
institutional act of reconciliation.  
The revolution of the 1963-1965 period evidenced the fragility of 
Dominican society and the dependence on the United States. The influence of 
the U.S. on the Dominican nation proved to be a difficult burden from which 
Dominicans could not escape in the short run.  
173
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 They assume that 
the revolution was unfinished as it was unable to solve the underlying 
problems of the country, especially those related to socioeconomic standing, 
such as poverty and social inequality. The “unfinished revolution,” in Wiarda 
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and Kryzanek’s terms, revolved around a deep polarization in the Dominican 
society, based on socioeconomic crisis and political hostility.  
The peace accord signed in 1965 brought the naming of a moderate, 
President García-Godoy, who was in charge of the highest office until the 
calling of new elections in 1966. This election again showed the relevance and 
leverage of political elites in a country heavily influenced by the United 
States. Here, the option was clear for the ruling conservative elites. Joaquin 
Balaguer, probably the most apt Trujillo puppet during the dictatorship, was 
not only the choice of the political elites but also of the U.S. embassy, which 
was eager to impede the election of Juan Bosch for the presidency.174
 
  
The campaign largely favored Balaguer, as Bosch and his supporters 
constantly faced repression, threats and a climate of fear that aimed to halt 
his candidacy for the highest office. While Bosch had to stay in urban areas to 
prevent attacks, Balaguer spread his campaign all over the country, with a 
special focus on the peasant population. Although his aim was to distance 
himself from the Trujillo dictatorship, he proposed the same recipe for the 
return of stability to the country -peace, order, and reconstruction. Although 
the focus was not on work at this time, two key elements of Trujillo’s trinity –
peace and order- remained crucial in the Balaguer political campaign.  
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The Politics of Order  
Balaguer won the 1966 presidential election with 57 percent of the vote 
to 39 percent for Bosch. Although Balaguer won by a landslide, Bosch’s 
support in the election proved remarkable, in spite of the mounting 
repression and the climate of fear.   
The new government had the immediate challenge to transit an 
orderly transition after three decades of dictatorship and an extended civil 
war. It also needed to articulate all disgruntled sectors of the society, deeply 
divided in internal struggles. The Balaguer administration brought a period 
of economic opening that gave rise to two key forces in Dominican society, an 
expansion of the middle class and a well-organized business sector. While 
emphasizing his nature of economic modernizer, Balaguer attempted to put 
some distance from the Trujillo legacy, although his political system 
remained similar to that of the dictator. These two forces managed to avoid 
direct control from the Dominican state, although upholding a continuous 
support from the government.175
The power that Balaguer was able to concentrate was immense and 
had utmost discretion in every single sphere of power. The executive power 
was tremendously concentrated vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial powers. 
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Yet, Balaguer was not Trujillo. This means that he understood that under the 
conditions in which he arrived to power and the international and national 
contexts, he would had to liberalize the economy176 and create more spaces 
for society in order to remain in power. The kind of economic liberalization 
that Balaguer initiated gave the impulse to the political liberalization that 
would come some years ahead. In fact, Espinal acknowledges that the 
“privatization” of the economy allowed a more clear differentiation between 
state and civil society.177
Economic and political power was not necessarily related under the 
Balaguer administration and a variation among political elites became 
possible. The rise of the middle class and business sectors also led to the 
delineation of “new rules of the game” in which these newly constituted forces 
demanded more accountability, participation and decision-making. Flavio 
Dario Espinal illustrates the cleavages and divisiveness of opposition forces 
during the Balaguer regime. First, the left was divided internally between 
the “hard” left, dedicated to the demonstration of force besides democratic 
means, and Bosch and his supporters, who rejected representative democracy 
and elections as a viable means to achieve power.
  
178
                                                 
176 This economic liberalization includes the expansion of state size, a focus on infrastructure 
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Conaghan and Espinal, 560. 
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 Second, the right 
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including the PQD and MIDA, advocated for constitutional reform to halt 
Balaguer’s aims to get reelected and remain in office. Third, there was a 
severe rupture within the PRD -giving rise to leaders such as Jose Francisco 
Peña Gomez- which led in 1973 to the creation of an alternative political 
force, the PLD, with the exit of Juan Bosch. It was in this climate that the 
PRD decided from 1974 onwards to reengage in the democratic game by 
developing a sound campaign of civil and political rights, institutionalization 
of the state, social and economic reforms and participation of excluded 
groups.  
The PRD also was greatly influenced by social democratic ideas and 
affiliated to the Internationalist Socialist adopting many of its core ideology. 
At the same time, the early 1970s were not as gentle with Balaguer as it has 
been the 1960s, and it was clear that both international and domestic 
conditions have changed. Domestically, Balaguer was losing support from his 
loyal base, the peasants and the rural poor. The disenchantment of this 
critical base of support along with the strengthening of middle and urban 
sectors with rising demands of participation and decentralization of decision-
making processes, posed a serious challenge to the Balaguer regime. Lastly, 
the conformation of the PRD as a serious alternative force to the Reformist 
Party of Joaquin Balaguer made it even more difficult for a new militarized 
electoral process to occur in 1978.  
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The Path to Democracy 
The elections in 1978 signaled the beginning of the democratic 
transition in the Dominican Republic.179 The PRD defeated the Reformist 
Party led by Balaguer after twelve years in office. The balance of forces that 
had prevailed under Balaguer was broken.180 The context in which this 
important victory took place involved a profound transformation of political 
forces and actors: a favorable international context marked by clear 
mandates of the Carter administration to support democracy in the region; a 
middle class that decided to engage in the democratic game by demanding 
more participation and decentralization of decision making processes; and an 
urge of individual and civil rights by the Dominican society.181 Nevertheless, 
Conaghan and Espinal argue that the country faced some conditions that 
made it an unlikely democracy, for example the unfavorable socioeconomic 
conditions comprising a historical fragmentation of civil society, lack of 
mobilization of popular sectors, dependency on agricultural market, delay of 
industrialization and a lack of compromise of middle classes and working 
classes.182
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  Therefore, Conaghan and Espinal argue that the underlying 
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socioeconomic structures and the authoritarian political legacy had led to a 
“hybrid democratic-authoritarian” regime type featured by the basic rules of 
the democratic game (political contestation and fair elections) but filtered by 
fractures in the acceptance of democratic rules by the ruling elites. 183
Ramonina Brea points out that aligning with social democratic ideals 
made international and local analysts assume that a consensus would prevail 
in the new PRD presidency.
 
184 Yet, this perception would fall short and soon 
the democratic transition would unveil the intrinsic tensions to 
democratization, especially the legacy of authoritarianism. Brea argues that 
the PRD initially was a party committed to organize and mobilize the masses 
to achieve democracy and social and economic reform, but soon turned into a 
party fragmented by internal tendencies, clientelistic and informal 
relations.185
If we are looking at the absence of the treatment of race during the 
democratic transition of the Dominican Republic, it is essential to identify the 
political and societal actors of the transition and the issues at stake during 
this process. Among these actors, Ramon Tejada Holguin identifies the PRD 
and the Reformist Party, the individual leaderships of Jose Francisco Peña 
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Gomez and Joaquin Balaguer, a sector of the military, the business sector, 
and civil society.186 Other authors, such as Carlos Andujar include the United 
States as a critical actor in the democratic transition of 1978.187
Ruben Silie underscores the need to differentiate between the 
transition per se and the transfer of power during the transition. In this 
respect, he points out that the transition was not a “pacted democracy” in a 
sense of a general consensus among political and social forces to bring closure 
to the Balaguer regime. This argument contradicts mainstream literature 
about democratic transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
emphasize the leverage of “pacts” among societal forces in laying the 
foundations of the democratic transition. The way in which Silie 
differentiates the transition per se and the transfer of power allows for a 
better understanding of the nature of the transition. Here, he acknowledges 
that the transfer of power certainly was “pacted,” especially with the “fallo 
 Yet, the 
discussion of the nature of the transition still is very much alive, and there is 
no consensus that this was a “pacted democracy” or that other processes were 
put in place that initiated the democratic regime in the Dominican Republic.  
                                                 
186 Interview with Ramón Tejada Holguín, held in December 2008 in the Dominican 
Republic. Tejada Holguin makes the caveat that the business sector did not count at the time 
with a prominent leadership as it does today, being mostly absorbed by the Balaguer’s 
regime.  
 
187 Interview with Carlos Andujar held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in September 
2008. 
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histórico” in which the PRD presidency was traded off for control of the 
senate and the judiciary by Balaguer.188
Figure 1. Perception of Dominican Political Parties 
 
 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Cultura Política de la Democracia en Republica 
Dominicana, 2008: El Impacto de la Gobernabilidad, 160 
 
The victory of the PRD led to institutional advances such as the 
respect of the constitution, the instauration of a representative democracy 
and the restoration of the branches of power. Yet, as we have mentioned 
earlier, authoritarian and democratic tendencies often conflate in the 
Dominican experience. And this election was not the exception, when –
through the so-called “Fallo histórico”- a new conformation of pact took place 
between elites, whereby the PRD turned over senate seats to Balaguer’s PR 
by giving him majority in the Senate and control of the Judicial power in 
                                                 
188 Interview held with Ruben Silie in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in September 
2008. 
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exchange for the presidency for the PRD. Although this move was more 
subtle than previous authoritarian measures, it meant a distortion of the 
popular will in a supposedly clean election.189 Many scholars have pointed out 
that this particular feature made almost impossible most of the institutional 
reforms promised. Carlos Andujar points out that the Dominican transition 
was traumatic, in both in the ideological and political realms and that until 
today, the Trujillo legacy is very much alive and present in the institutions, 
political system, and society. 190 Ruben Silie emphasizes the role of the 
military in the downfall of the Balaguer regime, by withdrawing their 
support that gave legitimacy to the government.191
The Regional Context 
  
 
The case of the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic is a 
benchmark that signals the beginning of transitions in Latin America. The 
region had been for decades a fertile land for military coups, dictatorships, 
and brutal civil war, especially in Central America.  
 O’Donnell and Schmitter have explained what is at the core of 
transitions, basically implying “a movement from something toward 
                                                 
189 Ibid, 240 
 
190 Interview held with Carlos Andujar in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in September 
2008. 
 
191 Interview held with Ruben Silie in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in September 
2008. 
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something else.”192 They argue that this movement signified in the region a 
shift from authoritarian rule (with varied configuration, severity, longevity, 
etc.) to what it is called a political democracy.193
“…the Dominican Republic led the way when international 
intervention prevented an election fraud that had sought to 
extend President Joaquin Balaguer’s 12-year term in office, 
making way for the first opposition victory in a free 
presidential election under universal suffrage in that country’s 
history –and the start of Latin America’s transitions to 
democracy…”
 This movement took place 
for the first time in the region in the Dominican Republic in 1978. As Jorge 
Dominguez underscores: 
194
As Dominguez points out, the country represented the first successful 
attempt for democratization in the region. We need to note, however, that the 
victory led by the PRD was not without problems, and was featured by active 
international pressure led by President Carter and the United States. 
Furthermore, Balaguer was able to keep a hold on the majority of the Senate 
by manipulating adverse results. This point of departure soon was followed 
by many countries in the region. Beginning with Ecuador and Peru, followed 
by Argentina and finally with Chile and Mexico, civilian presidents elected 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 65. 
 
193 Ibid. 
 
194 Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (3rd ed.) Constructing Democratic Governance in 
Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 323. 
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democratically would put an end to authoritarian regimes.195
This decade was featured by profound economic challenges with 
insurmountable levels of inflation. Dominguez stresses that it was the worst 
performance of Latin American economies since the times of the 1930s 
economic depression.
 This flourishing 
period in which civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights were 
regained by the population also accompanied by what many economists have 
called “the lost decade.”  
196 Moreover, these transitions to democracy brought 
discontent in the population in regard to corruption practices, accountability, 
and general performance. Year after year, regional surveys such as 
Latinobarometro197 and Iberobarometro have shown data revealing ample 
levels of discontent and distrust in institutions and political parties.198
                                                 
195 Ibid 
 
196 Ibid. He argues that this poor performance during the 1980s was later followed by severe 
financial panics in the region in Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Brazil. Later on, Argentine 
economy was severely affected in 2001 with the confiscation of deposits and the devaluation 
of the Argentine peso. 
 
197 The first surveys carried out by Latinobarometro in the region date back to 1995 in eight 
countries of Latin America. This selection is further expanded in 1996 to 17 countries and 
later, in 2004, is completed by the inclusion of the Dominican Republic (with the exception of 
Cuba). 
  
198 Latinobarometro (Corporación Latinobarometro,1996-2009) and Iberobarometro 
(Consorcio Iberoamericano de Empresas de Investigación de Mercados y Asesoramiento, 
CIMA,1992-2009). 
 
 Yet, 
Dominguez emphasizes the endurance of Latin American democracies in 
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maintaining elected civilian presidents, in spite of traditional weak civilian 
control over the military.199
Among the many indicators of democratic performance, the level of 
commitment of the government to the general well-being of the population 
and corruption practices that benefit small groups continue to provide sound 
data in the analysis of public perception of democracy. To the question posed 
by the 2009 Report of Latinobarometro whether people perceived that they 
were governed by powerful groups in their own benefit or whether they were 
governed for the well-being of the population (and only considering those who 
responded that they were governed in benefit of all the population), the data 
reveals high levels of discontent in the Dominican population.
  
200
 
 
Figure 2. Level of Perception that the Country Is Governed for 
the Benefit of the Population 
 
Source: Latinobarometro 2009 Report, 39 
                                                 
199 Dominguez, 324-328. 
 
200 Corporación Latinobarometro, “Latinobarometro 2009 Report,” November, Santiago de 
Chile, 39, http://www.latinobarometro.org/  
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In regard to the perception of corruption, Latin American countries 
have consistently scored at very low levels. Especially informative has been 
the 2008 Report from Latinobarometro, asking how many public officers are 
corrupt from a sample of a hundred. Out of eighteen countries in the region, 
only two, Uruguay and Chile scored below the 50 percent, while the 
remaining countries estimated than more than 60-80 percent of public 
officers were corrupt.201
Figure 3. Level of Corruption in Public Officials 
 
 
 
Source: Latinobarometro Report 2008, 46 
 
The Dominican Republic again scores higher than the average of Latin 
American countries, with a perception of corruption of 75.7 percent of 
                                                 
201 Corporación Latinobarometro, “Latinobarometro 2008 Report,” November, Santiago de 
Chile, 46, http://www.latinobarometro.org/  
 
68.6
45.6
48
61.2
64.2
64.4
66.1
67.5
68.9
72.3
73
73.1
74.5
74.6
75.4
75.7
76
76.2
80.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Latinoamerica
Uruguay
Chile
Brasil
Paraguay
Costa Rica
Colombia
Bolivia
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Mexico
Venezuela
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Republica Dominicana
Argentina
Guatemala
Honduras
How Many Public Officials are Corrupt?
110 
 
Dominican public officials. Levels of corruption remain one of the critical 
indicators of democratic performance. The data reveal that, regionally, 
corruption practices seem to be a deep-seated challenge for Latin American 
governments, except for Chile and Uruguay, and negatively impacts 
democratic performance in the region. 
In clear congruence with the Latinobarometro Report, the Perception 
Study of Corruption in Households of Dominican Republic202
Figure 4. Corruption in the Dominican Republic 
 notes that at 
least 81.8 percent of Dominicans believe that corruption is widespread in the 
country. This percentage reflects Dominicans who answered that the country 
is “corrupt” or “very corrupt.” 
 
 
Source: Estudio de Percepción de la Corrupción en Hogares de la Republica Dominicana 
(Programa de Transparencia y Acción Ciudadana), December 2008, 3 
                                                 
202 Programa de Transparencia y Acción Ciudadana, “Estudio de Percepción de la Corrupción 
en Hogares de la Republica Dominicana,” Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana, December 
2008, www.anje.org/serve/listfile_download.aspx?id=1374&num=1    
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 The table below show Dominican perception on institutions. In regard 
to the assessment of institutions, the data from Iberobarometro203
Figure 5. Trust in Institutions 
 presents a 
varied picture, with Dominicans giving favorable scores to education, the 
Church, and the armed forces while giving poor scores to political parties and 
the legislative body. 
 
 
Source: Barometro Iberoamericano 2009 (CIMA), 21-25 
 
The data shown by Iberobarometro 2009 are interesting in many 
respects. First, it is noteworthy how Dominican Republic leads the regional 
                                                 
203 Consorcio Iberoamericano de Empresas de Investigación de Mercados y Asesoramiento 
(CIMA), “Iberoamerican Barometer of Governability 2009,”  Bogotá, Colombia, 
http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/.  The Iberobarometro assesses population perception in 
the region since 1992. The 2009 Barometer of Governability examines 21 countries of Latin 
America and Iberoamérica as well as Hispanic population in the United States.  
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count in the perception of trust in the church, television news, press, private 
businesses and banks. As the table notes, Dominicans assess poorly political 
parties, Congress, NGOs, unions, and the police. Yet, as we noted elsewhere, 
trust in political parties has declined in the region since the transition to 
democracy and remains low for all countries examined. Putting this fact in 
perspective, the Dominican Republic scores third in the perception of trust in 
political parties right after Hispanics in the United States and Uruguay, with 
34 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Hence, Dominicans still believe that 
political parties are able to canalize and mediate interests effectively in 
Dominican society.  
We also need to acknowledge the role of parties in securing democratic 
transitions and move into more consolidated democracy. The 
institutionalization of parties, with highly organized structures and agendas, 
clearly has impacted the process of democratization. The recent 2009 Report 
by Latinobarometro stresses the relevance of political parties in the 
democratization process. 
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Figure 6. Perception that Democracy Cannot Exist Without 
Parties 
 
 
Source: Latinobarometro Report 2009, 27 
 
At first glance, the table shows the Dominican Republic scoring 
significantly higher than the average for Latin American countries, 11 points 
over the average of 60 percent for the region. The intrinsic association 
between political parties and democracy is therefore a strong value in 
Dominican society. This perception has remained strong despite areas of 
discontent that democracy and political competition may bring, for example, 
internal corruption in political parties, poor economic performance or little 
accountability of political actors. However, the data become more interesting 
when the survey broadens the analysis to assess whether democracy can exist 
without political parties and a legislative body. 
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Table 7. – Democracy Cannot Exist without Political Parties or 
National Congress 
 
Country Without Political Parties 
(%) 
Without Congress or 
Parliament (%) 
Points of 
Increase / 
Added 
 2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 -2009 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
77 71 80 61 -25 
Average 
Latin 
America 
58 60 55 57 4 
Source: Latinobarometro Report 2009, 28 
 
The data reveal that while support for the existence of political parties 
as a fundamental layer of the democratic system in the Dominican Republic 
remains high, scoring higher than the average of Latin American countries, 
the country has an opposite trend to that of the region. In other words, 
comparing data from 2006 and 2009, Dominicans are 6 percent less favorable 
to the perception that democracy cannot exist without political parties and 19 
percent less favorable to the perception that democracy cannot exist without 
a Congress or Parliament. In both cases these trends are opposite to that of 
the average of Latin American countries, which in both cases reported an 
increase of two points (from 58 to 60 percent in regard to political parties and 
from 55 to 57 percent in regard to Congress or Parliament).204
                                                 
204 Corporación Latinobarometro, “Latinobarometro Report 2009,” November, Santiago, 
Chile, 28, <
 The increasing 
negative perception of political parties and Congress in general, hence, must 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/> 
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not be overlooked when assessing the evolution and current state of 
democracy in the Dominican Republic. 
 In a broader context and addressing the reliability of political parties 
in the region, Dominguez asserts that: 
“…Parties are the most effective instruments to articulate and 
aggregate social, economic, and political demands; set 
priorities; and respond to those demands. Parties are key 
means to organize parliamentary politics to support or oppose 
the executive. Bargaining between parties reduces the 
intensity of acute conflicts and creates the political room for the 
rise and consolidation of “arbiter” institutions such as the 
courts…”205
A Convoluted Quest for Democracy 
 
 
 As we will discuss further in the next section of this dissertation, 
political parties in the Dominican Republic have played an unequivocal role 
in the success of the democratic transition and the following consolidation 
process.  
 
The first government of the PRD led by Antonio Guzman made 
significant progress in respect to the institutionalization of civil and political 
rights and delineation of the “rules of game” as understood in a democratic 
regime. Nevertheless, it faced dissent within its own party and four years 
later, in 1982, Jorge Blanco was elected president for the PRD. Expectations 
were much higher in this second presidency of the PRD, as the party gained 
                                                 
205 Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (ed.), Constructing Democratic Governance in 
Latin America (3rd. Ed), (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 329.  
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an absolute majority in both chambers of Congress. However, these 
expectations did not turn into reality and the party was seriously accountable 
for this. First, it has been acknowledged that the PRD was rapidly absorbed 
by the state, making it difficult to differentiate between both discourses, and 
soon engaged in authoritarian and paternalistic practices typical of the 
Dominican state.206
The distance between the masses and a political party that was able to 
canalize its social demands was caused by the “stigmatization” of every 
opposition force that emerged from the democratic game. This particular 
feature resembled Balaguer’s political action and raised serious doubts of the 
PRD’s capability to handle the democratic process without authoritarian 
practices.
 Second, there was a falling out between a party of the 
masses (PRD) and the Dominican society.  
207
Table 8. Linkages between Citizens and Parties in the Americas 
   
 
 
 Voted in 
presidenti
al election 
%  
Voted in 
legislative 
election %  
Difference 
in 
presidenti
al/legislati
ve vote  
Sympathiz
e 
%  
Works for the 
party (total 
interviewees) 
%  
Works for the 
party (only 
sympathizers
) %  
México 71.3 58.1 13.2 49.2 7.4 9.7 
Guatemala 56.5 41.1 15.4 14.7 3.8 14.2 
El 
Salvador 
67.9 65.6 2.3 31.3 8.3 15.6 
Honduras 82.5 70.3 12.2 44.2 19.9 27.3 
Nicaragua 61.2 46.8 14.4 49.8 10.9 16.8 
Costa Rica 70.8 92.7 -21.9 36.2 11.2 19.6 
                                                 
206 Flavio Darío Espinal, “Política, Constitución y Reforma,” 242. 
 
207 Particular attention deserves the civil revolt of April 1984 for the rising costs of food and 
the disproportionate repression carried out by the Dominican state.  
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Panamá 79.5 51.0 28.5 20.8 12.8 26.6 
Colombia 60.2 46.5 13.7 28.6 11.7 25.2 
Ecuador 83.8    9.3  
Bolivia 90.9      
Perú 91.8 91.8 0 29.9 8.0 15.4 
Paraguay 67.6    12.1  
Chile 70.8 66.4 4.4 25.6 3.8 9.2 
Uruguay 88.9   53.3 15.2 21.6 
Brasil 84.1   34.1 14.0 23.8 
Venezuela 76.8 29.8 47 32.5 13.2 26.8 
Republica 
Dominican
a 
80.3 77.2 3.1 60.4 20.0 27.3 
Haití 78.0 72.5 5.5 37.9 15.4 23.7 
Jamaica 48.0 33.1 14.9 47.1 6.8 12.9 
Guyana 78.1 56.8 21.3 19.5 10.1 22.5 
Canadá 84.0   50.7   
Estados 
Unidos 
89.3   62.2   
Total 
Américas 
74.8 59.2  37.1 11.3 20.01 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Barometer of the Americas 2006, 55  
 
 
The government of the PRD led by president Blanco was marked by 
corruption scandals that eroded one of the main bases of legitimacy that the 
party featured since the remarkable campaign of 1978. The implementation 
of a stabilization package promoted by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) also proved to have remarkable leverage in the decline of support of 
Blanco’s government.  By 1986, the party has lost much of its support, 
especially from the poor and middle classes, and, Joaquin Balaguer again 
became a viable option to solve the economic and political turmoil of the PRD 
governments.  
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the initial period of the 
democratic transition of the Dominican Republic. The aim was to provide a 
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comprehensive analysis of the pacts, actors, movements, and agenda that 
were at the forefront of the democratic process in its initial period. It also 
dealt with the convoluted legacy of the Dominican history, stigmatized by the 
conflation of authoritarian and democratic tendencies.  
 
The Race Factor and the Democratic Transition 
In a country like the Dominican Republic, race has outlasted more 
than any other element and proved to be a critical factor in the constitution of 
the Dominican nation. Therefore, it seems surprising that the literature on 
democratic transitions, in general and in the Dominican case, has not dealt 
with the sudden absence of the treatment of race during the initial 
democratization of the country.  
In order to understand the underlying factors of the initial transition 
we have to deal with the utilization of race during the Trujillo dictatorship 
and the Balaguer administration that followed.  
Wilfredo Lozano argues that antihaitianism208 was a historical 
construct in the Dominican Republic. Yet, it is taken to new heights by the 
Trujillo dictatorship.209
                                                 
208 In its core, antihaitianism as a state-sponsored ideology from the Trujillo administration 
revolved around two main arguments: Dominicans as proud heirs of a glorious Hispanic 
Conquistadores and the courageous Taine Indians (Sagas: 1993, 2000) leading to a rejection 
of elements of an Afro-American heritage. 
 
 During the regime, the intellectual and political elite 
209 Several scholars agree with the notion that antihaitianism was not a creation of Trujillo. 
In this line of argument, Ernesto Sagas in Race and politics in the Dominican Republic, 
considers that antihaitianism was already a part of the Dominican culture. However, it is 
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became the most important articulator of this anti-Haitian discourse. 
Therefore, Lozano argues that this has been a historical construction. 
However, this construction has not molded into what we know today as 
antihaitianism until the rise of Trujillo. Trujillo is the one who was able to 
transmit this ideological and political antagonism to Dominicans as a 
requisite to assume Dominican identity. Yet, Lozano warns that although an 
obvious thread connects the historical construction with the contemporaneous 
view of the Haitian issue, both need not be conflated.  
Lozano identifies two key builders of this anti-Haitian discourse: 
Arturo Peña Battle was the ideological mastermind while Joaquin Balaguer 
constructed the political argumentation of antihaitianism. The ways in which 
Balaguer was able to build this discourse proved critical for the way elites 
began to view the Haitian issue in a contemporaneous key. Two were the 
argumentations that Balaguer articulated while this discourse remained in 
effect: first, the demographic problem, in which Balaguer created the 
perception that Haitians had prolific conditions of procreation while the 
Dominican Republic was still aiming for population policies granting high 
preferences for the white population. In this specific sense, the demographic 
problem was constructed as a great hazard and challenge to resolve if 
                                                                                                                                                 
with Trujillo that it is converted into “state-sponsored ideology”. See Sagas, Race and 
Politics, 46. 
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Dominicans wanted to preserve their national identity.210
The construction of race by Trujillo is not a new creation and dates 
back to colonial times. In the Dominican Republic, much of the racial card is 
related to the perception and exultation of an exclusive Hispanic legacy 
instead of acknowledging an Afro-American legacy, which at the same time 
works as a key distinction from with the Haitian neighbors. Wooding 
 The second 
argument was related to the threat of cultural assimilation. Balaguer became 
the mastermind who warned against the dangers of the cultural, political and 
religious assimilation of Haitians into the Dominican identity. He was the 
one that articulated the idea of the threat of the Haitian invasion, the 
peaceful occupation and the obscure Haitian aim of uniting the two parts of 
the island into one. Here, Lozano presents a very appealing thesis that 
Balaguer did not enforce this discourse of the Trujillo dictatorship along his 
entire mandate, but rather when his political regime began to present signs 
of debilitation that put in danger his power of legitimacy. Therefore, while he 
maintained good and safe relations with Duvalier until the mid-1980s with 
the “braceros accords,” the anti-Haitian discourse did not prevail. However, 
when democratic contestations such as the one led by Jose Francisco Peña 
Gomez began to arise, this discourse became not only prevalent but also a key 
argument that rescued the intellectual discourse of the Trujillo dictatorship. 
                                                 
210 Lozano shows that this demographic perception has been proved wrong and that Haitians 
have reproduction levels that equate half of Dominicans. Interview with Wilfredo Lozano 
held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 2008. 
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emphasizes the historical accent on the Hispanic legacy while pointing out 
that the crossing of variables of gender, class and ethnicity with the purpose 
of a consolidating of the democratic process is relatively new in the 
country.211
The absence of the treatment of race during the democratic transition 
is acknowledged by many scholars in the Dominican Republic. Ruben Silie 
emphasizes that the topic was not part of the agenda of intellectuals in the 
country. Silie understands this “forgotten factor” as a legacy of “trujillismo” 
in which the perception of social relations was constructed upon the negation 
of the Haitian neighbor. Therefore, the study of race or racial relations in the 
country would represent a contradiction to the Trujillo regime.
  
212
While the treatment of race during the early democratization period 
seems to be irrelevant to the construction of the democratic foundations in 
the Dominican Republic, there is a noticeable renaissance in the 1990s of race 
and ethnicity as key markers of the Dominican identity. According to Lozano, 
two factors led to this difference in the treatment of race in the country: 1) 
Jose Francisco Peña Gomez did not exist in 1978 as a palpable political 
 Moreover, 
this legacy emphasized the Indian heritage vis-à-vis the afro-American 
legacy. 
                                                 
211 Interview with Brigitte Wooding held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 
2008. 
 
212 Interview with Ruben Silie held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 2008. 
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option. We have to recall here, that Peña Gomez was a leader of the PRD of 
Haitian decent213; 2) Silie and Lozano stress the fact that although Bosch and 
Balaguer have strong and different points of view in many respects, they held 
a very similar position regarding the Haitian issue. Here, Bosch and 
Balaguer had a similar vision of the state, the first one within a democratic 
vein and the second one in an authoritarian vein; however, they considered 
that the Dominican society was unable to organize and thus the state had to 
build the society from the top down. However, in the 1990s and with Peña 
Gomez as a real option to take power democratically, the argument was the 
complete opposite. Peña Gomez believed that the construction of the state 
was a direct consequence of the organization of society; thus, what proved 
crucial for this leader was the foundation from the bottom up.214
                                                 
213 It has been argued that Peña Gomez’s parents had to escape the massacre of 1937 and left 
baby Peña Gomez orphan, event after which, the boy was adopted and raised by a Dominican 
family.  
 
214 Interview with Wilfredo Lozano held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 
2008. 
 
 Lozano also 
provides an economic argument to explain the absence of the treatment of 
race during the democratic transition of 1978 and the resurgence of race as a 
factor in the 1990s. The argumentation line emphasizes the role of the state 
as an economic agent, specifically as a sugar plantation owner who did not 
encounter any benefits in mounting a race discourse at a time in which the 
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Haitians were providing the labor force for the economic production of the 
Dominican Republic.  
The discourse of antihaitianism by the Dominican state leads to the 
problem of the Haitian immigration. Once the Haitian population leaves the 
sugar plantation –and at the same time the Dominican state concludes its 
reign as sole owner and administrator of sugar plantations- and immigrates 
to the cities, where it urbanizes, then the immigration is seen as not only an 
economic, but a political, social, cultural, and religious threat.215
Conclusions 
  
 
Much of the literature of transitions has completely overlooked the 
racial and ethnic issue as an underlying factor of a democratization process. 
We have learned in a contemporary view that the absence of the racial and 
ethnic debate in a transition in which new rules of the game are put in place 
and pacts and alliances are reshaped among sectors, has eroded social 
relations in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, it has had remarkable 
consequences in electoral politics that followed the country from the 1990s 
onward while preventing one of the most apt leaders of Dominican political 
history to become president.  
Yet, in academic research, it seems unworthy to engage in 
counterfactual analysis. The question of what would have happened if the 
                                                 
215 Ibid 
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racial and ethnic debate would have been present in the early transition 
remains still open. 
Chapter 4 
 
Race and Migration 
 
“The erosion of Dominican national identity, steadily under way 
for more than a century through dealings with the worst of the 
Haitian population, has made worrying advances. Our racial 
origins and our tradition as a Spanish people must not stop us 
from recognizing that our nationality is in danger of 
disintegration if we do not take drastic measures against the 
threat to it from the proximity of the Haitian population.” 
(Joaquín Balaguer, La Isla al Revés, 1984 quoted in James 
Ferguson’s “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Beyond,” Minority Rights Group International,19)  
 
Race and migration are inevitably interconnected in the historic legacy 
of the Dominican Republic. Both factors have underpinned historical 
relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and have engendered 
hostile and distrustful relations between the neighboring countries of 
Hispaniola. This chapter will address the patterns of migration of the island 
from the early twentieth century to the present time. It is important to 
understand the question of migration through the lens of race to grasp the 
consequences of the absence of the treatment of race during the 
democratization process in the Dominican Republic. 
 This chapter will argue that the omission of the subject and its 
avoidance in the Dominican democratic agenda in the late 1970s have played 
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an unequivocal role in the migration debate that currently affects both the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti.  
With the aim of revisiting this connection, the chapter first will 
address the initial periods of foreign migration to the Dominican Republic 
during the early twentieth century American occupation of the island.  
Second, the analysis will provide a political-economic context of the 
conditions upon which Haitian migration not only was accepted but also 
stimulated.  
Third, the chapter will scrutinize how dictatorial governments in both 
countries transformed uncontrolled migration patterns into “cooperation 
agreements.” 
 Fourth, the chapter will analyze the long-standing equivocal attitude 
by Dominican governments in providing an acceptable solution for this 
challenge. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the debate between “jus 
sanguinis” and “jus solis” in the Dominican Constitution as well as the 
implications of the unobserved linkage between race and migration and its 
consequences on the Dominican-Haitian experience. 
Previous chapters have scrutinized Haitian-Dominican relations since 
the initial colonization of Hispaniola by foreign powers, through the Haitian 
Declaration of Independence, the following Haitian occupation of the 
Dominican Republic, and the Dominican Independence of 1844. In addition, 
the chapters have buttressed the complex context upon which both 
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neighboring countries carried out their state building processes. Finally, the 
chapters also have made clear the construction of deep prejudices among both 
societies, drawing upon differences in color, race, language, and cultural 
traits. 
 Through centuries of coexistence, the Dominican Republic and Haiti 
have experienced relations of stark conflict and smooth cooperation. The 
question of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic is a good example of 
the uneasy relations that feature the history of both countries, as well as its 
intrinsic relation to factors such as race, nation, culture, and socioeconomic 
conditions.  
 
Migration as a Response to Economic Needs 
The paradox in the island of Hispaniola, which often puzzles both 
historians and sociologists, is how a country like Haiti, with a booming 
economy during colonial times and well into the nineteenth century, would 
turn into the impoverished nation that we see today, beset by poverty, 
lacking of economic resources, and suffering from instability and structural 
and institutional weakness. Developing in a parallel but inverted fashion, the 
Dominican Republic turned from a solitary and abandoned colony of the 
Spanish Empire with surmounting levels of poverty to an institutionally 
stable country, with a promising economy –now based fully in services- with 
acceptable socio-economic conditions. This paradox has been addressed many 
127 
 
times by the literature, but more research needs to be done to provide a 
thoughtful and convincing argument regarding the decline of Haiti and the 
rise of the Dominican Republic. Many authors have underscored as a critical 
turn the Haitian revolution in 1804 and the international isolation that 
followed this important event. We must recall that Haiti became the one and 
sole nation that declared itself the first black republic in the region and this 
generated widespread prejudice in traditional elites who saw the newly 
independent country as a threat to the pursue of elites’ interests. 
Migration of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic began in the 
early twentieth century during the U.S. occupation of the island. This new 
modality was in a great deal stimulated in great part by foreign owned 
(mostly American) sugar mills in the Dominican Republic that were in need 
of cheap labor to cut the cane on the sugar plantations. This economic 
activity, however, was far from being exclusively economic, and soon involved 
many other factors that had to be put in place in order for the system to 
work. The system that gave overall organization to the sugar industry was 
“the batey.” It is then not surprising that Wooding and Moseley-Williams 
called “the bateyes” a country within another.216
                                                 
216 Bridget Wooding and Richard Moseley-Williams, “Inmigrantes haitianos y dominicanos de 
ascendencia haitiana en la Republica Dominicana,” published by the Cooperación 
Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID) and the Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes 
(SJRM), 2004, 42, 
 With the aim of providing a 
Caribbean context, Wooding and Moseley-Williams claim that the Haitian 
http://www.espacinsular.org/IMG/_Inmigrantes_haitianos.pdf 
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migration began in a wide sense after the colonization of 1492. Bearing in 
mind the extermination of indigenous populations, the region was settled 
with African slaves by the dominance of colonial powers, including Spain, 
Portugal, Netherlands, France and Great Britain.217 Wooding and Moseley-
Williams estimate that Haitian migration for the two following decades after 
1919 involved approximately 5.000 Haitian workers (called “braceros”) per 
year.218
 Martinez notes that the initial decades of the twentieth century in 
Hispaniola showed a steady migration of workers from islands such as St. 
Kitts and Nevis, Antigua, Anguilla, St. Martin and Montserrat.
  
219 The 
contracts of these workers were negotiated mainly by particular plantations 
for the sugarcane harvest. A portion of these migrants did not return to their 
countries and decided to stay in Santo Domingo.220 Martinez highlights the 
fact that these West Indian workers came to be called by Dominicans as 
“cocolos” or “ingleses” regardless of whether they came from British, Dutch, 
French or Danish possessions.221
                                                 
217 Ibid 
 
218 Ibid 
 
219 Samuel Martinez, “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State and Migrant 
Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” Latin American Research Review, 34, No. 1, 
(1999): 64, 57-84. 
 
220 Ibid 
 
221 Ibid, Martinez also underscores that the origin of the term “cocolo” is still unknown.  
 
 The incorporation of “cocolos” to the sugar 
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industry was uneasy in the Dominican Republic. They faced challenges from 
Dominican elites and Dominican workers of the sugarcane plantations.222
It is worth mentioning that one of the critical factors driving cane 
growers and plantation owners was the need not only to have access to cheap 
labor but also to get workers easily disciplined for the sugarcane harvest. To 
them, an immigrant labor force had many advantages in this sense over the 
Dominican nationals. Martinez underscores that West Indians workers “could 
be obligated to work at night or on Sundays without overtime pay or left idle 
and hungry for days…”
  
223 Although there is no consensus in the literature, 
most authors agree that by the 1910s, most Dominicans had abandoned the 
sugar industry.224
The Stimulation of Haitian Migration  
 
 
Haitian immigration did not begin to take shape before the U.S. 
occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916. At the time, sugar plantations 
were served by the immigrant labor of workers from the Lesser Antilles. The 
incorporation of “cocolos” in the sugar industry, however, proved determinant 
for the abandonment by Dominican workers of the sugarcane plantations. 
Silie underscores that these workers entered the Dominican Republic with 
                                                 
222 Ibid 
 
223 Ibid,  65 
 
224 Ibid. See Bryan (1985:242). 
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some advantages regarding the following Haitian immigrants. First, they 
came with contracts endorsed by their colonial authority that granted them 
some kind of legal status225 in the country.226
There is no consensus regarding the number of Haitian workers 
entering the Dominican Republic before the U.S. occupation of 1916. 
Martinez observed that by the 1920s the number of Haitians and “cocolos” 
living on sugarcane plantations was nearly equal.
 Second, although they 
encountered some resistance from Dominican elites and Dominican 
sugarcane workers, they were not rejected by terms of race or ethnicity. 
Third, most of them returned to their home countries, and only small colonies 
decided to stay in Santo Domingo. After a few decades of “cocolo” immigration 
to work in the sugar plantations, cane growers began to stimulate Haitian 
labor as a source of cheaper labor as well as a more feasible solution to the 
high levels of man-force required to cut the cane in the extensive sugar 
plantations in the country. 
227 This proportion only 
increased after that time and by the late 1920s, approximately 100,000 
Haitian workers were living in the Dominican Republic.228
                                                 
225 Martinez underscores that many of these workers had consular representation as British 
subjects; however, these status did not served well once they entered the sugar plantations. 
Martinez, 65. See Richardson 1983: 128. 
 
226 Interview with Ruben Silie held in December 2008, in Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic. 
 
227 Martinez, “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand,” 66. See also Castillo (1978:53). 
 
228 Ibid 
 As mentioned 
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above, extreme poverty conditions were the underlying reasons for Haitian 
workers to enter the eastern part of Hispaniola. The deterioration of the 
bateyes’ conditions also constituted a reason for the replacement of West 
Indian workers (cocolos) for Haitian workers. Cane growers played an 
unequivocal role in stimulating this new wave of immigration. Cheaper 
means of transportation, inexpensive labor wages and the possibility to 
discipline Haitian workers in desperate need of achieving basic living 
conditions became a mix for the success of a booming commodity in the 
country.  
It is worth noting that the military U.S. military that occupied the 
island of Hispaniola229
                                                 
229 The United States occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 and Haiti from 
1915 to 1934. 
 institutionalized the workers’ contracts for the sugar 
industry in 1919. Although there was an initial immigration of workers from 
the English-speaking Antilles called “cocolos,” the great majority of workers 
following the earlier decades of the twentieth century for the Dominican 
sugar industry came from Haiti. As has been addressed elsewhere, among the 
main reasons that explain the flux of Haitian migration into the Dominican 
Republic were, on one part, extreme poverty, inequality and lack of 
opportunities, and on the other part, stable economic and social conditions in 
the Dominican Republic along with high levels of employment in the sugar 
industry. This explanation easily can be translated into numbers, as the 
report of Wooding and Moseley-Williams shows. Building upon data from the 
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World Bank (2002b and 2002c) and the Dominican Census (2002), the 
authors explain the insurmountable differences in social and economic 
indicators of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. In brief, the Dominican 
Republic accounts for a GDP per capita four times higher than Haitians (US$ 
2230 to US$480), and malnutrition and infant mortality is doubled in Haiti 
compared to the Dominican Republic (73 to 39 infant mortality and 17 to 6 in 
malnutrition, respectively).230
The U.S. occupation of Hispaniola, with overlapping time periods in 
Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) no doubt 
represented an important point of departure of a further process of 
centralization that would lead to the Trujillo dictatorship in 1930 and the 
Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti beginning in 1957. With the U.S. occupation 
and most sugar mills owned by American companies, it was clear that the 
military governments on both parts of Hispaniola would aim to have a stake 
in setting the conditions for the recruitment of “braceros” as well as the living 
conditions in the “bateyes.” As Martinez points out “the central government 
gained new powers as a result of fiscal reforms and the establishment of 
national constabularies under U.S. rule.”
 
231
                                                 
230 According to data provided by the World Bank (2002b and 2002c) and the Dominican 
Census of 2002. Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 2004, 28. 
 
231 Martinez, 67 
 
 Martinez criticizes the way in 
which the United States failed to implement advanced labor migration 
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policies, mostly giving the power to the sugar industrialists to determine the 
most convenient labor solution.232
Economic and political cooperation in dictatorial political regimes 
 
 
The mid-twentieth century on the island of Hispaniola was featured by 
a solid network of cooperation among the dictatorships of Francois Duvalier 
in Haiti and Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. This chain 
of agreements began in 1952 with the major purpose to “institutionalize” 
Haitian labor in the sugar industry of the Dominican Republic. By these 
agreements, Haiti provided a determined number of “braceros”233 to the 
Dominican Republic in exchange for economic compensation that represented 
a considerable profit for the Haitian government. The agreements took place 
for three decades. Three actors were critical in setting the stage of the 
economic and social context during this “chain of exploitation”234: the sugar 
mills, the Dominican government and the Haitian government.235
                                                 
232 Ibid 
 
233 “Braceros” is the given name to Haitian people that enters the DR with the purpose to 
work in the sugar industry during the harvest to cut the sugarcane. 
 
234 Wooding and Moseley-Williams refer to a “chain of exploitation” as the highly criticized 
and corrupt system of exploitation originated in 1952 with the infamous agreements between 
the Duvalier and Trujillo regimes to “contract” sugarcane workers. See Bridget Wooding and 
Richard Moseley-Williams, “Needed but Unwanted: Haitian Immigrants and Their 
Descendants in the Dominican Republic,” in CIIR Briefing, Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 2004, 38. 
 
235 Ibid 
 
 It is worth 
mentioning that the agreements proved in the long run to be a source of 
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economic profit for both governments sharing the island of Hispaniola, 
instead of becoming a viable means for the unemployed Haitian population to 
further a promising life in the Dominican Republic. Most of the Haitian 
workers were deceived by both governments; they suffered exploitation 
conditions, lacked of social benefits, and were devoid of legal status that 
undermined their conditions as immigrants as well as workers.  
Wooding and Moseley depict in depth how these agreements took place 
during at least three decades. First, Haitian workers were recruited as 
temporary workers through a wide variety of means including radio and 
trucks equipped with speakers that alerted the Haitian unemployed 
population to the promising labor conditions in the eastern part of the island. 
This call for “braceros” took place utilizing all government agencies in Haiti, 
including President Duvalier, government officials, as well as the well-known 
CEA236 (Consejo Estatal del Azucar) in the Dominican Republic. This well-
organized contracting organization took into consideration a wide network of 
subcontractors, including Haitian officials, bureaucracies (renovation of 
contracts), medical examinations, consular fees, return travel fees, and 
expenditures by the Haitian Embassy in Santo Domingo.237
                                                 
236 The CEA, Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (State Council of Sugar) was created by Law no. 7 of 
August 19, 1966. The purpose of the creation of this Council was give autonomy to a new 
body with the ability to centralize and effectively administer twelve sugar mills that have 
been previously under the control of the Trujillo administration. See 
  
http://www.cea.gov.do/historia/index_ant.htm  
 
237 Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 40 
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Wooding and Moseley-Williams note that at least two conditions were 
not followed in these agreements: the medical examinations of the “braceros” 
and the return trip fees for Haitian workers to go back to their country.238
To bear in mind the importance of the labor contracts with the 
Dominican Republic, we need to consider the people involved, profit expected, 
and political actors in the agreements per year. Wooding and Moseley-
Williams recall that these bilateral agreements were stipulated in American 
dollars to be paid to Haitian officers in reception points all along the 
Dominican-Haitian frontier.
 
This chain of exploitation was further sophisticated and improved, and 
underlying corruption and exploitation became rampant in the “bateyes” in 
the Dominican Republic.  
239 According to their report, the contract made in 
1986 regulated the contracts of 19,000 “braceros” to work in the Dominican 
sugar industry, providing two million dollars compensation to the Haitian 
government.240
                                                 
238 Ibid 
 
239 Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 40 
 
240 In the report, Wooding and Moseley Williams note that this money was received by the 
Haitian ambassador on January 18 1986. However, it disappeared when baby doc flew the 
country in February 7, defaulting with the provision of Haitian workers to the Dominican 
Republic, and negatively affecting the harvest of 1986. See Wooding and Moseley Williams, 
40. 
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Ferguson also has noted that the driving force behind Haitian 
migration to the Dominican Republic has been poverty.241 Interestingly, 
Ferguson underscores that the underlying motive for Haitian migration still 
holds in current patterns of migration that may parallel migratory 
movements of the beginning of the twentieth century.242 The structural 
poverty that affects the country show an average annual income of US$ 500 
per capita, as well as a majority of the population living in miserable poverty 
in rural communities. Many scholars have pointed out the social extremes 
that seem to be ingrained in this small country of eight million inhabitants. 
Extremes are shown not only in ethnic composition but also in access to 
economic resources. In regard to race and ethnicity, only 5 percent of the 
Haitian population is considered as white or mulatto, while the remaining 95 
percent is considered black.243
In regard to access to economic resources, Ferguson notes that the 
small mixed-race minority, along with a small proportion of black families, 
hold the economic power and the international connections with former 
colonial powers such as France, as well as the U.S.
  
244
                                                 
241 James Ferguson, “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and 
Beyond,” Minority Rights Group International, 8. 
 
242 Ibid 
 
243 Ferguson, 9 
 
244 Ibid 
 
 It is not difficult to 
imagine then that the nature of inequality that prevails in the country is 
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intrinsically related to the way race has influenced the economic and social 
patterns of the western side of Hispaniola. The history of poverty and social 
exclusion has been a reality in Haiti through periods of political instability.245
As discussed above, Haitian migration was stimulated by the rise of 
the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century. 
The international rise of the price of sugar introduced the necessity in 
Dominican elites to hire cheap labor in order to maintain the productivity. 
Haitian labor proved to be the cheapest labor available, and by the 1920s, 
Dominican sugar mills began to “contract”
  
246
It is noteworthy that Haitian migration does not involve only the 
Dominican Republic, and that the Haitian diaspora has migrated to United 
States, France, Canada and other Caribbean countries.
 Haitian workers to cut the cane 
in the sugarcane harvest. 
247
                                                 
245 For a complete picture of the political instability that has haunted the country for decades 
see Ferguson , 8-9. 
 
246 Needless to underscore is the inhuman conditions in which these Haitian workers were 
contracted, as well as the permanent abuses they experienced during their stay in the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
247 Ferguson notes that according to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the 
United States is home to 800,000 Haitians, France to 60,000 Haitians and Canada to 40,000 
Haitians. See Ferguson, 9. 
 
 Yet, the 
destination of the largest Haitian migratory movement has been the 
Dominican Republic. Ferguson notes that this movement is complex and 
involves “voluntary and involuntary migration, long and short-term residence 
in the Dominican Republic, legal and illegal entry, smuggling, expulsions, 
138 
 
and a long history of human rights abuses.”248 Ferguson highlights two 
central paradoxes to the Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic: 1) the 
necessity of Haitian workers for the Dominican economy and 2) the 
conditions of poverty and deprivation. The first paradox regards the fact that 
while the cross-border trafficking has been and is stimulated by economic 
elites in the Dominican Republic, the Haitians still are considered a racial 
threat with insurmountable cultural differences by the Dominican 
population. This first paradox has been addressed by mainstream literature 
in Haitian-Dominican relations. However, Ferguson contributes to the 
literature by underscoring the fact that Haitians encounter worse forms of 
poverty and deprivation conditions in the eastern part of the island than the 
experienced in their home country, Haiti.249
This dissertation argues that migration patterns from Haiti to the 
Dominican Republic have changed since the early twentieth century. 
Although the first migratory flow of Haitian workers was oriented to the 
sugar industries, the beginning of the twenty-first century shows that this is 
no longer the case. The decline in the international price of sugar, as well as 
the reduction of importation quotas from the United States, greatly affected 
the Dominican economy and that nation had to diversify in order to regain 
productivity levels of previous decades. The Dominican economy turned into a 
 
                                                 
248 Ferguson, 9 
 
249 Ibid 
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“services economy”250
Keeping in mind that the previous flow of Haitian migrants crossed 
the border to work in the sugar harvest for temporary periods,
 in which construction, tourism, and non-traditional 
agriculture became the fundamental pillars of this economic turn. Therefore, 
as noted by Dominican scholars such as Silie and Segura in their seminal 
work La Inmigracion Haitiana,  Haitian labor began to be utilized in other 
economic activities, such as construction and tourism.  
251
Ferguson quotes findings by the International Human Rights Clinic at 
the University of California asserts that males illiterates in their late 
twenties are classic examples of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, 
and in spite of acknowledging changes in the agricultural sector since the end 
of the bilateral agreements as well as the strategies of privatization of the 
sugar industry, the employment pattern based on sugar cane harvest 
 this new 
turn in the Dominican economy requires a worker population that holds a 
more permanent status.  However, some organizations contest the 
assumption that the employment pattern has changed in the Dominican 
Republic.  
                                                 
250 The OECD defines services as “a diverse group of economic activities not directly 
associated with the manufacture of goods, mining or agriculture.” Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The Service Economy,” Business and Industry 
Policy Forum Series, 2000, 7. 
 
251 Although many Haitian workers decided to stay illegally or without legal status in the 
Dominican Republic for unlimited periods of time. 
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remains of important leverage in the country.252 Yet, this study does not 
underestimate the complex nature of the composition of the Haitian 
migration, acknowledging the high numbers of Haitian males in the 
construction industry, manufacturing labor and street-salespersons.253
Yet, as Ferguson reminds us, the Haitian population living in the 
Dominican Republic is not homogenous. Basic differences denote a wide 
majority of undocumented migrants devoid of any legal status and a small 
documented Haitian population, mostly based in urban settings.
  
254
Looking at the economic reality of the Dominican Republic, one may 
argue that sugar has been the most important commodity since the late 
nineteenth century. The sugar industry was a fundamental source of profit 
during the U.S. occupation from 1916 to 1924. As we recalled elsewhere, it 
was in this period that a more formal and institutionalized recruitment of 
Haitian “braceros” to cut the sugar cane was implemented. In addition, U.S. 
corporations controlled at least half of the existing sugar mills with almost all 
 
                                                 
252 Ferguson, 10. See also International Human Rights Law Clinic, “Unwelcome Guests: A 
Study of Expulsions of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent from the Dominican 
Republic to Haiti,” Berkeley, University of California, 2002, 34,  
< http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Unwelcome_Guests.pdf>  
 
253 International Human Rights Law Clinic, “Unwelcome Guests: A Study of Expulsions of 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent from the Dominican Republic to Haiti,” 34. 
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production going to supply U.S. imports quotas.255 According to Ferguson, the 
number of Haitian workers who entered the Dominican Republic during the 
U.S. occupation did not diminish after 1924, showing a continuous migratory 
movement to the eastern part of Hispaniola.256
                                                 
255 Ferguson notes that by 1925, U.S. corporations controlled 11 sugar mills of the 21 sugar 
mills in the country. Also, 98% of exports were destined to supply U.S. imports quotas. See 
Ferguson, 10. 
 
256 The official census of 1935 registered at least 50,000 Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic. See Ferguson,10. 
  
If we look at the distribution in the labor market of Dominicans and 
Haitians, we can grasp the underlying and sometimes evident race relations 
between these neighboring countries, harboring feelings of distrust, contempt 
and hostility. In the bateyes, Dominicans were employed in supervisory and 
higher skilled positions with better compensation. The perception that still 
holds today that Haitians were ill-suited for good jobs and suited only for 
cutting cane also was in place during the twentieth century. In addition, two 
modes of production distinguished both countries in the colonial period.  
On one hand, a plantation-based economy that boosted Haitian 
production during its golden years with a well-functioning network of slavery 
set the foundation of the system. On the other hand, a hacienda mode of 
production existed in the Dominican Republic, based mostly on cattle 
ranching and farming, with a more flexible slavery network in which the 
slave could buy his own freedom. 
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 Indeed, these differences did translate years after in the sugar mills of 
the Dominican Republic. Haitian workers did the hard, humiliating and 
poorly paid jobs, while most Dominicans refused to cut cane and were 
employed in higher-skilled jobs within the mills. The race divide also can be 
seen in the fact that Dominicans drawn from “the poorest sectors of rural 
society and darker-skinned, were forced by poverty to cut cane.”257
Migration as the Underlying Conundrum 
 
 
Dominican governments have largely evaded the issue of Haitian 
migration to the country. There are many reasons for this attitude including 
a lack of political will to provide an acceptable solution for both parts 
involved in the controversy, a fear to upset economic elites of the country that 
depend on Haitian labor supply to further their economic activities, and the 
desire to avoid a national debate that certainly would incite racial divides in 
the country. It is important to bear in mind that since the 1980s there has 
been important international pressure on the way in which Dominicans 
handle Haitian workers in the bateyes and the sugar industry, calling into 
question human rights abuses and child labor practices, among others.   
The pattern mentioned above has been largely followed by most 
Dominican governments since the return to the democratic regime in 1978 
with the PRD defeat of Joaquin Balaguer. Yet, the Trujillo dictatorship and 
                                                 
257 Ferguson, 10. Ferguson notes that by 1970’s this minority was quickly outnumbered by 
Haitian “braceros.”  
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the Balaguer administration are important markers upon which to analyze 
how Haitian migration and the consequent race relations it engendered were 
managed. As noted elsewhere, the Trujillo dictatorship signaled an 
installment of anti-Haitian prejudice as a means to foster Dominican 
nationalism and with the aim of building the nation-state. The Dominican 
nation came to be identified with everything that was not Haitian. Therefore, 
“Dominicanness” was, in essence, a Hispanic, Spanish-speaking and Catholic 
society. With the aim of differentiating from the Haitian neighbors, Trujillo 
spread throughout the country a need for Dominicanization, -especially on 
the frontier-, to prevent the “Haitian enemy” from influencing and 
contaminating national values.258 Yet, as Ferguson reminds us, Trujillo was 
highly dependent upon supplies of Haitian workers. Ferguson interestingly 
addresses how Trujillo’s attitudes changed from the 1937 massacre to the 
mid-twentieth century, by which time he had taken over many of the sugar 
mills controlled by American and domestic owners.259
As we have said before, race and migration are clearly entwined in the 
Dominican reality. The historical, economic, social, and cultural narratives of 
Hispaniola show these issues at the forefront of the development of the 
Dominican nation-state and its identity. Nevertheless, in looking at Haitian 
 
                                                 
258 It is worth mentioning that Trujillo was successful for many years in its aim to strengthen 
the Dominican nation and their sense of belonging vis a vis the Haitian nation through fear 
and prejudice. 
 
259 Ferguson, 10 
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migration to the Dominican Republic, one can omit dealing with the many 
facets that are impacted by the high influx of Haitians to the neighboring 
country. Among these facets, race is a significant facet, but by no means the 
only one. Looking at migratory patterns and domestic impacts, we need to 
address political, economic, social, racial, and cultural impacts and 
consequences.  
Political impacts are related largely to civil and political rights, 
including the issue of nationality to Haitian residents and Dominicans born 
in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents. The question of nationality, 
therefore, is the means through which political and civil rights are exercised, 
including getting access to education, health, social services, right to vote, 
and the like. As will be developed further in this chapter, the political facet 
encompasses the judicial debate regarding the appropriateness of “jus solis” 
as prescribed by the Dominican constitution, or “jus sanguinis.” In any case, 
we should bear in mind what has been considered a loophole in the 
Dominican constitution that makes it more difficult to discern the concept of 
a “person in transit” as the explanation for denying citizenship in the 
Dominican Republic. Economic impacts involve a manifold of actors, both in 
the Dominican Republic and in Haiti.  
First and foremost, the business community in the Dominican 
Republic, especially in the sugar, construction, agriculture, and services 
sector, plays a major role in the impulse of Haitian immigration as a valuable 
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workforce, in terms of cheap labor as well as a more disciplined and laborious 
workforce than Dominicans nationals. This has been the case, since the 
beginning of the sugar industry in the country in the late nineteenth century, 
with the business community being one of the most ardent advocates for the 
introduction of Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic. Yet, this position 
has encountered sporadic contradictions with Dominican governments that 
attempted to regulate and control Haitian migration with no success.  
Social impacts of the Haitian flux of migration to the Dominican 
Republic involve a wide variety of aspects, including processes of assimilation 
and acculturation to the Dominican identity, insertion of the foreign 
community in Dominican customs, and patterns of social interaction.  
The race facet, considered of critical importance in this dissertation, 
plays a major role in the way Dominicans shape their identity vis-à-vis 
Haitian migration to the country. Both countries share a history of mutual 
distrust, racial divisiveness and ethnic stereotypes. The Dominican 
stereotype is deeply entrenched in its Hispanic, Catholic and Spanish-
speaking legacy. Therefore, Dominicans define themselves in contraposition 
to Haiti, the latter understood as a country with African roots, influenced by 
rites such as voodoo and Creole-speaking. 
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Figure 9. Level of National Pride and Beliefs in Common 
Values (Average per country) 
 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Barometer of the Americas Report 2006, 207 
 
 
 
Finally, the cultural facet involves the social interaction among 
Haitians and Dominicans, including intermarriages, cohabitation in 
Dominican neighborhoods, and the like. Thus, Haitian migration to the 
Dominican Republic has manifold impacts. It has an extended chain of actors, 
including business and economic elites, the Dominican and Haitian 
governments, civil society, the complex network of people who informally 
recruit Haitian workforce, the police, and the armed forces.  
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The Unobserved Link: Race and Migration 
Jus Solis vs. Jus Sanguinis 
The debate between the appropriateness of “jus solis” and “jus 
sanguinis” for non-nationals born in a different home country is not new.260 
The discussion has nurtured constitutional debates all over the world and 
has given rise to constitutional precedents in countries that have experienced 
a high flux of Haitian immigration. Espinal reminds us of the importance of 
nationality for the legal implications of state decisions regarding of who is or 
is not Dominican.261
The current heated debate over this issue also has led to aspirations to 
expand Dominican nationality to Dominican descendents abroad, therefore 
 The Dominican conundrum and the debate that has 
raged over the new Constitution stems from the 2005 decision of the 
Dominican Supreme Court to limit the “jus solis” already established in the 
original constitution, denying nationality to Dominicans born in the country 
to undocumented Haitian immigrants. This decision clearly challenged what 
had been established in the Dominican constitution, which considers that the 
principle that rules births in the country is that of “jus solis.”  
                                                 
260 Jus solis is a clause often included in Latin American constitutions which determines the 
citizenship principle in regard to the country of residence at the time of birth. On the other 
hand, jus sanguinis is a clause that favors the right to obtain the parents’ citizenship as 
determined by blood. This practice is utilized more often in Europe and Great Britain. See 
Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 52. 
261 Rosario Espinal, “Falacia sobre el Jus Solis y el Jus Sanguinis,” Clave Digital, May 12, 
2009 <http://www.clavedigital.com/App_Pages/Opinion/Firmas.aspx?Id_Articulo=14354> 
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adducing “jus sanguinis” to the right to nationality.262
The recently proclaimed Dominican constitution stipulates both the 
principle of “jus sanguinis” and a restricted principle of “jus solis”, noting the 
exception of children born to diplomats residing in the country, to people in 
transit or to those who reside illegally in the country. The subject is treated 
in the Dominican Constitution, Chapter 5, Section I “On Nationality.” 
 The issue of “jus 
sanguinis” and “jus solis” is highly relevant to the Dominican reality. It 
regulates the right to nationality, as well as determining the ascription of an 
individual to certain culture, traits and “Dominicanness.” This is not a minor 
issue in a country where race and nation are so entwined vis-à-vis Haiti. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that any resolution regarding the right to 
nationality of children born to parents of Haitian descent becomes a question 
of national interest.  
263
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 One 
conundrum relates to how one determines if a person is “in transit” in the 
Dominican Republic as a base to denying citizenship to newborns. History 
shows that government officials have relied largely on this aspect of the 
article to undermine the right of “jus solis” as a principle to grant citizenship. 
Therefore, children born in the Dominican Republic to parents of Haitian 
263 Dominican Constitution, proclaimed in January 26th, 2010, Chapter 5, Section 1. Article 
18 notes that nationality is granted to “persons born in the national territory, with the 
exception of the sons and daughters of foreign members of diplomatic and consular missions, 
foreign persons in transit or of those who reside illegally in Dominican territory. A foreign 
person is considered in transit when defined as such in Dominican laws,” trans. Gabriela 
Hoberman, http://www.suprema.gov.do/codigos/Constitucion.pdf  
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descent residing in the country for decades have been denied the right to 
obtain birth certificates as Dominicans.  
Wooding reminds us that in the Dominican Republic, a “birth 
certificate has become the evidence of nationality for children who are born in 
the country.”264 Hence, the registration of a birth certificate also becomes a 
necessary means to carry out further civil actions and be eligible for rights 
and protections, such as obtaining a passport, protection against child labor 
and the like.  This puzzle has resulted in literature on “statelessness” as a 
new status held by these children who cannot achieve Dominican citizenship 
or easily obtain Haitian citizenship.265
One of the core problems that Dominican governments have failed to 
address is the “stateless” conditions of many children of Haitian descent 
residing in the Dominican Republic. These children, although born to 
Dominican parents, are not considered Dominicans by the country’s law. This 
attitude has raised questions at the international level, not only from 
national governments but also from international agencies and non-
governmental organizations. The “stateless” condition occurs when a person 
born in a country is not legally recognized as a national citizen because of 
national descent and origin. Therefore, race becomes a huge issue in a 
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country that has completely avoided dealing with the topic during its 
democratization path.  
This chapter argues that the lack of treatment of race during the 
democratic transition has led to noteworthy consequences in Dominican life. 
Haitian migration flows to the country represent one example of the impact 
of race and ethnicity in the eastern part of the island. Therefore, migration 
and race become definitely become intermingled with economic, social, 
political, and legal consequences.  
Most Dominican governments have reacted to Haitian migration with 
a series of deportations, that sometimes are periodic police actions to control 
illegal immigration and from time to time are tantamount to mass 
deportations of all Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic. In regard to 
public perception of Haitian workers living in the country, the long-standing 
racial divide still holds true and Haitians are perceived as “black people” ill-
suited for high-skilled jobs that deprive Dominicans of job opportunities in 
their home country. Yet, the other side of the coin shows that many 
healthcare facilities of the Dominican Republic have been overwhelmed by 
Haitians generating anger and prejudice on the Dominican side. On top of 
this situation, economic elites in the country defend their right to “contract” 
Haitian workers as a way to access to cheap labor for the kind of jobs 
Dominicans are not willing to do. This complex picture only highlights the 
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core of the argument in looking at Dominican-Haitian relations over the last 
decades. 
Looking more specifically to the political side of Haitian immigration to 
the Dominican Republic, Lozano underscores that conservative elites have 
utilized the idea of the “Haitian threat” to the Dominican nation to weaken 
liberal elites.266 Assessing the success of this strategy, Lozano highlights how 
this racial construction did have notable political effects in three critical 
historical years of the Dominican experience: 1990, 1994, and 1996, in which 
Francisco Jose Peña Gomez, the most important leader of the PRD of Haitian 
descent, almost rose to power in 1994 and a political alliance was the only 
way to defeat him in 1996.267 Indeed, Lozano acknowledges in his analysis 
that the liberal forces in the country, instead of acting to include the 
immigration and racial issue in the political agenda of the democratization 
process, remained silent, thereby, weakening the consolidation of the 
Dominican democracy.268
 In the same line of argumentation, this dissertation argues that the 
treatment of race as well as issues like the Haitian immigration, -which 
represents a connected consequence of the way in which race and nation have 
been constructed on the island of Hispaniola- have been notoriously absent 
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from the political discourse that set the agenda during the early 
democratization process.   
Digging into the groups that benefit most from racial prejudice against 
Haitians, priest Regino Martinez identifies the authorities, both military and 
civilian. According to Martinez, this complex network of “buscones” and 
“cambistas” often count with the support of some members of the military. 
This network goes even further and constitutes a permanent fraud of official 
norms, avoiding official customs control, where both Dominicans and 
Haitians are involved.269
According to Silie, the current ambassador of the Dominican Republic 
in Haiti, the treatment of the Haitian issue in the political Dominican context 
cannot escape the ideological imprint of the Trujillo dictatorship.
 
270
                                                 
269 Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM), 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en 
Republica Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 2005), 
148. Interview with Regino Martínez. 
 
 Indeed, 
Silie underlines that up to the 1980s, Haitian immigration was treated by 
Dominican government officials as part of the process of “peaceful invasion” 
instead of looking at it as a migration phenomenon. According to Silie, this 
had two immediate consequences: first, the challenge in delineating an 
effective migratory policy, and second, the politicization of the Haitian issue. 
As we have mentioned often in this dissertation, this politicization to which 
270 Ruben Silie, “Aspectos y Variables de las Relaciones entre Republica Dominicana y Haití,” 
Revista Futuros, III, no. 9, (2005): 6, <http://www.revistafuturos.info> 
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Silie refers was featured in the attacks and antihaitianism sentiments 
against Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, leader of the PRD, who was accused of 
promoting the unification of the island of Hispaniola and the Haitianization 
of the Dominican Republic.271
The media also has been considered one of the main “keepers” of anti-
Haitian prejudice in the Dominican Republic. Ernesto Sagas has investigated 
the role of the media in promoting and conveying racial prejudice in the wake 
of the political campaign of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez.
  
272 A thorough 
analysis of media outlets shows the power of the media in creating racial 
narratives in Dominican society, as well as perpetuating the issue of race as a 
unifying factor against the “invader” enemy. Regino Martinez also highlights 
that the media in the Dominican Republic has tremendous leverage and on 
occasion, stimulates much of the racial prejudice entrenched in Dominican 
society. Martinez highlights that the radio is the communication outlet with 
greatest reach in the Haitian-Dominican frontier.273 He further argues that 
caricatures in the daily Listin have a clear racial impact, generating 
“rejection, death and annulation.”274
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273 Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM), 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en 
Republica Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 2005), 
150. Interview with Raymundo Martínez.  
 
274 Ibid, 151. 
 A recent article published by the daily 
Listin, suggests that racial stereotypes still are relevant in Dominican society 
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and serve interest groups well. The article275 refers to the homicide of a 
farmer in Navarrete presumably by Haitians. It is interesting to note that 
the article reveals no formal charges against the three Haitians accused of 
killing the farmer;276 however, the title of the article implies the contrary. In 
addition, the article underestimates the role of a Dominican involved in the 
investigation. The article later reveals the difficulties affecting the 
community of La Joya, where residents have resorted to Migration to 
repatriate illegal Haitians living in the area. The article illustrates the 
entrenched racial perception of Haitians; while the Dominican farmer is 
shown as a white man lying in the floor, with his head full of blood, the 
presumed aggressors are portrayed as black people, utilizing both fire 
weapons and “machetes.”277
                                                 
275 Listin, “Acusan a Haitianos de Matar a un Agricultor en Navarrete,” by Ricardo Santana, 
April 12, 2009, Section La Republica, 
 The continued use of racial stereotypes to 
portray the differences between Haitians and Dominicans has been a 
permanent feature in local Dominican media. Although more subtle in 
contemporary times, the power of the media still is relevant and contributes 
to racial perceptions –or the absence of them- in Dominican society.  
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276 In fact, the article then reveals that three Haitians have been released in the 
investigation of a farmer in Navarrete. 
 
277 The utilization of “machetes” in the illustration of Listin conveys different messages. 
First, the utilization of the machete implies the use of barbaric and outdated means; as well 
as a clear reference to the role of Haitians in the Dominican Republic as “picadores” of sugar 
cane in the Dominican fields. 
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Regarding the two main parties in the country, the incumbent PLD 
(Dominican Liberation Party) and the PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party) 
are not far apart in their treatment of Haitian immigration to the Dominican 
Republic. Both parties consider that there is an urgent need to give the 
situation a global and comprehensive solution. Indeed, they argue that the 
permanent immigration flux across the Dominican-Haitian border needs to 
be controlled and that the Dominican Republic cannot afford the considerable 
burden that Haitian immigration brings to its neighboring country. This 
consensus regarding Haitian immigration becomes clearer when one looks at 
the discussion of jus solis and jus sanguinis. Regarding the recent 
Constitutional Reform Project approved by the Asamblea Revisora, the right 
to nationality in the Dominican Republic is going to be achieved by both jus 
sanguinis and jus solis. We need to bear in mind, however, that these 
principles do not hold equal relevance in the Dominican Constitution, and the 
principle of “jus sanguinis” prevails in the reform over “jus solis.”  
The decision to reform Article 16 of the previous Constitution sprang 
from an informal accord between the PLD and PRD leaders, President Leonel 
Fernandez and Miguel Vargas Maldonado, respectively. Scholars, 
representatives of civil society, and non-governmental organizations have 
soundly criticized the agreement for denying the right to nationality to long-
time Haitian residents in the Dominican Republic (the article cannot be 
applied retroactively), as well for facilitating the right to nationality for 
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Dominicans living abroad. Considering the difficulties in resolving the 
Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic, we cannot shy away from 
the 285-04 Immigration Law, which still has not been implemented due to 
the lack of regulation by the executive branch. Both parties, therefore, show 
an unmistakable concordance in their respective positions to approach the 
immigration flux to the Dominican Republic.  
The approved article still denies nationality to persons born to foreign 
diplomats in the country as well as to persons born to foreign persons in 
transit or residing illegally in the country. Again, the core of the problem is 
how “transit” is defined. The Article has been delineated in a way that favors 
the right to nationality to persons claiming jus sanguinis instead of those 
claiming jus solis. Therefore, the PLD and the PRD agree that granting 
nationality to persons of Haitian descent is, at the very least, a hazard to 
Dominican nationality. In other words, “Dominicanness” continues to be 
defined generally, as everything that is not from Haitian descent.  
To those who have expected that the new constitution would bring 
fresh solutions to an ancient problem, deception has been the result of years 
of efforts to arrive at a comprehensive solution to the Haitian immigration 
problem. Moreover, looking from a historical comparative perspective, we can 
grasp that in regard to the construction of race and ethnicity and the sense of 
nation in the Dominican Republic, parties hold a national viewpoint that 
transcends party fractions and lines while adopting a common strategy. This 
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was true in 1994 when Balaguer’s PRSC and the PLD agreed to unite to halt 
the vivid possibility of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez becoming president of the 
Dominican Republic.  
We need to bear in mind that the mentioned article, although it 
considers the right to nationality by the two main mechanisms of jus solis 
and jus sanguinis, precludes the right to claim jus sanguinis for the children 
of diplomats residing in the country, as well as foreigners in transit and/or 
residing illegally in the Dominican Republic.  
Espinal argues that both states, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
have responsibility for failing to solve the immigration conundrum that 
affects the neighboring countries of Hispaniola. 278 On one hand, Haiti has 
proved inefficient in improving its conditions of poverty and corruption, 
thereby collaborating in the migration of its population in search of better 
living conditions. On the other hand, Haitian immigration has been promoted 
by the Dominican business sector and corrupt government officials, who 
benefit economically from this immigration to the Dominican Republic.279
In analyzing this reality, Espinal concludes that this responsibility is 
shouldered by both states, and this reality needs to be acknowledged if a 
comprehensive solution to this puzzle is going to be found. She even goes 
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further in the analysis, stating that the new constitution, while restricting 
the jus solis and excluding the possibility to achieve civil rights for persons 
with Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic, will result in a new 
form of “Dominican apartheid.”280 In the same line, Lozano argues that the 
business sector needs to accept responsibility for the way it utilizes Haitian 
labor and the Dominican state needs to regulate more efficiently the frontier 
between both countries.281
Racial Prejudice and Nationality 
 
 
The investigation of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic is 
entwined with the Dominican identity and construction of nationality. When 
interviewed regarding racial prejudice in the country, Dominicans tend to 
agree that there is an extent of racial prejudice against Haitians, black 
Dominicans, and women. Raymundo Gonzalez claims that these prejudices 
have different tinctures; while Haitian prejudice is more visible, racial 
prejudice against women and black Dominicans are more subtle.282
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 According 
to Gonzalez, the structure upon which racial prejudice is constructed is 
281 Odalis Mejía, “La Migración Necesita un Acuerdo Inteligente y de Responsabilidad,” 
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related to the organization of society, uniting social condition with racial 
stereotype. In other words, as social inequity is related to economic structure, 
white people are associated with economic and political elites. Gonzalez 
explains the relation between racial prejudice and a poor social condition: 
“…it has a historic character; the colonial economic structure was 
racial. The black person was at the same time the equivalent of a 
slave and the white person was the equivalent of the master, the 
master is now the businessmen, the owner of the business and the 
slave is the worker, the engine of the industry and the machinery. In 
order words, it is a structure that carries from the colony a racial 
base…”283
Stressing this form of continuity, Gonzalez emphasizes that the 
Trujillo dictatorship signals the benchmark where ruptures and continuities 
were re-signified in Dominican society. As mentioned elsewhere, the paradox 
of Trujillo’s dictatorship is that there are both a clearly defined pattern of 
discrimination (against Haitians and people of Haitian descent) and the 
construction of national unity. According to Gonzalez, this “prejudice re-
signification” geared toward Haitians was the most important factor of the 
twentieth century.
 
 
284
                                                 
283 Ibid, 106, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. Raymundo Gonzalez argues that Trujillo claimed 
that he was the one that emancipated the lower classes from the prejudice and condemnation 
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Delfina Alejo de Burgos,285 director of the Foundation for Development 
of the Dajabon Province (FUNDEPRODA) agrees with Gonzalez about the 
existence of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic against the Haitian 
population. She notes, however, that there have been improvements in the 
way in which Dominicans deal with Haitian immigration. Noteworthy among 
these changes are the cultural exchanges between both populations living 
side by side in the Dominican-Haitian frontier.286
Racialised identities in the Dominican Republic as well as how racism 
underpins power have also been subjects of interest of mainstream 
literature.
 
287
“…race is created by attaching social and cultural significance 
to physical features or colour, and then by grouping individuals 
according to phenotype and appearance. Colour categories 
represent arbitrary ascriptions or imposed discontinuities 
along a continuous spectrum and play an important role in 
social definition and self-description, becoming a sign of 
cultural and social affiliation. Degrees of whiteness and 
blackness not only denote racialised distinctions but also allude 
to over-generalised European and African ancestries, hence 
cultural associations and assumed origins…”
 Noting the Dominican Republic and Haiti shared history of 
insularity, Howard asserts that: 
288
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 This study posits that the racial prejudice and the construction of 
nationality clearly were entwined during the Trujillo dictatorship and had a 
sort of continuity during the Balaguer regime. The way in which Dominicans 
define themselves neglecting their African roots is only one means through 
which national identity is forged in a country visible marked by historic 
struggles with its closest neighbor, Haiti. Trujillo masterminded Dominican 
national unity with the identification of a foreign enemy. The perpetuation of 
racial prejudice during the Balaguer regime was geared toward the 
continuation of the homogenization of the Dominican society. Hence, race 
became a dividing factor during the democratic transition and was obscured 
by class or ideological struggles. Finally, the cyclical repetition of history -
now in the form of illegal migration of an impoverished nation to the 
Dominican Republic- now reveals that race still continues to leverage 
Dominican national identity. 
 
Conclusions 
As we can grasp well from the beginning of this chapter, Balaguer’s 
initial quote still lives on in the Dominican consciousness. This chapter has 
attempted to show that nation, race, and migration have been entwined in 
the Dominican reality. It has been a feature than neither Dominicans nor 
Haitians had the chance to escape from. Therefore, trying to understand the 
absence of the treatment of race during the democratization period in the 
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Dominican Republic has led to the deepening of anti-Haitian sentiments 
toward the current flux of Haitian immigration in the country, as well as to 
the Haitian population living in the Dominican Republic with little or no ties 
to their home country.  
The relationship between race and migration is complex. Looking at 
race as we have shown in previous chapters, it was linked directly to the 
construction of the Dominican nation-state, beginning with Trujillo in 1930. 
Trujillo utilized and promoted Dominican nationalism through the 
supremacy of three basic features: the Hispanic heritage (understood in 
terms of “whiteness”), Catholicism, and the Spanish language. It is not 
difficult to compare this three-pillar pyramid with that of its neighboring 
country, Haiti. On the other side of Hispaniola, the very first black republic 
constructed its national identity upon an opposite three-pillar pyramid: the 
African heritage (understood in terms of “blackness”), Creole, and French 
language. Yet, these differences in nation building do not fully account for the 
complexity that has characterized the relationship between the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti. 
 Many authors have underscored that both countries underwent 
periods of stark confrontation and smooth cooperation. This chapter has 
shown that Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic clearly was 
promoted by the Dominican business sectors that found Haitian labor a 
valuable means to boost their sugar industry in the Dominican Republic. 
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Indeed, this economic activity was officially endorsed by the governments of 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo and Duvalier 
dictatorships and represented a valuable source of income for both countries. 
Moreover, Haitian immigration continued to be promoted in the Dominican 
Republic for other industries, such as construction, agriculture and the 
service sector. This fact must not be overlooked and has to be analyzed in 
looking at the responsibilities of both parties in dealing with continued 
movements of people across borders on the island of Hispaniola.  
The issue of migration, and its inescapable relationship with race, is at 
the core of the current debate in the Dominican Republic. A new reform of the 
Dominican Constitution has been approved, including new mechanisms to 
achieve Dominican nationality. This issue has opened a lively debate in the 
Dominican society, including government officials, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society. A final agreement between the leading 
parties stipulated that Dominican nationality can be achieved through jus 
solis or jus sanguinis. However, the final article encountered strong 
opposition from scholars and civil groups who argue that, in reality, the 
article facilitates the achievement of Dominican nationality for the children 
of Dominicans living outside the country, while preventing Haitians living in 
the Dominican Republic or Dominicans of Haitian descent to ever achieve the 
Dominican nationality.  
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The debate over the status of persons living in the Dominican Republic 
with no access to political, social, and civil rights is likely to continue in the 
near future. A perception that Haitian immigration to the country represents 
a national threat to the Dominican Republic still is very much alive. Indeed, 
this sentiment proved to unite parties that disagree on almost every issue.  
 The link between race and migration remains strong in the Dominican 
Republic and has notable political effects. While no comprehensive solution is 
seen in the near future, the political effects will continue to challenge 
Dominican rule of law and the quality of its democracy.  
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Chapter 5 
Political Implications of Race in the Dominican Republic 
 
The absence of the treatment of race during the incipient democratic 
transition of the country in the late 1970s had important effects on the 
political system of the Dominican Republic. Also, the overexposure of racial 
prejudice and concerns during the decade of the 1990s made a significant 
imprint in both the Dominican society and its political path over the following 
periods. Race and ethnicity are primarily understood in the Dominican 
Republic in direct relation to the relationship with its immediate neighbor on 
the island of Hispaniola, Haiti.  
The Dominican Republic is home to many immigrants, such as the 
Chinese, Colombian, and French communities. Strikingly, considering the 
relevance of the way race and ethnicity have played out in Dominican society, 
the treatment of race in the political agenda of the democratization process is 
an area that has been poorly explored by mainstream literature.  
In light of the case study examined, the questions and assumptions 
postulated in Chapter 1 can be addressed. 
The central research questions of this dissertation are: 1) Why is there 
an absence of the treatment of race and ethnic allegiances during the 
democratic transitions in Latin America? 2) How has the absence of ethnic 
identities affected the nature and depth of democratic transitions?  
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Four assumptions were offered as possible explanations to the posited 
research questions. This chapter will address each in detail. 
 
Assumption 1: Race was a dividing factor among groups united to fight 
a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early democratic 
transitions. 
 
When dealing with the absence of race and ethnic allegiances during 
the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic in the late 1970s, most 
interviewees, including government officials, experts, and representatives of 
civil society, agreed that race was not an issue to be treated during the 
democratic transition.289
                                                 
289 Focus groups held in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican Republic, in December 
2008 and September 2009. 
 After examining the legacies of the Trujillo 
dictatorship and the prolonged leadership of Joaquin Balaguer from 1966 to 
1978, a myriad of actors related the political scenario to the common purpose 
of putting closure to years of authoritarianism in the Balaguer regime.  
Strikingly, race was not an issue during this incipient democratization 
period; thus, it was considered a “dividing factor” in the aim of deposing 
Joaquin Balaguer from the presidency of the Dominican Republic. The 
remarkable effort by both Trujillo and Balaguer during their tenure in office 
to avoid dealing with any issue that would threaten an already 
“homogenously constructed” society is worth noting. After the infamous “El 
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Corte”290
                                                 
290 Name utilized to refer to the massacre ordered by Trujillo of Haitians living in the 
Dominican Republic in 1937. 
 under the direct order of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the treatment of 
racial perceptions and prejudice was overlooked completely by the Dominican 
state. 
 
Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were clouded by ideologies and 
class cleavages that perceived the racial question as a factor that 
would disappear as countries became more democratic. 
 
In the case of the Dominican Republic, race and ethnic allegiances 
have not disappeared in the country. This study posits that the avoidance of 
the treatment of race and ethnicity, and a limited definition of citizenship in 
the political agenda of the initial democratization period has had many 
consequences on the political path of the country and the challenges it 
currently faces.  
Avoidance of the racial issue was a deliberate stance by successive 
Dominican governments since the return to democracy in 1978. The data 
gathered from in-depth interviews and focus groups reveal that there was a 
notorious avoidance of the issue by political and economic elites for the fear of 
touching delicate national interests that would bring high political costs to 
the parties willing to tackle the issue. This still remains true in the current 
government of President Leonel Fernandez, which has failed to design a 
coherent and comprehensive migratory policy to deal with Haitian nationals 
who enter the country illegally every day.  
168 
 
Milton Ray Guevara,291  a former PRD Senator, claimed in an 
interview with the author that the issue of race was not part of the political 
agenda at the end of the 1970s. He also stated that by 1978, Balaguer’s 
regime had remained in power for twelve uninterrupted years, featuring a 
government with administrative corruption and political repression.292
Ray Guevara recalled that Balaguer was an honest political leader, yet 
he accepted corrupt practices within his circle of confidence, and adopted, a 
well-known slogan that “corruption did not enter the doors of his office.”
  
293
                                                 
291 Interview with Milton Ray Guevara held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 
September 2009. 
 
292 Ray Guevara notes that many Dominican exiles could not return to the Dominican 
Republic during the Balaguer regime, as well as he underscores the practice of political 
prisoners.  
 
293 Information gathered from the in-depth interview with Milton Ray Guevara, held on 
September 14th, 2009 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. 
 By 
the end of the Balaguer’s regime, the country was desperate for a change, and 
the slogan at the time reflected this sentiment: “the change without violence.” 
If a change without violence was to exist in the Dominican Republic, after a 
long period of authoritarian government as well as a thirty-one year 
experience of dictatorship, race was not even considered during this 
reunification of the country, as it was a factor that probably would cause 
cleavages, disagreement, and division. Ray Guevara underscores the contrast 
between Balaguer’s core agenda and the new PRD agenda. While the PRSC 
centered its political agenda on the construction industry, low wages, and a 
successful clientelistic system, the PRD promoted in the late 1970s a change 
169 
 
based on investment in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and job 
creation, along with the strengthening of public liberties and human rights.  
As mentioned above, this assumption suggests that ethnic factors were 
clouded by ideologies and class cleavages, with the belief that the racial factor 
would disappear as countries became more democratic. A counterpoint 
dialogue between Dore Cabral and Veloz Maggiolo placed the notion of 
ideology and race in the Dominican Republic at the forefront of the analysis. 
While comparing the literary and political efforts of Joaquin Balaguer and 
Juan Bosch, Veloz Maggiolo underscores that Bosch constructed a more 
profound and cohesive literary work than Balaguer. He posits that Bosch was 
ahead of his time, evolving from “a moderate left and then, after the coup, to 
more radical positions.”294 He also argues that Bosch was an ideologist who 
created the very first text of Dominican classes.295 Dore Cabral notes that 
Bosch was influenced greatly by Puerto Rican writer Eugenio Maria de 
Hostos, who brought the ideas of positivism to the Dominican Republic.296
                                                 
294 Marcio Veloz Maggiolo, “Dialogo de la Lengua,” Quórum: Revista de Pensamiento 
Iberoamericano, 14, 2006, 142 
 
295 Ibid 
 
296 Ibid, 142. Dore Cabral notes that Bosch studied with professors formed by Hostos and 
later directed an edited book from Hostos in Cuba. Dore Cabral makes a parallelism between 
the modern thinking that Hostos fostered in the country to that played out by Juan Bosch in 
the 1960s. See Dialogo de la Lengua,144. 
 
 
Hence, Bosch became the first political leader to address the issue of social 
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classes without further intricacies, i.e. “machepas”297 to refer to the poor 
people and “tutumpotes” to refer to the rich classes. As Veloz Maggiolo notes, 
most of the population to whom Bosch’s discourse was geared in the 1960s 
involved illiterates as well as farmers from rural regions. Dore Cabral 
underscores that this change brought to a society still deeply divided between 
“Trujillistas” and “anti-Trujillistas,” a new understanding -especially for the 
young population- that what really was a stake was the dichotomy between 
rich and poor.298
A recent study of racism in the Dominican Republic that collected 
seventeen in-depth interviews with different personalities of the country puts 
the issue of race and prejudice at the forefront of the analysis. Carlos Esteban 
Deive argues that racial prejudice in the Dominican society is rooted in the 
colonial period, where African slavery was justified by claiming their 
apparent barbaric and inferior features.
 
299
                                                 
297 In the same dialogue, Veloz Maggiolo contributes to Dore’s assessment by noting that the 
utilization of “hijo de machepa” by Juan Bosch responded to the need to refer to a person that 
nobody knows, while the utilization of “tutumpote” is generally used to refer to those holding 
power and economic resources.  
 
298 Dore, Quórum, 144. 
 
299 Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM), 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en 
Republica Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 2005), 
31. Interview with Carlos Esteban Deive.  
 Racial prejudice in that period 
was illustrated in a myriad of examples, among which the following stand 
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out: inability to run for public office, ban to participate in military 
organizations, lack of possibility to obtain graduate education, and the like.300
“…it was a despicable and racist campaign against Jose 
Francisco Peña Gomez. Balaguer passed a decree that ordered 
Dominicans’ radios to play the national anthem at noon…it 
was obvious that this was against Peña Gomez (due to his 
Haitian origins), an immaculate man, more Dominican that all 
Dominican citizens. This country did not experience any other 
leader with such a grandeur in the nineteenth, twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. He was an extraordinary leader, 
brilliant; with an integral education…He was a self-taught 
individual, learning French, Russian, German, Italian and 
English during his trips.  He graduated in La Sorbonne, he was 
a visionary, and on top of all features, he was a democrat…”
 
The absence of the treatment of race during the Dominican early 
democratic transition was going to be short-lived and proved to be in full 
blossom during the 1990s to halt the access of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez to 
the Dominican presidency. Ray Guevara recalls the fraud implemented in the 
year 1994 by the Balaguer regime: 
301
Looking specifically to the groups that benefited from the racist 
campaign that targeted the candidacy of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, Carlos 
Esteban Deives asserts that the powerful and rich classes benefitted most by 
preventing political access to a candidate with Haitian descent.
 
 
302
                                                 
300 Ibid, 31. Deive, however, notes that these measures did loosen a bit in Santo Domingo, 
and exceptions being made due to the fact that the white population was being outnumbered 
by the black and/or mulato population.  
 
301 Interview held with Milton Ray Guevara in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in 
September 2009. 
 
302 Ibid, 32. 
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Assumption 3: Democratization as spearheaded by the middle class 
political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a 
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e. 
through parties- and not through race, class, or ethnicity. 
 
The extensive qualitative data gathered through in-depth interviews 
and focus groups in the country reveal that the democratization process in 
the Dominican Republic was spearheaded by a middle class political elite 
that understood the notion of representation in political terms, i.e., 
considering that parties were to play the determinant role in articulating and 
mediating interests in society.  
According to the Barometer of the Americas 2008,303
Figure 10. Percentage that Sympathizes with a Political Party 
 the country has 
the highest percentage of society identification with a political party. 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), <www.LapopSurveys.org>, Barometer of the Americas 2008, 147 
                                                 
303 The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), <www.LapopSurveys.org>, Barometer of the Americas 2008.  
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Political parties remain at the core of Dominican democracy. Espinal 
and Morgan argue that three factors lie at the forefront of parties’ presence in 
the country: first, the entrenched mechanisms of electoral fraud purported by 
the Balaguer’s regime following the downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship; 
second, the incipient democratization process that began in the late 1970s 
and continued throughout the 1980s where one aim was to strengthen the 
Dominican electoral system; and third, a nascent civil society that quickly 
developed the skills and mechanisms to advocate and help sustain a 
representative democracy, mainly through high levels of electoral 
participation.304
Figure 11. Support for Stable Democracy (LAC countries) 
  
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), <www.LapopSurveys.org>, Barometer of the Americas 2008, 127 
                                                 
304 Rosario Espinal, Jana Morgan and Mitchel A. Seligson (ed. of the Series), “Political 
Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic” (Barometer of the Americas, Latin American 
Public Opinion Project, 2008), 139. 
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Although support for stable democracy usually is low in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, the Dominican Republic falls within the 
nine countries out of twenty-three countries surveyed in the region that show 
a medium-high support for stable democracy.  
Dominican commitment to participate in electoral processes has 
remained high for decades in presidential elections (approximately 75 
percent). Yet, this is not the case with congressional-municipal elections 
which are not held simultaneously to presidential elections, where the 
percentage of absenteeism reaches almost 50 percent.305
Espinal identifies a shift in party identification from the historical 
period of “solid party identification with caudillo type leaderships” (such as 
leading figures like Bosch, Balaguer, and Peña Gomez) to a co-participated 
patronage and clientelistic system.
 This has been one 
factor leading to the decision to converge the two electoral processes from 
2012 onwards. The aim is to increase the level of electoral participation, 
while appealing to vote along party lines.  
306
                                                 
305 Ibid 
 
306 Ibid 
 
 Another feature worth noting in the 
Dominican electoral system has been the political polarization that proved 
instrumental in both keeping political parties relevant as well as maintaining 
their dynamism as articulators of interests of the Dominican society.  
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Since the democratic transition of 1978, political parties continue to 
play a determinant role in the Dominican society. They are not only the 
articulators of society vis-à-vis the state, but also are critical players in the 
decision making process. Political parties in the Dominican Republic are 
featured by highly clientelistic practices, neopatrimonialism and internal 
corruption. Three parties, the PRD, PLD, and PRSC have become the axis 
around which Dominican politics conflated during at least five decades. The 
polarization in party preferences has been fueled by the charismatic 
leaderships of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, Juan Bosch, and Joaquin 
Balaguer. Data drawn from the Barometer of the Americas 2008 note the 
opposite tendencies that have featured Dominican politics.307 Yet, Seligson et 
al. make the caveat of the shift from ideological opposing tendencies in the 
early transition to a model featured by “patronage and scarce programmatic 
differences.”308
                                                 
307 The downfall of the Trujillo regime led to a steady and increasing organization of political 
parties, as major actors of the Dominican society. Ideological viewpoints contributed to a 
polarized party system, the development of party loyalties and opposing tendencies. During 
twenty years (1966-1986), party struggle was featured by the leverage of the PRSC (Partido 
Reformista Socialcristiano) and the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano). The mid-80’s 
reflected the increasing electoral weight of the PLD with an evolution from an ideological 
party (with the leadership of Juan Bosch) to a more centrist platform (with new leaderships, 
such as that of President Leonel Fernandez). See Jana Morgan, Rosario Espinal and Mitchell 
A. Seligson (Ed. General of the Series) “Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican 
Republic, 2008: The Impact of Governance,” 2009, 146. 
 
308 Ibid, 140. 
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Figure 12. Necessity of Parties for Democracy and  
Level of Trust in Political Parties 
 
 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), <www.LapopSurveys.org>, Barometer of the Americas 2006-2007, 69 
 
The absence of leaderships such as those of Bosch, Balaguer and Peña 
Gomez have transformed the internal composition of parties as well as their 
mechanisms of contestation in interparty struggles. Yet, it would be a 
mistake to assume that political parties have lost their path in being the 
clearest articulators of interests in society vis-à-vis the Dominican state. 
They not only have played a critical role in the success of one of the first 
democratic transitions in the region but also succeeded over the years in 
becoming the main channels of representative democracy. Moreover, authors 
such as Espinal note the politicized nature of Dominican society, whether as 
a means to express ideological preferences or as a means to develop 
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clientelistic networks scoring higher than the average of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries.  
 
Figure 13. Level of Politicization of LAC countries and the 
Dominican Republic 
 
 
Source: Rosario Espinal, Democracia Epiléptica en la Sociedad del Clic, 44  
(based on the Latinobarometro 2005 results). 
 
These results reveal that political parties still play a determinant role 
in Dominican society. The data also show that the level of politicization based 
on participation, activism, and recruitment are at the core of the Dominican 
political structure led by the two main political parties of the country, the 
PRD and the PLD. Similar results can be found in regard to how Dominicans 
score higher than the average of Latin American countries in voting patterns. 
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political parties.309 These findings suggest that although satisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy still is low (43 percent) in the Dominican Republic 
and worst in the average Latin American countries (31 percent) the former 
still has strong support for the importance of voting to the democratic system 
as well as that of political parties for the functioning of democracy.310
Figure 14. Voting Patterns (Dominican Republic and LAC 
countries) 
 
 
 
Source: Rosario Espinal, Democracia Epiléptica en la Sociedad del Clic, 44.  
(based on Latinobarometro 2005 results) 
 
 
Political Representation in Dominican Democracy 
The question of representation has spearheaded many debates and 
different theories in the comparative literature. This assumption argues that 
                                                 
309 Rosario Espinal,  Democracia Epiléptica en la Sociedad del Clic, (Santo Domingo: Editora 
Taina, 2006), 44. 
 
310 See Rosario Espinal, Democracia, 44-45, Cit. of Latinobarometro 2005. 
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democratization was spearheaded by the Dominican middle class, who 
understood that representation was political -through political parties- 
instead of built upon cleavages of race, class, or ethnicity. The fact that 
representation was political tinctured much of the development of political 
parties in Dominican society. Yet, in order to understand why representation 
was political in the Dominican Republic, we need to lay out what 
representation is in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Maria A. Martinez argues, following mainstream literature in political 
theory, that the notion of representation can be viewed as the evolution of a 
different model of Greek democracy.311 Therefore, the idea of representation 
became an option to the complicated mechanisms of the Greek direct 
democracy, especially in more populated cities where direct participation was 
becoming more and more challenging. Martinez notes that representative 
democracy has undergone a series of structural changes since its inception, 
yet maintains some defining features: selection of representatives by the 
population; distinct levels of discretion held by representatives in their 
functions; freedom of expression and public opinion formation; and the use of 
deliberation and debate to reach decisions.312
                                                 
311 María Antonia Martínez, “La Representación Política y la Calidad de la Democracia,” 
Revisa Mexicana de Sociología, 66, No. 4, (Octubre-Diciembre, 2004): 662. 
 
312 Ibid, 662-663. Cit. of Manin (1998: 237-238). 
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Manin reminds us that the first phase of representative democracy is 
intrinsically linked to the spread of parliamentarism.313 This period was 
featured by limited access to the right to vote, with only selected individuals 
considered citizens able to choose representatives. In this context of restricted 
vote, political parties emerged as weak organizations, devoid of institutional 
cohesiveness and temporal durability.314 Martinez reflects on Manin’s 
assertion that the key function of the representative in this period was to be 
the “man of confidence” instead of a means through which to convey the 
political will of the people.315
Representative democracy, then, made a noteworthy shift during the 
enfranchising of different groups to have access to the vote. This process took 
place mainly from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the first 
decades of the twentieth century. It was accompanied by great economic, 
social and political developments that demanded new mechanisms to 
incorporate new social classes to the political system.
  
316
                                                 
313 Ibid, 663. See also Manin (1998: 249). 
 
314 Ibid. 
 
315 Ibid. Citation of Manin (1998:249-50) 
 
316 Ibid, 664 
 
 With this new 
foundation of political parties as articulators of interests of disadvantaged 
classes, parties became more organized and stable. In contraposition to 
previous decades, when parties served the interests of the oligarchy and 
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where most of the population was unable to cast votes, political parties 
became the fundamental leg of new social movements and classes that 
demanded participation and inclusive mechanisms in traditional restrictive 
societies. One benchmark of this shift in political and social functions of 
political parties is World War II. Political representation then involved 
political competition based upon programmatic objectives, along with 
participation understood “as an expression of a group or class identity.”317 
From this period onwards, representative democracy began to be equated to 
the role of political parties, as strong institutionalized organizations 
competing in elections with programmatic agendas.318
Martinez notes that this period is challenged by the late 1960s-early 
1970s denominated crisis of political representation, where parties and 
electors became somewhat disconnected and the following factors became 
visible: parties’ attrition of legitimacy, lack of party identification, electoral 
volatility and decrease in political participation.
  
319
In the Dominican Republic however, the relationship of the citizenry 
with political parties shows some interesting twists. By the period when some 
countries were experiencing a “crisis of representation,” the Dominican 
Republic -perhaps lately due to its past of prolonged dictatorship and 
 
                                                 
317 Ibid 
 
318 Ibid. Citation of Thomassen (1994: 252). 
 
319 Martinez, 665. 
 
182 
 
authoritarianism- was undergoing a new revival of political parties. The late 
1970s in the country represented the highest point in electorate and parties 
identification, along with noteworthy levels of political participation. 
When speaking about democracy in the Dominican Republic, it is 
important to look closer at the findings and results of the LAPOP survey on 
political culture of democracy conducted in the Dominican Republic in 
2008.320 In line with previous years, the findings show that 78 percent of 
interviewees in the 2008 survey edition consider that democracy is preferable 
to another form of government.321
Figure 15. Is Democracy Preferable to Other Form of Government 
  
 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Barometer of the Americas 2008, 17 
 
                                                 
320 Jana Morgan and Rosario Espinal (General Series Editor Mitchell A. Seligson), “Political 
Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic, 2008: The Impact of Governance,” 2009, The 
AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org. 
 
321 Ibid, 17 
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The data gathered by the Barometer of the Americas reveal that 
Dominicans maintain high levels of support for democracy over any other 
form of government. This trend has had little variation during the last 
decade, showing a four point increase from 2006 to 2008. The democratic 
transition of 1978 represented a point of departure for the return to 
democracy in Latin American countries and demonstrated a stable force for 
three decades.322
Regarding the Dominican Republic, Galvan asserts that racial 
prejudice affects democratization as a result of the imposition of a “model” 
whereby equality under plurality and diversity that feature democracy, are 
not accepted.
 
323
Carlos Andujar refers to the impact of racial prejudice on the structure 
of political parties in the country by revealing that it is a national problem. 
Having inherited a conservative discourse regarding racial prejudice, political 
parties introduce it within their political discourse, whether as a political 
resource or a campaign instrument.
  
324
                                                 
322 One caveat noted by the Espinal, Morgan and Seligson relates to the temporary 
interruption of the country’s institutional order in the 1994 electoral crisis due to the 
accusation of electoral fraud by the government of Joaquin Balaguer, upon which the 
government reduced its term from four to two years. See Espinal, Morgan and Seligson, 125, 
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), 
 Later, he continues developing how 
www.LapopSurveys.org. 
 
323 Interview with Sergia Galvan, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005. 
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a 
Refugiados y Migrantes, 187. 
 
324 Ibid 
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social cohesion, nationality and racial prejudice are intertwined in the 
Dominican reality: 
“…social cohesion from the sociological point of view…is part of 
the conformation of the nation. The construction of the nation 
appropriates the Haitian issue as a symbol of national 
cohesion. In other words, it is a well-developed value dealt with 
by the founders of the ideology of the Dominican state after 
1844, to transform it into a cohesive axis…the Republic has to 
be cohesive around symbols and values…patriotic symbols are 
part of that and prejudice also was part, not of the patriotic 
symbols but rather of the ideology of the new nation. I think 
they used this element to perfection. Today, anti-Haitian 
prejudice is not a determinant factor of cohesion…I think today 
it is in the unconscious, forming part of the historic memory. 
Prejudice is present as a vector of cohesions, as it becomes part 
of national identity; we are Dominicans, but we are anti-
Haitian, that principle still continues to exist in many 
Dominicans…”325
                                                 
325 Interview with Carlos Andujar, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005. 
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a 
Refugiados y Migrantes, 246, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
 
 
 
In dealing with the democratization process in the Dominican 
Republic, we need to look at the level of tolerance in the country. Seligson et 
al. developed a measure on the scale of inclusion (or political tolerance) 
looking at the following elements: the right to vote of people who do not have 
in higher consideration the form of government of the country; the right of 
these people to demonstrate peacefully with the purpose of expressing their 
viewpoints; the right of these people to seek public office; and the right of 
these people to pronounce discourses on television.  
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The following table presents the findings of the measure of political 
tolerance in comparative perspective (23 countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean). 
 
Figure 16. Level of Political Tolerance 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic 
2008, 21 
 
The comparative data assessing political tolerance in twenty-three 
countries of the region suggests that the Dominican Republic does not fare 
very well in levels of political tolerance. Although its score of 52 % reveals a 
slightly majority of the population showing moderate to high levels of 
political tolerance, the findings suggest that this majority is not remarkable. 
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Considering that the country was one of the first in the region to begin its 
democratization process, geared to promoting equality and inclusiveness in a 
political society that experienced different degrees of authoritarianism since 
the early twentieth century, the findings are not very promising. In fact they 
suggest that some authoritarianism has made an imprint in Dominican 
society that has affected the openness and tolerance of its polity.  
 
Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship 
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new 
democratic definition of citizenship. 
 
Research on the construction of the Dominican nation and citizenship 
reveals greater contestation in the information and data gathered during the 
field research trips to the Dominican Republic. Non-governmental 
institutions, experts, and scholars working on issues of citizenship, 
migration, and race continue to warn about entrenched antihaitianism and 
racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic against its neighbor, Haiti. Many 
of these sectors argue that the Dominican Republic unwillingly has 
constructed its identity in contraposition to Haiti. In order words, 
Dominicanness comes to be whatever is not Haitian. This perception relates 
to the Dominican self-identification as a Catholic, Hispanic, and Spanish-
speaking country in stark contraposition to Haiti, a country identified with 
voodoo religious practices, African descent and Creole-speaking language. 
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Yet, these assertions are simplifications of a highly complex and intricate 
reality.  
One may wonder about the determinant factors in the Dominican 
nation-building process. Which have been the sectors promoting these kinds 
of divisions? What has been the role of the Dominican Republic in promoting 
the existence of an “external enemy” to reassure its nationalism? To what 
extent is the Haitian state responsible for depriving protection to Haitian 
nationals of protection to maintain the status quo? These are questions that 
have no easy answer, yet, we have to address them in order to avoid 
oversimplification in the analysis. 
While acknowledging that the construction of nation in the Dominican 
Republic is linked historically to its relationship to Haiti, we have to identify 
different periods in regard to Dominican-Haitian relations. There is no doubt 
that Trujillo represented a benchmark in the construction of nation or 
“Dominicanness” through the utilization of a nationalistic discourse geared to 
reinforcing cultural, social, political, and ethnic patterns of the Dominican 
population. This discourse was later buttressed by the “Dominicanization” of 
the Dominican-Haitian border in order to prevent illegal immigration to the 
country and all types of intermingling between both populations.  
In regard to racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic, Carlos 
Esteban Deives notes that racial prejudice has been clearly tied to anti-black 
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prejudice.326 Where the African ancestry is totally neglected and Indian 
heritage is venerated, black Dominicans are not able to come to terms with 
their own identity even in their official documents.327
Franklin Franco, a professor of history and sociology in the 
Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD) affirms that racial 
prejudice in the Dominican Republic is manifested in daily life. Franco 
identifies three main reasons for the survival of racial prejudice in two 
centuries of history: the fact that the Dominican Republic obtained its 
independence from Haiti; the commitment of the Dominican state to 
maintain levels of racism, illustrated in its educative curricula; and the 
leverage of racism as an ideological trend with grassroots in Europe, the 
United States and Latin America.
 
328
Although the area of education lies beyond the goals of this 
dissertation, it is worth noting how Franco associates racial prejudice with 
the way in which the educative curricula has been structured until recently. 
Indeed, he posits that in the mid-1990s, most textbooks in social studies and 
Dominican history clearly avoided the issue of slavery, illustrating a high 
level of racism in the education of the Dominican population. He also stresses 
  
                                                 
326 Interview with Carlos Esteban Deives, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 
2005. 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio 
Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 35. 
 
327 As it becomes clear in the interview with Carlos Esteban Deives, Dominicans with African 
descent cannot identify themselves as black in their official documents, but as Indians. 
 
328 Ibid 
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that education in the country historically has been run by the Dominican 
state, geared toward avoiding the black or African component in the 
constitution of the Dominican identity.329
The Demometrica Barometer of 2005
  
As mentioned above, Haitian emigration to the Dominican Republic 
has been a critical factor in the relationship between the two countries of 
Hispaniola for centuries. The absence of the treatment of race during the 
early democratization of the country has carried many consequences, among 
which an increasing Haitian population living in the Dominican Republic 
represents a critical factor to be analyzed. Hence, it is critical to understand 
and investigate the Dominican perception of the Haitian presence in the 
country.  
330
                                                 
329 Ibid, 65. 
 
330 Demometrica Barometer, “La Emigracion Haitiana,” June 2005, 3-4. 
 explored Dominican 
perceptions of Haitian presence in the country, with a focus on violent events, 
deportations and labor relations, among others. The data show that out of ten 
interviewees, eight believe that the entry of Haitians had increased during 
previous months. It is worth noting that in eight of ten interviewees, 34.2 % 
assert that this is a very harmful event and 44.9 % argue that is a harmful 
event for the Dominican Republic. Therefore, almost 80 % of the population 
considers that the Haitian immigration represents a damaging event for the 
Dominican Republic. This narrative is not new, however; it is built upon 
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discourses of the Trujillo dictatorship as careful delineated theoretical 
assumptions during Balaguer’s regime aimed at showing Haitian 
immigration as a direct threat to Dominican nationality and sovereignty, as 
well as a threat to a possible unification of the island of Hispaniola into one 
nation. Hence, racial prejudice that frame these perceptions include, first, the 
perceptions that Haitians “steal jobs from nationals” (59.3 %); followed by the 
belief that they “carry illnesses” (41.5 %) and that they “increase the levels of 
delinquency” (29.7 %).331
The data also shows that at least 40 percent of the interviewees 
declare that they are aware of the last events of violence between Dominican 
and Haitian communities. As expected, the majority (52.4 %) believe that 
Haitians are responsible for these acts of violence, and 27.1 % understand 
that both Dominicans and Haitians are to blame in violent events. In regard 
to repatriations, a similar pattern can be viewed: 46.9 % of the interviewees 
said they are aware of the repatriations of Haitian population. However, 
when it comes to analyzing the acceptance/rejection of these kind of 
 Some regional differences can be found in these 
perceptions, however. The interviewees of the east and Santo Domingo are 
more prone to suggest that Haitians steal jobs from nationals while 
interviewees in Santiago and el Cibao were more prone to point out that 
Haitian people bring illnesses to the country.  
                                                 
331 Ibid, 4 
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measures, 82 % are favorable to repatriations of Haitian people to their home 
countries (46 % are favorable and 36 % are very favorable).332
Figure 17. Position on Repatriation 
 
 
 
Source: Demometrica Barometer, June 2005, 24 
 
Dealing with the issue of repatriations, it is interesting how political 
parties’ position in repatriations has evolved since last century. In 1991, Vega 
asserted that although Haitians have become more visible since the 1990s in 
diversified economic activities in the Dominican Republic, political parties 
have failed to address the Haitian issue in their political agendas: 
“…in spite of anterior expressions, political parties have 
not included the Haitian issue in their programs, 
platforms or electoral promises. At the ideological level, 
there is a strange but accepted agreement on the issue 
by the extreme right and the extreme left. Both sectors 
reject the repatriation of Haitians. The extreme right, 
responding to the need of cheap labor, diminishing 
further pressures for rises on wages. The extreme left, 
acting upon a humanitarian sentiment and also 
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assuming that the Haitian presence could further 
contribute to their political objectives, stimulating 
destabilization in the country …”333
Figure 18. Human Rights Violated in Repatriations of Haitians 
 
 
 
 The data also reveal than only 19.4 % of the Dominican interviewees 
consider that human rights are violated in the repatriations of Haitian people 
to their home countries. These data are relevant not only in understanding 
Dominican perceptions of Haitian immigrants, but also in unraveling 
entrenched prejudices in regard to race, ethnicity and color between both 
communities.  
 
 
Source: Demométrica Barometer, June 2005, 27 
 
                                                 
333 Vega, Bernardo. En la Década Perdida, (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 
1991), 248, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
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The question of repatriations has been widely discussed in the 
Dominican society. Repatriations by the Dominican government of illegal 
Haitian immigrants are one result of the absence of a mature treatment of 
race relations in the Dominican democratic process.  
The information gathered in the focus groups and interviews held in 
the Dominican Republic334 in 2008-2009 suggests that there was a notorious 
absence of the treatment of race and ethnicity during the democratic 
transition of the Dominican Republic. Franciso Leonardo from the Servicio 
Jesuita de Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM) asserts that the issue of race was 
absent from the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic. While there 
is no clear consciousness of this absence, the gap in the political discourse 
and the agenda of political parties still is remarkable.335
                                                 
334 Focus groups and interviews held in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican 
Republic, in September 2009. 
 
335 Interview with Francisco Henry Leonardo, Servicio Jesuita de Refugiados y Migrantes 
(SJRM), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, held in September 2009. 
 
 Leonardo 
emphasizes the lack of a coherent national migratory policy that has endured 
from the incipient transition to the 1990s. Noting the role of the PRD in 1978 
in challenging the political predominance of the PRSC from 1966 to 1978 -
inculcating in the Dominican imagination the need of civil liberties and hope-
the country experienced a stagnation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
The year 1984 was followed by a second consecutive mandate of the PRD with 
president Salvador Jorge Blanco. Leonardo stresses the impact of a civil 
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revolt that erupted during Blanco’s government, fueled by social, economic, 
and political unrest.336
The process of import substitution in the Dominican Republic, along 
with the international crisis of the sugar industry, sparked new reforms in 
the country. According to Leonardo, the international crisis of the sugar 
industry carried a diversification of Haitian immigration as new labor 
markets become attractive for this population.
  
337
The new immigration –previously geographically limited and located in 
the “bateyes” - became more visible to the national population. The 
immigrants actively participate in the informal economy, in the industries of 
construction, agriculture and tourism spread throughout the country.
 
338
“…the politics of migration have been developed in the country 
within a framework of informality. We had in the country until 
august 16, 2004, a legislation dated back to 1939. This suggests 
the mismatch between the legal framework and the current 
context. During the first mandate of President Leonel 
Fernandez in 1997, a new debate arose regarding the necessity 
to adequate the legal framework to the new realities, by 
creating bilateral mechanisms, in which states, civil society 
and experts would have different levels of participation.  After 
the failure of several proposes, during the government of 
 
It is very appealing to analyze the logic of migration in the Dominican 
Republic. Leonardo asserts that: 
                                                 
336 Ibid 
 
337 Leonardo is referring to the shifts experienced in the traditional Haitian immigration for 
labors in the sugar cane fields to the ‘new Haitian immigration” (term first used by Ruben 
Silie, Carlos Segura and Carlos Dore in la “Nueva Inmigración Haitiana”) more diversified in 
different economic activities, including construction, agriculture and tourism. 
 
338 Ibid 
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Hipólito Mejia the new general law of migration 285-04 was 
promulgated. We have criticized this law, because we think 
some elements are unconstitutional, especially the way in 
which “transit” would be interpreted…339
Finally, Leonardo stresses the imbalance between American and 
Dominican resources and the occupation of Dominican Republic by the U.S. 
He makes the case that if the country had not been tinctured with prejudices 
 
 
Here, Leonardo refers to the national and international context that 
influenced the flux of Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic. It is 
worth noting the impact of the collapse of the sugar industry in the late 
1980s as well as its impact on the Haitian population.   
In answer to the question of whether in the immediate future, 20 or 30 
years, a similar situation of the racist and anti-Haitian campaign could be 
developed in the country, Leonardo begins from the outset by saying that the 
Dominican population is in its majority “mulata,” with a “white” and a 
“black” minority. The question for Leonardo refers to how the Dominican 
national identity has been forged in function of its relation with Haiti. Yet, he 
includes in the analysis several periods that often are overlooked in dealing 
with the conformation of the Dominican nation-state. First, he stresses the 
ephemeral independence, a brief period of negotiation with Jean P. Boyer, the 
Haitian occupation, the independence of 1844 and the consequent struggles of 
reconquest, and the struggle with the Spaniard state.  
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against Haiti, Dominicans should have been able to define its country’s 
identity in relation to all the above mentioned events. Yet, the emphasis has 
been placed very strongly on the independence from Haiti and some historic 
loopholes have been avoided in the Dominican culture.  
Coming to terms with the impact of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, 
Leonardo asserts that Dominicans live in an identity crisis, where the “Afro” 
component is absent, both from the genetic angle as well as the psychological 
and cultural one. This crisis is a result of the conscience conflict in which 
Dominicans are pushed towards assuming a Hispanic and catholic identity.  
Milton Ray Guevara considers though, that the fact that the definitive 
independence of the Dominican Republic was from Haiti carried a great deal 
of importance. The “ethnic problem” is understood in regard to the 
relationship to Haiti, obscuring the fact that the Dominican Republic has 
received immigration from several groups, including Cubans, Colombians, 
Chinese, French and the like. Yet, Ray Guevara agrees with Francisco 
Leonardo about in the lack of a coherent policy toward Haiti by Dominican 
governments, stressing the fact that Haitian immigration has been 
considered a pragmatic issue. 
 In an article published in the newspaper Listin in 1991 called “The 
Impossible Divorce,”340
                                                 
340 Milton Ray Guevara, “The Impossible Divorce,” Listin Diario, 1991. 
 
 Ray Guevara asserted that in the case of the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, divorce was impossible, but separation was 
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obligatory. Hence, the Dominican Republic should strive for a state policy of 
cooperation regarding its closest neighbor. The current situation with 
uncontrolled migration, feeds the myth of the “peaceful invasion” in different 
areas, such as construction, tourism and agriculture, and the result is a 
deepening of tensions and negative perceptions. He further asserts that the 
Dominican Labor Code -in which he played a critical role as one of its 
authors- established that 80 % of the company’s payroll employees should be 
Dominican citizens, and only 20 % could be foreigners. Ray Guevara claims, 
as do many others, that this code is violated in all areas, except the industrial 
sector, where many employers challenge this normative by fostering Haitian 
immigration to keep wages low while increasing companies’ profit.341
                                                 
341 Ray Guevara also notes the deactivation of the “Comisión Mixta,” as a sign of the 
disinterest on the issue of migration and race in the Dominican Republic. He underscores the 
necessity of improving coordination relations between both countries, with joint programs, 
especially in forestry and industrial plants. Interview with Milton Ray Guevara in Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic, September 2009. 
 
Leonardo argues that conservative sectors in Dominican society have 
promoted racial prejudice against Haitians and utilized it to its advantage. 
This prejudice is also grounded in the economic interests behind these 
attitudes, where these political sectors represent economic stakeholders of 
the sugar industry, foreign investment in agriculture, and tourism. While 
Haitian labor continues to provide higher margins of profit in all economic 
activities, there would be a high stake carried out by these sectors to 
maintain the status quo.  
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In response to the question whether one could say there are inclusive 
mechanisms in the Dominican Republic –or whether the country is 
democratic if a considerable part of the population living there Haitian 
immigrants are not visible- Leonardo highlights that the country has 
survived all kinds of turmoil selling to the Dominican society the myth of the 
“peaceful invasion.” Hence, when dealing with inclusive mechanisms in the 
eastern side of Hispaniola, high political costs and national interests could be 
at stake and rarely are utilized by the majority of the Dominican society. 
There is a lack of a truthful analysis in migratory politics, considering the 
costs of Haitian immigration as well as the advantages to Dominican society.  
Looking at the political actors of the early democratization process, 
Leonardo asserts from the outset that the twelve year period that followed 
Balaguer’s government in 1966 was marred by soaring political instability. 
He argues that the first incipient attempt to establish democracy in the 
country took place in 1962 after the civil war. All the political forces that 
were forced out of power continued to develop strengths from the opposition 
during Balaguer’s regime. Leonardo stresses the political repression that 
fostered the aim for democracy and liberty in Dominican society. Among the 
actors, he identifies the international community (which was driven mainly 
by the international role and presence of the PRD), the discontent in the 
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population, the socioeconomic situation and the leadership of Antonio 
Guzmán as the articulator of the democratic change.342
 
  
Looking into the sentiments of antihaitianism and the way they served 
the consolidation of the Dominican state, Leonardo recognizes that in the 
Dominican Republic there is an anti-Haitian sentiment and a racial 
prejudice. On top of that situation, there is a loophole of the Dominican state 
in institutionalizing a coherent migratory policy, where issues of education, 
political participation, nationality and migration all become intermingled.  
 
Figure 19. Attitudes Regarding the Rights of Haitians in the  
Dominican Republic 
 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Barometer of the Americas 2008 Report, 176 
 
Public Perception of Haitian Immigrants 
The findings of LAPOP’s survey for the Dominican Republic in 2008 
show that the Dominican society is divided about whether Haitian 
                                                 
342 Interview held with Francisco Henry Leonardo (Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes 
SJRM) in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, September 2009. 
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immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be able to obtain the 
Dominican citizenship (47.2 %). The question regarding permits to 
undocumented Haitians granted by the Dominican government suggests, 
however, a slightly different perception. Opinions regarding the job market 
and the possibility of Haitian immigrants to obtain work permits imply a 
more sensitive issue. Hence, this question presumes that more than the 
majority of the Dominican society opposes granting work permits for 
undocumented Haitian immigrants. Yet, it is important to note that in the 
majority of the in-depth interviews, opinions and perceptions regarding the 
Haitian migration issue do not support LAPOP’s 2008 findings.  
The data reveal high levels of entrenched antihaitianism in Dominican 
society that lead to negative perceptions about the rights of Haitian 
immigrants in the Dominican Republic. The qualitative analysis of the data 
collected suggests that at least two thirds of the population opposes the 
granting work permits to undocumented Haitians in the country as well as 
citizenship rights to children born to Haitian parents. Although this latter 
position has been widely contested by international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and groups of civil society, the denial of 
citizenship rights of children born to Haitian parents has prevailed in the 
recent crafting of the new Constitution of the Dominican Republic. Sergia 
Galván, director of Colectiva Mujer y Salud in the Dominican Republic, 
criticizes the common view of conflating racism with racial prejudice. She 
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firmly asserts that racial prejudice must not be understood only as an 
expression of racism.343
“…if you ask why Peña Gomez, the most charismatic leader of 
the country, who had the power of the masses, the power of the 
population, never had access to real power. It was precisely for 
the racism. But that same leader used to say: “I am black but 
with a white soul”…there is little analysis in the issue of 
racism, and they do not question what they have to do with 
racial prejudice. All candidates of left-wing parties have 
attempted to “whiten” themselves in their campaign 
pictures…”
 Galván affirms that Dominican Republic has a deep-
rooted racial prejudice, represented in life perspectives, ideal imageries, and 
the way in which corporeity and the idea of beauty and its ethno-racial 
referents are managed. Galván’s understanding of racial prejudice is 
interesting, as she incorporates the psychological component of racism as a 
determinant of the way in which individuals relate, both at the group and 
individual levels. Galván takes a comprehensive approach to the analysis of 
racial prejudice, incorporating the labor market and the construction of 
identity.  
Looking into the politics of racial prejudice and how they impacted the 
nature of the democratization period in the Dominican Republic, Galvan 
notes that: 
344
                                                 
343 Interview with Sergia Galván, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005. 
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a 
Refugiados y Migrantes, 179. 
 
344 Ibid, 185-186, trans. Gabriela Hoberman.  
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The issue of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic is still a 
complex, multi-dimensional and intricate challenge that must be addressed 
to reach a healthy democracy in a country often besieged by internal 
struggles, international demands, and contested identities.  
 
Strategic Culture in Hispaniola 
In a very recent report, Gamarra and Fonseca345 analyze Haitian 
strategic culture, with a special emphasis in how it relates to its closest 
neighbor, the Dominican Republic. The report is built upon the SOUTHCOM 
definition of strategic culture as “the combination of internal and external 
influences and experiences –geographic, historical, cultural, economic, 
political, and military – that shape and influence the way a country 
understands its relationship to the rest of the world and how a state will 
behave in the international community.”346
The viewpoint of strategic culture is relevant to the study of the 
relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti as a framework for 
an understanding of the influence of racial and ethnic factors in the 
democratization process of both countries of Hispaniola. The report begins by 
noting that race and color are formative influences in the way Haiti defines 
  
                                                 
345 Eduardo Gamarra and Brian Fonseca. Workshop held in Miami on August 6, 2009, 
“Haitian Strategic Culture,” Florida International University (Applied Research Center). 
 
346 Ibid 
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its strategic culture. The historical and cultural narratives of the country, 
including an overwhelmingly number of slaves in a flourishing plantation 
economy and the revolutionary violence that the country had to went through 
to achieve independence, led to a deep culture of anti-slavery advocacy and 
revolutionary change.347 Gamarra and Fonseca stress from the outset that 
race, color, and nationalism have been structural factors in the relationship 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Regino Martinez, a priest 
working with Dominican and Haitian communities, highlights the 
spontaneous rejection to everything “black” as well as prejudice against a 
specific group, Haitians. Part of this rejection is rooted in the contradiction 
where black Dominicans do not consider themselves as “black,” and label 
themselves as Indian, with an ample variety of shades in between that 
clearly excludes that of blackness. Interestingly, Martinez blames not only 
the Dominican elite but also the Haitian elite in perpetuating this prejudice 
to their advantage.348
“There is a “dominicanness” of European and catholic identity 
that neglects and rejects everything all things black and 
African. I think that an ideological structure has been 
constructed to give roots and rationalize our identity…Our 
identity is defined negatively, I am not Haitian therefore, I am 
Dominican. What features me as a Dominican, what gives me 
 Looking to how Dominicans construe their identity, 
Regino Martinez argues that: 
                                                 
347 Ibid, 3 
 
348 Interview with Regino Martínez, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005. 
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a 
Refugiados y Migrantes, 143. 
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identity as a Dominican, is not the fact of not being Haitian, 
are the values that we have cultivated…”349
“…what divide us is not something external, what divide as 
from the Haitian people is the ideological frontier implanted 
from the top-down…the same necessities that affect the poor 
Haitian are experienced by the poor Dominican…A double 
moral has been created in Dominicans vis a vis the Haitian 
population. What does this mean? It means that I use them 
when they are necessary and I reject them when I don’t need 
them anymore, and when there is a necessity of a shared 
identity, then, nothing can be done because we are different. 
And we need each other, both populations need each other. 
Haitians without Dominicans, nor Dominican without Haitians 
cannot reach anything. This is what the decision makers and 
leaders are not willing to understand…”
  
And he later continues: 
350
According to Gamarra and Fonseca, a myriad of factors cut across this 
contested relationship including the persistent aim for the indivisibility of 
Hispaniola; the consequent twenty-two year domination rule of Haiti over the 
Dominican Republic; the striking fact that the latter, instead of gaining 
independence from a foreign colonial power did so from Haiti; racial attitudes 
and violent coexistence; and a steady Haitian migration to the Dominican 
Republic. Gamarra et al. assert that Haiti is a predatory state, and that 
Haitian elites have been the keepers of Haitian strategic culture, by the 
pursuit of “self-aggrandizement and unfettered self-interest.”
 
 
 
351
                                                 
349 Ibid, 144, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. 
 
350 Ibid, 145. 
 
351 Ibid, 4. 
 
 Looking into 
the economic elites of the Dominican Republic, a parallelism can be drawn, in 
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regard to the way in which these elites perpetuate themselves to pursue their 
self-interest. These elites have been the target of the attacks of non-
governmental and international organizations on the issue of illegal Haitian 
immigration, blaming them of being the keepers of the status quo and failing 
to adapt to a more regulated migratory framework. Some scholars have 
criticized the role of elites in keeping Dominican salaries depressed, while 
hiring Haitian people, who often are willing to take harder jobs for meager 
salaries. Hence, elites carry a great deal of responsibility on both sides of 
Hispaniola. In an in-depth interview, Luis Alberto Reynoso, from the 
Association of Development of the Frontier Region, described the role of the 
elites in promoting racial prejudices against the population of the Dominican 
Republic.352
Bearing in mind that currently Haiti currently is incapable of 
effectively exercising sovereignty over its national territory without the 
support of the international community, one must consider the burden that 
this places on its closest neighboring country. In looking at Haitian and 
Dominican relations, the study argues that in the process of nation-building 
of the Dominican Republic, two elements became critical to differentiate 
 He asserts that Haitians are taught in from very early education 
that Dominicans are the culprits of centuries of mistreatment and annexation 
of their territories. 
                                                 
352 Interview with Luis Alberto Reynoso, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 
2005. 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio 
Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 176. 
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themselves from anything Haitian: color and language.353
Ray Guevara underscores the lack of institutions in Haiti. He suggests 
that this weakness of the Haitian state poses a threat to the Dominican 
Republic and that the latter is not able to absorb the burden. He points out 
the role of the international community and the need for Haitian elites to act 
responsibly in dealing with the problems the Haitian nation faces.
 Events followed 
with the Trujillo regime, the “Dominicanization” of the frontier, the massacre 
of 1937, and the permanent migration of Haitian nationals to the Dominican 
Republic in pursuit of jobs, food, and stability.  
354
Our fourth assumption suggested that the process of nation-building 
and citizenship had a profound impact of the exclusion of race as a dimension 
of a new democratic definition of citizenship. As we have noted elsewhere in 
this chapter, the construction of nation and what constitutes 
“Dominicanness” were a central feature of the Trujillo dictatorship. He was 
able to bring together national values, a sense of belongingness, common 
goals, and a new direction to Dominican society. These values were imposed 
from the top down in a way that did not tolerate any kind of dissent or 
deviation from what the state imposed. Hence, the identification of the 
Dominican Republic as a nation has been clearly linked to that period. Also, 
the issue of race become secondary and only serves the goal to differentiate 
 
                                                 
353 Ibid. 
 
354 Interview with Milton Ray Guevara held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 
September 2009. 
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the Dominican Republic from Haiti. Therefore, race became “homogenous” in 
a country clearly shaped by Haitian immigration, altering perceptions and 
attitudes vis-à-vis the incoming population. The transition in the late 1970s, 
however, promised a more inclusive and democratic understanding of 
citizenship. The incumbent PRD, the first governing party of the transition, 
came to power with the firm promise to achieve social and political equality, 
with the promotion of civil and political liberties. After assessing more than 
three decades following the transition, new challenges begin to arise if a new 
understanding of citizenship is to be achieved in the country. Yet, the 
findings have shown that still the notion of citizenship still is related to the 
neglect of the race issue as an integrative part of the life of Dominicans.  
In other words, Dominicans still construct their nationality in 
contraposition to what they neglect themselves to be, rather than looking into 
what they really are. This explains, at least in part, why the Dominican 
political elite remain reluctant to provide a solid legal framework for the 
treatment of illegal immigration and for Haitians born in the Dominican 
Republic. Also, we need to acknowledge that the Haitian state does carry a 
burden by overlooking the fate of their nationals in their neighboring 
country. A complex variety of economic, social, and political interests has 
worked against political elites of both sides of Hispaniola to change the status 
quo.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter tested the argument that the absence of the treatment of 
race and ethnic allegiances during the early democratic transition of the 
Dominican Republic impacted the nature of the democratization process in 
the country. The first assumption laid out in this dissertation argued that 
race was considered a dividing factor among groups united against a common 
authoritarian enemy during the early democratic transition.  
Data extracted from interviews and focus groups in the Dominican 
Republic reveal that race was not even considered a “factor” in the democratic 
agenda of the late 1970s. This finding is somewhat surprising in a country 
characterized by entrenched racial relations not only vis-à-vis Haiti, its 
neighboring country, but also in terms of everything not considered white and 
Hispanic within the country. 
How it is possible that the treatment of race was an absent factor 
during the initial democratic transition? In a country where insularity and 
geopolitical conditions so deeply configured racial and social divisiveness 
between Dominican Republic and Haiti, how did race become so underplayed 
by political and economic elites? All interviews and focus groups held in the 
Dominican Republic suggest that race was not important in the late 1970s. 
Several reasons account for this, including the need to eliminate 
authoritarian processes and to define the repositories of political power, i.e., 
political parties. Why did Dominican political and economic elites succeed in 
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their discourses pitting against Dominicans and Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic maintaining a limited definition of citizenship? If race and ethnicity 
were absent during the aforementioned period, how do we explain its 
resurgence in the 1990s against the leadership of Jose Francisco Peña 
Gomez? 
This dissertation argues that not dealing with racial issues during the 
transition had numerous consequences in the post-transition or consolidation 
phase. One of the main consequences was an ill-designed migratory policy 
that followed democratization in the country, and resulted in serious 
challenges including issues such as nationality; citizenship; human, civil and 
political rights; and international demands regarding fair treatment to 
Haitian nationals.   
The second assumption posited that ethnic and racial factors were 
clouded by ideologies and class cleavages that perceived the racial question 
as a factor that would disappear as countries became more democratic. 
Continuing the same line of argumentation of my first assumption, because 
ethnic allegiances and race were not even considered as relevant factors 
during the democratization processes, ideological and class cleavages became 
prominent in Dominican politics.  
At the time that many countries in Latin America were undergoing 
repressive military governments and a period of an obscured civil society, the 
Dominican Republic became one of the first countries to embrace democracy 
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with a solid party system that would endure for decades. Hence, political 
parties became the main articulators of societal interests and the main 
keepers of representative democracy. 
 My third assumption was that democratization as spearheaded by the 
middle class political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a 
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e., through 
parties- and not through race, class or ethnicity. This observation is derived 
from the data and the analysis that democratization in the Dominican 
Republic was promoted by the middle class with a bottom-up approach. The 
peasantry also was involved in this process after breaking its alliance with 
the Balaguer regime, supporting the PRD, which became a party with a mass 
spectrum, able to garner support from very different sectors in Dominican 
society.  
Democratization was driven by the middle class political elite who 
understood democracy through parties instead of race, class, or ethnicity. The 
country arrived to the democratic transition of 1978, with a triad of political 
parties that became for many years the articulators and mediators of 
Dominican society’s interests. The PRD, the PLD, and the PRSC functioned 
until recently as a political triadic that disputed the support of Dominicans 
nationals. Only very recently, the Reformism (PRSC) has lost its base of 
support, leaving political contestation in a bipartisan model, the incumbent 
PLD and the PRD.  
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Finally, the fourth assumption claimed that the construction of the 
notion of nation and citizenship had a profound impact on the exclusion of 
race as a dimension of a new democratic definition of citizenship. The data 
reveals that Dominicans have constructed in many dimensions, their 
identity, vis-à-vis Haiti. The dictatorship incarnated by Rafael Leónidas 
Trujillo was the twentieth century’s first attempt to provide a notion of 
“Dominicanness” in the country. As stated elsewhere, this “identity” was 
featured by Hispanic roots, Spanish-speaking language and Catholic 
heritage. However, this identity was imposed from above, geared toward 
unifying the country around core values against a constructed “foreign 
invader.”  
Of course, these notions of citizenship responded to the needs of the 
Trujillo regime, and involved no participation and mobilization of the 
Dominican’s civil society. The state controlled everything in society, and all 
those who acted outside the reach of the state were considered dissidents and 
therefore, subject to repression and assassination. It is with the democratic 
transition of 1978, where a new democratic opening was beginning to be 
crafted by the actors involved in the process. Yet, we need to call the 
attention to the twenty-year period that began in 1978 and continued until 
the late 1990s. It is during the 1990s that we begin to see the consequences of 
the absence of the treatment of race and ethnic allegiances as part of the 
democratic agenda of the late 1970s. The 1990s represent the benchmark of a 
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“revival” of sentiments of antihaitianism and prejudice against not only 
Haitian immigrants in the country, but also Dominicans of Haitian descent.  
The fraudulent 1994 presidential election in which Peña Gomez was 
the target of a dirty, anti-Haitian and racist campaign by Joaquin Balaguer 
stands out as a clear-cut example. This election has tainted Dominican 
politics for decades, and has had very important consequences including the 
reduction of Balaguer’s term to two years instead of four; the reform of the 
constitution, separate elections, administrative and financial independence 
and the creation of the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (which would 
elect the judges instead of them being designated by the senators).355
All in all, the most interesting finding is that in contrast to what was 
expected regarding the impact of the absence of race during the transition in 
a new definition of citizenship in the Dominican Republic, such a 
transformation did not occur. Put differently, Dominican society still 
constructs its identity narratives in a very similar fashion to that promoted 
by the Trujillato. This is not to say that authoritarian values still remain 
strong in Dominican society but it suggests that Haiti still constitutes a valid 
mirror from which to seek differentiation in terms of race and ethnicity. This 
assumption is grounded on the fact that Dominicans are still unable, with 
notable exceptions, to embrace their African ancestries and mixed descent in 
favor of a pure Hispanic and Indian heritage. Although mainstream 
 
                                                 
355 Interview with Milton Ray Guevara, held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,  
September 2009. 
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scholarship has struggled to change these points of view, general perceptions 
are oriented toward an entrenched racial prejudice. This racial prejudice 
halted the formation of a new understanding of citizenship since the 
democratization period initiated in the late 1970s. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation opened with two main research objectives: to 
investigate the absence of race during the democratic transition of the 
Dominican Republic and to analyze the consequences of this absence in the 
following democratization period. This study identified a series of central 
assumptions that were focused on the impact of race, class, ideology, 
representativeness, ethnicity, and nation-building in the Dominican 
democratization process.  
This concluding chapter revisits these assumptions, the findings of the 
study, and finally identifies future challenges for research on 
democratization. 
This study tested the following assumptions:  
 
- Assumption 1: Race was considered a dividing factor among groups 
united against a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early 
democratic transitions. 
- Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were obscured by more salient 
ideological disputes and evident class cleavages. Actors perceived the 
racial question as a factor that would disappear as countries became 
more democratic. 
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- Assumption 3: Democratization, as spearheaded by the middle class 
political elite, perceived race as a secondary issue to the construction of 
a representative democracy where representation was political –i.e. 
through parties- and not through race, class, or ethnicity. 
- Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship 
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new 
democratic definition of citizenship. 
Findings 
One of the general findings of this study is that the discussion of race 
was completely absent from the political agenda during the democratic 
transition of the Dominican Republic. Yet, in contrast to conventional 
wisdom, the reason for this absence does not seem related to the drive of 
Dominican society to fight a common authoritarian enemy and avoid 
divisions in society. Instead, the explanation rests with the underestimation 
of race and ethnicity during the Trujillato and Balaguer period that followed, 
in which the “homogenization” of the Dominican population led to the neglect 
of the issue of race as a structural layer of Dominican society. In other words, 
the treatment of race was manipulated by both governments as a valuable 
instrument for the constitution of a Dominican nationality separate and 
contrasting to Haiti. On the domestic political battlefront, race and ethnicity 
were ignored and underestimated during the early transition. 
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I assumed in this dissertation that ethnic and racial factors were 
clouded by class and ideological cleavages which perceived that racial issues 
would disappear as the country became more democratic. While the issues of 
race and ethnicity certainly were absent from the democratization agenda, 
the issue of class took the same path. As Dore argued, the notion of “class” 
was introduced into the Dominican political debate by Juan Bosch, who 
transformed the discussion between the so-called “Trujillistas” and “anti-
Trujillistas” that prevailed following the assassination of the dictator. In the 
end, the key question in the national debate was which group held the 
economic resources and which group didn’t.356
Joaquin Balaguer, who ruled the country for twelve years (1966-1978) 
until the political liberalization that occurred in 1978, became one the most 
prominent leaders of the twentieth century despite having been a major 
player in the Trujillo dictatorship, with active roles in different positions. 
Under Balaguer, the treatment of the racial narratives that were structural 
  
The PRD, hence, became the party of the masses, the one that 
committed to reach all classes with a multi-oriented agenda, including social 
and political rights, education, health, transparency and equality. It was a 
political party inspired in years of political exile, with prominent 
international exposure through its relation with the social democratic 
Socialist International movement.  
                                                 
356 Ibid. 
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to the construction of the Dominican nationality was not different than that 
under Trujillo. Following “el Corte,”357
Trujillo and Balaguer succeeded in conveying the perception of an 
indigenous and Hispanic legacy, a firm cult to Catholicism, and the 
veneration of the Spanish language. Their discourse, initiated by Trujillo and 
later continued by Balaguer, was geared toward the ethnic homogenization of 
the Dominican society, dismissing and neglecting all elements that fell 
outside of what was considered normalcy. If we examine the second part of 
my second assumption which argues that racial factors would disappear as 
the country became more democratic, clearly this has yet to be the result of 
the democratization process of the Dominican Republic. Ethnicity and race 
are structural factors, entwined in a complex myriad of factors that 
intervened in the nation-building process of the country. The paradox of race 
in the Dominican Republic is that it was both everything and absent from the 
 Dominican civil society returned to its 
dormancy. Although race still constituted an obvious structural element of 
Dominican life, it was completely obscured, dismissed and denied by all 
principal social and political actors. 
                                                 
357 This is the name by which the massacre of 1937 is known. As noted in earlier chapters, 
Trujillo ordered the assassination of thousands of Haitians and Dominicans with Haitian 
descent. This ruthless decision was allegedly enforced by Dominican soldiers who asked 
Haitians they encountered to pronounce the world “parsley”, a challenging world to 
pronounce for Franco-phones or Creole-speaking people. As has been the norm in other 
massacres worldwide, Dominican soldiers later explained that they had to get completely 
drunk to comply with the dictator’s orders. Although the numbers of victims of this horrible 
crime are still being contested, it is estimated that 6,000 people died in this massacre, 
including women and children. This number could have been much higher if Dominicans had 
not helped Haitians escaping from the military squads. See Bernardo Vega, En la Década 
Perdida (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1991), 212-214. 
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Dominican reality after the late 1970s. Also, we need to understand that the 
Dominican Republic is a very clientelistic and neopatrimonial polity. And in a 
country where political actors engage in a zero-sum game, race and politics 
become conflated in the Dominican reality. One vivid experience was the 
racial tint that invaded the electoral campaign of 1994, impeding the access 
to the presidency for Jose Francisco Peña Gomez. When no major issues could 
be raised against a qualified and charismatic candidate, the major source of 
attacks centered on his Haitian descent. On the other hand, and as every 
politician in the country, Peña Gomez was surrounded in the campaign by 
numerous rumors, involving international ties to illegal networks as well as 
the attacks on his Haitian origins. We need to recall here that the Haitian 
prejudice against Peña Gomez was grounded on the fact that his biological 
parents were Haitians (some have even claimed that his parents were 
assassinated during Trujillo’s massacre in 1937). Looking at constitutional 
constraints to run for office for Dominicans of Haitian descent, the Dominican 
Constitution stipulated that children born to foreigners “in transit” are not 
Dominicans and cannot run for any office. As mentioned in earlier chapters, 
this issue has sparked a heated debate on what is considered to be “in 
transit,” especially for Dominicans of Haitian descent and children born in 
the Dominican Republic who may never have lived or visited Haiti. It must 
also be acknowledged that mulattos and light-skinned Dominican blacks have 
served as presidents of the Dominican Republic, including Ulises Heureaux, 
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Rafael Trujillo, and even Leonel Fernandez. Yet, all three neglected their 
mixed descent and considered themselves to be “Indian.” This self-
identification speaks of the difficulty of Dominicans to transcend nationalistic 
discourses put in place during the Trujillato that neglect any kind of African 
descent in the Dominican population. For the 1994 election, Peña Gomez was 
in a favorable position to win the presidential bid, as well-documented public 
opinion polls showed at the time. But it appears that the underlying issue in 
the 1994 presidential election was not about eliminating a black man from 
achieving office but more about preventing a person of direct Haitian 
ancestry from reaching the presidency.  
Assumption three suggested that democratization in the Dominican 
Republic was spearheaded by a middle class political elite who understood 
that representative democracy was political -through parties- where race, 
class, and ethnicity played a secondary role. Chapter 5 dealt extensively with 
the democratization process in the Dominican Republic, the historical role 
and leverage of political parties, and how party identification shaped the 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the late 1970s. 
Dominicans agree on the crucial role of political parties in the Dominican 
reality.358
                                                 
358 Focus groups held on September 2009 in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican 
Republic. 
 
 Parties became critical for laying the foundations of the democratic 
experience, both at the institutional and informal arenas.  
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At the institutional level, parties were the main articulators of societal 
interests. In a society still deeply affected by the downfall of the Trujillato 
experience, political parties contributed to the framework for an orderly 
transition for the Dominican society. In regard to the informal arena, parties 
become the unequivocal ground for contested interests, recruitment and 
propaganda diffusion. In this context; race, ethnicity, and class were 
completely obscured by the ascendancy of political parties, and representative 
democracy came to be understood as political contestation by parties 
institutionally organized to convey and articulate society’s interests. In fact, 
considering the zero-sum nature of Dominican politics and the high stakes 
during the 1994-96 period it could be argued that the interests were oriented 
not only to prevent a person of direct Haitian ancestry from reaching the 
presidency but also to halt the PRD from returning to office.359
Finally, my fourth assumption claimed that the construction of nation 
and citizenship had a deep impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a 
new democratic definition of citizenship. Here, the research reveals mixed 
results. The nation-building process initiated under the Trujillato in which a 
particular notion of nation and citizenship was delineated, was a framework 
  
                                                 
359 The PRD lost an important opportunity in 1978 to deliver its campaign promises. On the 
one hand, the Guzman administration ended up with a veil of suspicion on corruption 
charges, and President Guzman committed suicide in his office. On the other hand, president 
Salvador Jorge Blanco faced many social and economic challenges which debilitated his 
administration. Also, his government was filled with corruption scandals and he ended up in 
jail on corruption charges. These missed opportunities gave space to the reelection of Joaquin 
Balaguer in 1986. 
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that eluded the notion of race and ethnicity for the purpose of homogenizing 
the Dominican population. Yet, race became relevant to draw what 
“Dominicanness” meant externally; in other words, in contrast to the Haitian 
neighbor. This perception of nation and citizenship, -or to put differently-, 
who belongs and who doesn’t, has not changed dramatically since the 
downfall of the Trujillo regime. This is not to say that the Dominican 
Republic still revolves around a pervasive racial prejudice against the 
Haitian population living in the country. It implies that in the end, 
democratization has done little to expand citizenship in the Dominican 
Republic. 
To some extent, the fact that Haitians are part of the permanent 
landscape in industries such as agriculture, construction, tourism, and more 
as street salespeople has made the race component more visible in the 
Dominican Republic. So far, it has been impossible to fully control the flow of 
illegal immigrants, and yet, as in the U.S., there is a strong sense that the 
only way to target undocumented Haitians is to go after employers who hire 
them. This connects with the central argument of this dissertation that 
argues that the absence of race during the democratic transition responds to 
vested political and economic interests to prevent more democratic 
citizenship regimes. The issue of children born to Haitian parents in the 
Dominican Republic is still unsolved and remains confusing under the new 
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Constitution of the Dominican Republic, which has gone in effect since 
January 2010.  
The Dominican experience highlights how the failure to design and 
apply a coherent migratory policy resulted in the very large presence of 
individuals born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian descent, who are 
vulnerable and do not belong to either Haiti nor the Dominican Republic. 
This state of affairs not only deprives these sectors from civil, political, 
economic, and social rights but also works against the development of a more 
mature and inclusive democracy in the Dominican Republic. This situation 
has been ignited by contradictory forces such as a business sector that profits 
from a large, cheap, disciplined and available labor force, and neo-
nationalists groups360
                                                 
360 Carlos Dore Cabral defines neo-nationalists as a group of individuals, including 
intellectuals, lawyers, politicians, communicators and members of civic organizations, unified 
around the idea that Haiti’s proximity and migratory process is the main threat for the 
Dominican Republic. See Carlos Dore Cabral. 2006. “Lo Nuevo y lo Viejo en la Inmigración 
Haitiana.” GLOBAL, 3, (8) (Enero- Febrero), 5-10. 
 that provide a nationalistic ideological framework that 
hides racial prejudice but whose aim is to eliminate all Haitian presence in 
the country. 
In the final analysis, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic carry the 
burden of encountering solutions to end networks of corruption throughout 
the border, strengthen their institutional channels, and apply consistent 
migratory policies to smooth the democratic process and enhance the quality 
of living of their respective populations. 
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Implications of the Study 
This dissertation has many implications for the study of race and 
democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean and elsewhere. 
Democratic transitions in the region have sparked a great deal of attention 
since the 1970s. Yet, explanations have been focused on elite dynamics, 
economic development, diffusion effect, regime collapse and foreign 
intervention. Mainstream literature has come short in achieving a multi-
dimensional approach to democratization. With the aim of filling part of this 
gap, this study has demonstrated that race and ethnicity, - structural factors 
of every society-, have been overlooked in the democratic debates. This 
absence has affected both the negotiating terms of the transition as well as 
the expansion of citizenship. 
The theoretical and empirical findings have shown that the cost of 
overlooking such important factors have negatively impacted the nature of 
democracy in the Dominican Republic. In fact, the findings demonstrated 
that democratization has had mixed results in the region. These processes 
revolved around three main drivers: eliminate military governments, halt 
authoritarian processes and identify the repositories of power (political 
parties). The focus on elite-centered approaches has precluded a broader 
understanding of transitions as well as the post-transition or consolidation 
periods. The findings from the Dominican Republic should contribute to other 
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studies on race and democratization and raise important theoretical research 
questions for students of democratization. 
 
Future Research 
This study has shown that democratization has done little to expand 
citizenship in the Dominican Republic. Political and economic elites have 
challenged democratizing processes by maintaining a limited definition of 
citizenship since the beginning of the democratization period. The research 
demonstrates that race was absent from the democratic debate during the 
transition period. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the findings show that 
the reasons for this absence were not a result of the need to eliminate 
authoritarian processes in the country.  
The research suggests that both the Dominican and Haitian states 
carry the burden of ill-designed migratory policies that led to an unprotected 
migration that has multiple consequences.  
An obvious limitation of the research has been the lack of consistent 
quantitative data regarding the impact of race on democracy. Race has been 
overlooked by mainstream literature as an independent variable in the 
process of democratization and needs to be taken into account as one of the 
structural layers of democratic transitions. 
Future lines of inquiry should delve into cross-national studies across 
the Latin American region and elsewhere. Especially appealing is the 
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comparison with reverse nation-building, where race and ethnicity 
determined the pace of the democratic transition in heterogeneous societies. 
It also would be interesting to examine comparative studies in countries 
where the racial phenomenon is not only African Diaspora populations. In the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, the countries in the Andes with a large 
presence of indigenous groups are appealing cases to investigate the impact 
of race on democratization. Cross-regionally, this research could be expanded 
with a study of the absence of race in the democratization process of 
European countries, looking at why other issues prevailed and were 
addressed long before the question of race and ethnic allegiances became a 
major issue. 
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Postscript 
 
 
 On January 12, 2010 at 16.53 in the afternoon a devastating 
earthquake category 7.0 in the Richter scale left in ruins the capital city of 
Haiti, Port-Au-Prince and its outskirts. The seismic hazard is difficult to 
perceive because of the long period of seismic silence between one event of 
great magnitude and other, in the case of Haiti, this period exceeds between 
150 and 200 years. 
This event of natural characteristics overlaps with conditions of 
extreme vulnerability, as a result of high levels of exposure and extreme 
poverty in Haiti. The event took by surprise not only the international 
community but also the inhabitants of the center-west of the Island of 
Hispaniola, who have to struggle daily to survive in a country with a fragile 
and inchoate institutionalism, rampant corruption and an absence of basic 
livelihoods. 
The Haitian State has been frequently considered a predatory state, 
condemning the Haitian population to a permanent condition of despair, 
poverty and inequity. Yet, the nation has endured and developed to a 
surprising level of resilience that allowed it to survive, developing a sense of 
belonging as well as maintaining an identity as a nation, with profound 
values transmitted from generations to generations since 1804, year in which 
they declared as the first “black” republic in the American continent.  
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The devastating January, 12 earthquake took place during the 
publication phase of this study. The location and magnitude of the impact not 
only in Haiti, but specifically in the Dominican Republic, led to include this 
last section in the study. More specifically, this section is aimed at examining 
at the possible repercussions of this devastating natural event in the way 
race is shaped in the Island of Hispaniola within the democratization context 
of the Dominican Republic. 
In spite of the unquestionable dimension of the event, the collapse of 
the information systems and the focalization of attention in providing 
response to the victims, weeks after the earthquake, there are no certain 
facts that would allow to a clear estimation of the damage. 
The earthquake left an incalculable human loss. Prime Minister Jean 
Max Bellerive estimates the death toll in more than 212,000,361
                                                 
361 Listin, “Los Muertos Se Cifran Ya en 212.000,” Section Las Mundiales, February 5, 2010, 
 without 
taking into account the bodies still beneath the rubble, and the bodies buried 
by families. In terms of economic damage, it is estimated that the disaster 
event impacted at least the equivalent of the 70% of the Haitian GDP, 
affecting not only the capital and outskirts but also extending the damage 
into the rest of the country.  
http://www.listindiario.com/app/article.aspx?id=130532. The Prime Minister notes that over 
a million people are now homeless due to the impact of the disaster; this number could 
increase up to two million if we take into consideration the population living in the streets 
prior to the earthquake on January 12, 2010. 
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Two weeks after the seismic event, rescue efforts were halted and the 
attention turned its focus to humanitarian aid, access to clean water, health 
attention and improvised refuges that garner all the attention of the poor 
Haitian institutionalism and the overwhelming presence of the international 
community (also affected by the earthquake). Serious security and 
coordination deficiencies persist, limiting the mentioned efforts, aimed still to 
the response and early rehabilitation. 
It is not surprising then, that the Haitian earthquake has created a 
series of consequences of multiple dimensions in the Dominican Republic, 
raising scenarios that have not yet been sufficiently examined. 
As the results of the focus groups have shown in previous chapters of 
this study, Dominicans perceived that health and education services were 
overwhelmed in the country due to the Haitian presence. The January 12 
disaster event collapsed the demand for these services in Port-Au-Prince, at 
the time where all capabilities were devastated in the urban center of the 
country. Therefore, Dominican Republic became the immediate option of 
reception of a great number of sick people, orphan children and Haitians who 
in this circumstance see a short term solution to respond to its perishable 
humanitarian necessities and a unique opportunity to cross the border, 
abandoning the scene of a devastated country and taking advantage of more 
relaxed migratory controls. 
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Following three weeks after the January 12, earthquake, preliminary 
data reveals that at least 35,000 people362
                                                 
362 Preliminary estimates and data from the Ministry of Police and Interior, Dominican 
Republic.  
 have cross the border into 
Dominican Republic. Having into consideration that some of them will return 
to Haiti, others, will probably stay in the Dominican Republic in the quest of 
better opportunities. The migratory issue with a complex history in the island 
of Hispaniola will increase the demographic burden in the Dominican 
Republic. Migratory movements, legal and illegal are likely to generate an 
overwhelming burden on the already compromised migratory system. It is 
often estimated that between 700,000 and 1,000,000 Haitian people live in 
the Dominican Republic. We need to note that certain economic and political 
elites have been widely benefitted from this labor in diverse economic sectors, 
often willing to work for poor salaries and being easier to follow directions, in 
comparison to local labor.  
On the other hand, the Dominican state has demonstrated a limited 
capacity (or a lack of will) to provide a comprehensive solution to the access of 
nationality for the Haitian population and its descendants. Consecutive 
governments from the democratic transition of 1978 have avoided dealing 
with the issue responsibly, halting the extension of civil, political and 
economic rights to a population of great leverage in the country’s 
development. 
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Therefore, the disaster event that devastated Haiti transcends the 
frontier and touches very sensitive issues adding to the already complex 
coexistence of both countries of Hispaniola. It is worth noting that the 
Dominican Republic has responded rapidly and effectively in providing 
humanitarian aid, collaborating in Haiti with health and emergency 
management personnel. It has also opened in Dominican territory all 
hospitals and emergency centers to the Haitians in need. President Leonel 
Fernandez was the first president to visit the affected area and the country 
served as center of operations both for international aid as well as logistic 
distribution of resources.  
In addition, Dominican Republic hosted the Summit for the 
Reconstruction of Haiti, event that convoked presidents of all over the world 
to design possible reconstruction scenarios for Haiti. More recently, 
Dominicans have reinforced their military forces in the border to avoid 
massive and uncontrolled migrations in Dominican territory. It is not 
surprising that the old fear of the “peaceful invasion” historically entrenched 
in Dominican society since the era of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo and Joaquin 
Balaguer, could become exacerbated by sectors of Dominican society, 
interested in maintain and strengthen racist attitudes against the population 
of the neighboring country. Taking it to an extreme, neo-nationalists sector 
could inflame the discourse of the “threat” of a transformation of Dominican 
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racial composition, in regard to color and physical appearance, reviving 
apocryphal precepts of the scientific racism of the nineteenth century. 
It is worth noting that the immense reconstruction effort for Haiti does 
not depend solely on the international community but also in the Haitian 
population. In a recent interview, the Chief of the United Nations Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH), Edmond Mulet, emphasized the need to modify the way 
in which the international community has been working in Haiti, and at the 
same time stressed the fact that Haitians need to assume their 
responsibilities.363
Among the main challenges affecting the international community, the 
following stand out: lack of coordination, difficulty in reaching effectively 
resources, and the great number of non-governmental organizations that act 
in isolation, avoiding the little coordination mechanisms in place and 
contributing to the crisis of information.
 
364
It is evident that the reconstruction of Haiti is a matter of great 
importance for the national interests of the Dominican Republic. In addition 
to the humanitarian support there is a clear intention to contribute to the 
stabilization of the country, reducing the dimensions of the exodus. An 
example of this has been the agreement on January 21st, between President 
  
                                                 
363 Listin, “Jefe ONU en Haití Reclama a Comunidad Internacional Cambios en Forma de 
Trabajar Allí”, Section Las Mundiales, February 4, 2010 
<http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=130405>  
 
364 Ibid.  
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Preval and the Dominican government to receive one hundred and fifty 
Dominican soldiers to reinforce the humanitarian corridor that unites the 
capital cities of Port-Au-Prince and Santo Domingo.365
“…We have to convene that Haiti was already, a 
pressure cooker before the earthquake. Now, that 
pressure cooker has exploded. The pressure in the 
Dominican-Haitian border is greater than ever as the 
humanitarian crisis in Port-Au-Prince inexorably 
extends to the eastern part of the island…”
 In a recent interview 
regarding the commitment of the international community and Dominican 
Republic with the Haitian situation, Carlos Morales Troncoso, Secretary of 
State of External Relations, noted that: 
366
“…the Dominican Republic will respond as it has always 
did with its occidental neighbor, with all of its heart and 
with the hands open. But we are conscious that neither 
our heart nor our hands are sufficiently big to deal with 
the problems that Haiti faces. There is a need of the 
world’s help but also there is a need of a new 
international commitment of help for the days ahead, 
 
 
 In concordance with the results of the interviews and focus groups 
conducted for this study which found that Dominicans perceived the Haitian 
situation as a “burden” on Dominicans shoulders, Morales Troncoso continues 
emphasizing the limitations of the Dominican Republic in regard to its 
humanitarian aid capabilities and recalls the need of a firm and sustained 
international commitment with Haiti: 
                                                 
365 Clave Digital, “R.D. Coordina con la ONU el Despliegue de sus Tropas en Haití,” National 
Section, February 4, 2010 
http://www.clavedigital.com/App_Pages/Noticias/Noticias.aspx?Id_Articulo=27547 
 
366 Listin, “La Respuesta a la Tragedia Ocurrida en Haití el 12 de enero,” Section Points of 
View, February 5, 2010, http://www.listindiario.com/app/article.aspx?id=130516   
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when the magnitude of the problems in Haiti turned 
less evident…”367
In addition, it should be emphasized that the earthquake occurred two 
weeks prior to the proclamation of the new Dominican Constitution. Although 
this event may be considered a mere coincidence, its analysis must not be 
overlooked in the months ahead. The new Constitution proclaimed on 
January 26th, 2010 was set to combine the judicial doctrines of “jus solis” and 
“jus sanguinis.” Yet, the final redaction of the nationality clause, however, 
does not openly recognize the right to access the Dominican nationality to 
people with Haitian descent, for being in “transit” status. This issue has been 
discussed in previous chapters, and had generated a heated debate among 
organizations of Dominican civil society, non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations. Taking into consideration the impact of the 
migratory movement from Haiti into Dominican territory, the new 
 
 
Yet, there are sectors in the Dominican Republic that believe in the 
need to actively participate in the reconstruction of the country to contribute 
to a future of political, economic and social stability; other groups, specifically 
political and economic elites, depend on the Haitian labor, which is not only 
uncontrolled (in general terms) but also does not possess the mechanism to 
access neither to the Dominican nationality nor to a more inclusive 
citizenship within the context of democratization. 
                                                 
367 Ibid. 
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Constitution imposes new barriers to the legalization of migratory status 
process and leaves the children with Haitian descent, with an undetermined 
situation that prevents their future development.  
The Dominican state has today, a unique opportunity to deal 
responsibly with the migration dilemma, -historically postponed since the 
initiation of the transition-, putting in practice mechanisms aimed at 
eliminating racial perceptions that hurt the quality of Dominican democracy. 
Today Haiti is on the brink. The reconstruction not only relies upon 
international humanitarian aid (including Dominican Republic) to reach its 
physical recovery, but also depends on the firm and sustained decision to 
construct the necessary bases to re-create a Haitian state. A state not only 
with the power to hold the legitimate use of force but also a Haitian state in 
conditions to generate work, resources and development opportunities for a 
population decimated for years of failed policies, administrative disarray and 
natural disasters. Finally, a self-sufficient state; institutionally solid; where 
all the rights of the Haitian population are fully respected. 
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